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European Union sugar policies hamper global efforts to reduce poverty. Export subsidies are 
used to dump 5 million tonnes of surplus sugar annually on world markets, destroying 
opportunities for exporters in developing countries. Meanwhile, producers in Africa have 
limited access to EU markets. The winners from the CAP sugar regime are big farmers and 
corporate sugar refiners such as Sudzucker and British Sugar. The losers are the poor. 
 
         Oxfam, from the report ‘Dumping on the World’ 
 
 
 
Oxfam does indeed have its own ’area of work’, just like the Jubilee debt relief campaign 
some years ago, but I have my reservations about it. It’s too much like when Kelloggs 
introduces a new brand of cornflakes. Oxfam takes up issues that aren’t really very new in the 
EU political process and present them as ’new’. 
    
Poul Nielson, EU Development Commissioner 2000-2004 
 
 
 
The aspirational research answer to ‘Are you interested in the developing world?’ is ‘Yes’. 
The real answer is ‘No’. 
 Vin Ray, Executive Editor, Newsgathering, BBC
 i
Abstrakt (in Danish) 
Fortalervirksomhed for forandring af de strukturelle årsager til fattigdom, såsom ulige 
internationale handelsregler, er blevet udbredt i de seneste år blandt NGOer i Nord. Denne 
specialeafhandlings case er således Oxfam Internationals forsøg på at influere reformen af den 
Europæiske Unions markedsordning for sukker, som har været stærkt kritiseret for at forvride 
international sukkerhandel. Oxfams mål har været at sikre sukkereksporterende 
udviklingslande en passende sukkerpris i EU, større markedsadgang, samt at alle 
eksportsubsidier og sukkerdumping blev stoppet. Oxfams primære strategi har været at opnå 
synlighed i medierne for at lægge pres på Kommissionen og de enkelte medlemsstater, i 
særdeleshed Storbritannien. Nyinstitutionel teori og teorier om massemediers effekter er brugt 
til at strukturere analysen af Oxfams påvirkning af medierne og kæde den sammen med 
forandringer i den politiske retorik og sukkermarkedslovgivning fra 2002-2005. Dækning i 3 
store britiske medier og et omfattende udvalg af primærkilder fra både England og 
Kommissionen i årene 1999-2005 har dannet det empiriske fundament for analysen og blev 
suppleret med interviews. Der blev påvist stærk og positiv synlighed for Oxfams budskab i 
The Guardian, hvilket kunne forklares med relevansen, som denne type historie havde for 
avisen. På BBC News var synligheden lav, da historier om udviklingsproblemer generelt får 
lave seertal, og fordi der ikke er sendetid nok til at dække komplekse problemstillinger. I The 
Daily Telegraph synes den politiske sympati overfor landmænds interesser at have været en 
forklaring på den lave interesse for kampagnen. Retorikken fra England og fra Kommissionen 
forblev konsistent i hele perioden, hvor der blev tilkendegivet preferencer for substantielle 
prissænkninger, at beholde Everything But Arms traktaten for markedsadgang uændret og for 
at stoppe eksportsubsidier, hvor kun sidstnævnte matchede Oxfam’s krav til fulde. Men 
budgetkriser og afgørelser i WTOs handelsretspanel omkring eksportsubsidier var også 
afgørende i forhold til at få EU til at gøre indrømmelser på dette område. Generelt har den 
lave indflydelsesgrad fra Oxfam selv skyldtes den lave mediedækning, men også det neo-
liberale økonomiske paradigmes stigende dominans indenfor landbrugsområdet, hvilket igen 
har været drevet frem af ønsket om at skabe en mere konkurrencedygtig europæisk 
fødevareindustri. Det var også resultatet af en årelang svækkelse af de korporative bånd 
mellem Kommission og landbrugssektoren, hvis krav om moderate prissænkninger 
paradoksalt nok faldt sammen med kravene fra mange udviklingslande, som nød godt af EUs 
fordelsordninger på importområdet. Til sidst var også den relative politiske enhed og 
sikkerhed omkring sukkerpolitikken, koblet med Oxfams vanskeligheder ved på den ene side 
at fremstille EUs høje priser som et problem og på den anden side argumentere for 
nødvendigheden af ikke at sænke dem for meget, ikke et særligt attraktivt konflikt-scenarie 
for mange medier. Til trods for åbenlyse vanskeligheder i forhold til at opnå politisk 
indflydelse via medierne, så har Oxfams kampagne ikke desto mindre positioneret  
organisationen som en meget synlig spiller i diskussionerne om EUs handels- og 
landbrugspolitik, som både ministre og kommissærerer hele tiden forholder sig til.  
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Abstract 
Advocacy for the change of structural causes of poverty, such as skewed international trade 
rules, have become widespread in recent years amongst Northern NGOs. The case of this 
thesis has thus been Oxfam International’s attempt to influence the reform of the European 
Union’s sugar policies, which have been strongly criticised for distorting world sugar trade. 
Oxfam’s aims were to secure developing country exporters a remunerative EU sugar price, 
greater market access and an end to all EU export subsidies and sugar dumping. Oxfam’s 
primary strategy was to gain media visibility to put pressure on the Commission and 
individual member states, particularly the United Kingdom. New institutional theory and 
mass media effects theory was used to structure the analysis of Oxfam’s impact in the media 
and link this to changes in political rhetoric and in sugar market legislation from 2002-2005. 
Coverage in 3 large UK media outlets and a diverse sample of primary documents from the 
UK and Commission 1999-2005 formed the empirical basis of the analysis and were 
supplemented with interviews. It showed strong and positive visibility for Oxfam’s message 
in the Guardian, attributable to the significance this type of story had for the newspaper. In the 
BBC News visibility was low because development stories generally attract low ratings, and 
because of little airtime for complex issues. For the Daily Telegraph political sympathy 
towards sugar farmer interests appear to have been one explanation for low interest in the 
campaign. The UK and the Commission’s rhetoric remained firm throughout the period, 
indicating preferences for substantial price reductions, retaining the Everything but Arm’s 
market access agreement unaltered and stopping export subsidisation, where only the latter 
matched Oxfam’s demands fully. Even so budget crises and WTO rulings on subsidised 
exports also prompted the EU to make concessions on export subsidies. In general the low 
impact of Oxfam itself was due to low media visibility, but also the increasing dominance of a 
liberal paradigm on agricultural reform thinking spurred by agendas of building a more 
competitive EU foods industry. It was also the result of a decade-long erosion of corporative 
relations between the Commission and the farming sector, whose demands for moderate price 
reductions paradoxically coincided with those of many developing countries dependent on EU 
import preferences. Lastly, relative political unity and policy certainty on the sugar issue, 
coupled with Oxfam’s difficulties in framing the EU’s fixed prices as both problematic and 
necessary to preserve never presented a particularly attractive conflict-scenario for the media. 
Despite the obvious difficulties for gaining political influence via the media, Oxfam’s 
campaign has nevertheless established it as a vocal player in discussions of EU trade and 
agricultural policy, which both UK ministers and Commissioners continually respond to. 
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Foreword 
This thesis has been a work in progress for a long time. Due to unforeseen circumstances in 
my private life it has proven a very demanding task to finish it. I am therefore very happy that 
it is finally so, even if a thesis, like most other early academic works in reality is of little 
consequence in the larger scheme of things. But to me personally it has been of great 
importance to finish what I started. The single case alone covers an intricate network of multi-
level actors, institutions and events ranging from the local to the global, though, and thus the 
present analysis only partially captures the complexity of the research field. I do however 
hope that it can serve as a road map of some usefulness for future researchers. A map does not 
equal the territory itself as everyone knows, but a good map provides useful guiding lines for 
navigation in the territory. I hope therefore to have contributed to an understanding of how to 
approach the research of media impact on European agricultural and trade politics and the role 
NGOs may play in this. I would like to thank all the people who generously devoted some of 
their time to be interviewed for this thesis, in particular the staff at Oxfam. Any errors and 
omissions are of course my responsibility alone. 
 
Ulrik Kristiansen  
Copenhagen, January 2007 
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 List of acronyms and abbreviations 
ACP = Africa, Caribbean and Pacific countries 
BBC = British Broadcasting Corporation 
BEUC = Bureau Européen de Unions des Consommateurs 
CAFOD = Catholic Agency For Overseas Development 
CAP = Common Agricultural Policy 
COGECA = Confédération Générale des Coopératives Agricoles de l’Union Européenne 
COPA = Comité des Organisations Professionelles Agricoles 
CMO = Common Market Organisation 
CTA = Technical Centre for Agricultural and rural cooperation 
DEFRA = (the UK) Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (since 2001) 
DFID = (the UK) Department for International Development 
DG Agri = Directorate-General of Agriculture 
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EBA = Everything But Arms treaty 
EU = European Union 
EUC = European Commission (abbreviation used for references only) 
GATT = General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs 
GDP = Gross Domestic Product 
HOCA = House of Commons answers (from the UK ministries) 
LDC = Least Developed Country 
MAFF = (the UK) Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (until 2001) 
MP = Member of Parliament 
NFU = National Farmer’s Union (in the UK) 
NGO = Non-Governmental Organisation 
NGDO = Non-Governmental Development Organisation 
SPS = Special Preferential Sugar 
UK = United Kingdom 
UNCTAD = United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
UNDP = United Nations Development Programme 
US = United States 
WTO = World Trade Organisation 
WWF = World Wildlife Fund 
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1. NGOs, the media and politics – a presentation and a case  
 
1.1 Overview 
This chapter introduces the practice known as advocacy and its relations to mass media and 
politics. In advocacy non-governmental development organisations (NGDOs) move away 
from their roles as project coordinators in developing countries1 and try to influence national 
or international political processes that affect developing countries politically, socially and 
economically. One such advocacy initiative is Oxfam International’s2 “Make Trade Fair” 
campaign and its attempts to influence the reform of the European Union’s so-called sugar 
regime, which is the case of this thesis. Sugar is an important export commodity to many 
developing countries, but according to Oxfam they have not been able to fully reap its 
economic potential because of skewed international competition, mainly in the form of the 
high import tariffs and export subsidies of the EU. For lack of political and economic 
resources Oxfam turned to the media in an attempt to influence decision-makers to change the 
regime so developing countries could export more sugar to the EU and face less distorted 
competition in regional markets. The research objective of this thesis is therefore to analyse to 
what extent Oxfam has been successful in using the media to influence one national 
government, the United Kingdom (UK), in its rhetoric, and the EU Commission in its rhetoric 
and in its legislative proposal on sugar reform - and why. 
 
1.2 Advocacy: a new dimension to development work  
NGDOs are no longer just building wells in remote African villages in order to alleviate 
poverty3. Over the past two decades Northern NGDOs have become increasingly involved in 
advocacy, a form of political action that comprises both public campaigning and lobbying to 
influence the actions and policies of consumers, corporations, governments and international 
organisations (Jordan  & van Tuijl 2000, Anderson 2000, Chapman & Fischer 2000, Hudson 
2000, Leipold 2000, Nelson 2000, Davies 2001, Cohen & Watson 2001, Coates and David 
2002). Advocacy in this context differs from lobbying activities of, for example, business 
                                                 
1
 The term ’developing countries’ (or ‘the South’) is used in this thesis to refer to countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America 
and the Pacific that are characterised by low levels of living, high rates of population growth, low income per capita, and 
general economic and technological dependence on developed economies. Thus, the term is not meant to designate a fixed 
category of countries and is obviously open to debate and interpretation. The term ‘development’ has itself been subject to 
numerous interpretations over the years, and some authors criticise the term for being biased towards a type of social and 
economic organisation that exists mostly in the North. (See Martinussen 1997: Chapters 1-3 and Schech & Haggis 2000: 
Chapter 3 for overviews.) 
2
 Oxfam International is mostly referred to as just ‘Oxfam’ in the rest of this thesis.  
3
 In the analytical context of this thesis ‘poverty’ is equated with income poverty. Thus ‘poverty reduction’ refers mainly to 
the creation of income opportunities in developing countries, which are intended to contribute to increasing individual, 
household and enterprise incomes. The definition of poverty reduction should by no means be reduced to this. Other 
important definitions include poverty reduction as human development (UNDP web site); as enhancing human choices and 
capabilities (Sen 1992); as an increase in food intake (Greeley 1997); and as reduction of deprivation as defined by poor 
people themselves (Chambers 1995).  
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groups or trade unions in that NGDOs attempt to advocate not for private economic interests 
or for a domestic constituency, but for interests of population groups in geographically distant 
and often impoverished countries. As Hudson (2000: 4) puts it: “Development NGOs have 
changed their portfolio of activities recognising that traditional ‘operational’ development 
activities often are unsustainable when poor communities find themselves in an unfavourable 
national and international policy environment which is beyond their control” 4.  
 
Thus, through the recent decades both NGDOs and other NGOs (environmental, consumer, 
union, faith-based, etc.) have increasingly sought to influence governments and international 
institutions5. Recent examples of this type of transnational advocacy include the 1996 
campaign for an international ban against landmines (Hubert 2000), the 1998 mobilisation 
against the Multilateral Agreement on Investment  (Kurtz 2002), the 2000 Jubilee debt relief 
campaign (Ringsing & Rasmussen 2003), the campaigns against multinational companies 
(like Nestlé and Nike) to press for improved labour rights (Bullert 2000), the campaigning for 
access to essential medicines, particularly HIV-medicine (Sell & Prakash 2004), the ongoing 
campaigns to influence World Bank policies (Nelson 2001), and the 2002 Trade Justice 
campaign initiated by British-based Christian Aid and the Trade Justice Movement6. Whereas 
some advocacy campaigns have addressed single issues, over the last few years many 
Northern NGDOs have campaigned for structural change. These campaigns have particularly 
been aimed at changing the rules governing international trade that are negotiated in the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO), as some these rules are perceived to perpetuate poverty in 
developing countries7. In this respect Oxfam is one of the NGDOs that has been at the 
forefront of  ‘fair trade’8 advocacy for the last 5 years, where Oxfam’s Make Trade Fair-
campaign “ … is calling on governments, institutions, and multinational companies to change 
the rules so that trade can become part of the solution to poverty, not part of the problem”  
                                                 
4
 Other reasons include: the growing recognition that often Southern NGOs are better placed to carry out project work on the 
ground, leading operational Northern organisations to look for new roles. Also there has been an increase of links between 
ideas of development and human rights and an ongoing desire for public profile among the NGOs. In addition there are 
increasing calls by Southern organisations for Northern NGOs to do more campaign and policy work (Chapman & Fischer, 
2000: 151). 
5
 The term ‘institution’ is here used interchangeably with the term ‘organisation’, although there is a formal difference. In 
brief, the distinction could be defined as this: ‘Institutions are the rules, the organisations are the teams of players’ –  to 
paraphrase an analogy used by prominent institutionalist Douglass North (1990). However, not all rules - or similar ‘guiding 
lines’ for behaviour - are formalised, and there are many different conceptions of institutions, as will be elaborated in chapter 
5. But some political organisations, such as the EU Commission, are usually referred to as ‘institutions’ in common English 
and therefore they are also referred to as such in some parts of this thesis.  
6
 See http://www.tjm.org.uk/ 
7
 See e.g. Said & Desai 2003: 60. 
8
 The term ‘fair trade’ generally comprises two dimensions: 1) A reference to an organised social movement which promotes 
equitable standards for international labour, environmentalism, and social policy in areas related to the production of fair 
trade labelled and unlabelled goods, which may range from handicrafts to agricultural commodities, particularly from 
developing countries; and 2) a slogan or ‘buzz word’ for international trade rules and practices that are either equal for all, or 
incorporate greater attention to the economic needs of developing countries (Wikipedia). Oxfam advocates both dimensions. 
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(Make Trade Fair web site)9.  In sum, advocacy has become an important aspect of 
international development work, and even though the study of advocacy is mainly concerned 
with political, social and economic relations in the North, these can be of profound 
significance to the same relations in the South. Furthermore, the Make Trade Fair-campaign 
constitutes a recent and very prominent example of advocacy activity and is unique, in the 
sense that there haven’t previously been concerted attempts of this scale from NGDOs to 
influence trade and agricultural policy10. It has therefore been selected as a case for this thesis. 
 
1.3 At a glance: The Make Trade Fair campaign 
The call to make trade “part of the solution” to poverty was in effect the main message of the 
Make Trade Fair-campaign that was launched on 11 April 2002. The campaign aims to form a 
global movement of NGOs, grassroots associations, trade unions, consumer groups, 
environmentalists, women’s groups, and others, who commit themselves to work to 
demonstrate “to the greater public and to mass media how unfair trade rules affect daily 
lives” (Oxfam 2003a: 1). Oxfam argues that change of trade rules “is possible” because “the 
international campaign to cancel the debts of poor countries [demonstrated that] public 
action can force the interests of the poor on to the international agenda.” (2002a: 9)11. Stated 
in the campaign’s central policy document, the report ‘Rigged Rules and Double Standards: 
trade, globalisation and the fight against poverty’, is the primary campaign goal of improving 
“market access for poor countries and ending the cycle of subsidized agricultural over-
production and export dumping by rich countries” (Oxfam 2002a: 8)12.   
 
The gist of the argument is that developing countries must have better access to the markets of 
industrialised countries in product areas where they can compete, and that Northern countries 
should stop depressing world prices on a number of agricultural products by exporting their 
own production with subsidies. In terms of fairer trade rules, Oxfam has been concerned with 
a number of different products, such as cotton, maize, clothing and dairy - but especially one 
product market under the European Union’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has been the 
focus of fierce criticism from the Oxfam campaign: the EU Common Market Organisation 
(CMO) for sugar – also called the EU sugar regime. As the author of the first Oxfam briefing 
paper on sugar13, Kate Raworth, put it: ”The problem is that Europe’s Common Agricultural 
Policy in general is destroying livelihoods of poor people in developing countries and the 
                                                 
9
 http://www.maketradefair.com/en/index.php?file=26032002160446.htm&cat=2&subcat=1&select=4. 
10
 Jenny Ricks, Assistant Coordinator for the Trade Justice Movement, e-mail communication. 
11
 It is still a matter of contention whether or not the Jubilee debt-relief campaign was successful. Although, the campaign 
managed to secure write-offs of debt from developed countries, many of these have only been slowly implemented or not at 
all (Greenhil et al. 2003, Kapoor 2005).  
12
 A number of other goals have also been set out, for example: ensuring access to basic medicines for developing countries, 
improving ethical conduct by transnational companies and women workers’ rights in developing countries. 
13
 Oxfam 2002c. 
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sugar regime is one very clear example of that” (BBC Radio 2002). Again Oxfam’s main 
criticism has been that the sugar regime is a particularly grievous expression of how the EU 
keeps more efficient developing country sugar producers out of their market with high tariffs, 
while EU sugar beet farmers and sugar processors get a guaranteed high price for their 
produce, nearly three times the world market price. This results in over-production that is then 
exported with subsidies into world markets and thereby contributes to depressing world sugar 
prices (Oxfam 2002c, 2004b, 2004c)14. As a ‘development-friendly’ reform of the sugar 
regime clearly was an important goal of Oxfam’s, the part of the Make Trade Fair-campaign 
that specifically targeted the sugar regime is in focus in this thesis15. 
 
Who is Oxfam International? 
 
Oxfam International is a confederation of 13 non-profit, secular, community-based aid and 
development organisations that work with local partners in over 100 countries worldwide with relief, 
development and advocacy. The 13 Oxfam organisations are based in: Australia, Belgium, Canada, 
France, Germany, Great Britain, Hong Kong, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Quebec, Spain 
and the United States. An Oxfam International secretariat is based in Oxford, UK, and the secretariat 
runs advocacy offices in Washington, D.C, New York, Brussels and Geneva. Oxfam International was 
founded in 1995 as an umbrella organisation for the 13 Oxfams. Oxfam Great Britain is based in 
Oxford, UK. It was founded in England in 1942 as the Oxford Committee for Famine Relief with its first 
mission to send food through the Allied blockade to the citizens of Nazi-occupied Greece (Oxfam GB 
web site).  
 
 
1.4 Limitations  
Coleman and Tangermann (1999) consider two analytical levels of primary importance in 
terms of what influences EU agricultural policy, namely the international level (the EU as an 
actor in the WTO) and the EU institutional level (primarily the Agriculture Council16 and the 
EU Commission). Keeler (1996) operates with a third level, which comprises all the national 
policy processes that constrain the policy process at the EU level. A complete analysis of the 
campaign and its effects ought thus to include all three levels. In concrete terms, this means 
that since Oxfam in Europe operates in 7 member states, advocacy progress and impact and 
its causes would be relevant to analyse in each of these, as well as progress and impact at the 
EU and international level (in the WTO). However, due to time and resource limitations the 
analysis at the national level has been focused on the United Kingdom only - and primarily in 
                                                 
14
 See chapter 2, section 2.4 for an elaboration of Oxfam’s criticism. 
15
 As sugar is only one part of the Make Trade Fair-campaign it is of course somewhat ‘artificial’ to analyse this part of the 
campaign in isolation other parts. However, due to the aforementioned prominence of sugar in the Oxfam campaign one can 
argue that sugar merits separate attention, as the sugar topic often has lent synergy, as a powerful example, to the criticism of 
other agricultural trade issues in the EU. In the words of former EU Development Commissioner, Poul Nielson: “The sugar 
debate has been an eye-opener for lots of people that there are ‘sick’ agricultural policies” (debate notes 2005 – see 
Appendix D). 
16
 The Agriculture Council is the formation of member state ministers in the European Council that negotiates issues 
concerning agriculture and fisheries. 
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terms of strategic communication with the media and its effects on government rhetoric. This 
is because a significant part of Oxfam’s campaign activity has been taking place in the UK 
and because media work has been at the forefront of Oxfam’s strategy on sugar (Make Trade 
Fair web site, Oxfam 2005a: 1)17. At the EU-level the analysis will focus on Oxfam’s 
attempts to influence the EU Commission, as this is the institution formally empowered to 
propose legislation  (EU web site)18. Influence with the Commission can therefore be 
considered crucial in the policy formulation phase.  
 
1.5 Conceptualising advocacy impact 
Advocacy objectives are usually distinguished in terms of 3 dimensions: 1) Policy impact of 
advocacy (and progress towards impact); 2) capacity building of organisations engaged in 
advocacy and of their ‘clients’ (e.g. poor communities in the South) for increased access to 
and participation in decision-making processes relevant to them; and 3) increasing legitimacy 
and accountability of advocating NGDOs in the North vis-à-vis their ‘clients’ in the South 
(Watson & Cohen 2001, Davies 2001). This thesis will focus on the first objective primarily, 
but draw in the second objective briefly during the EU-level analysis. For this purpose, table 
1.1. gives an overview of selected indications of advocacy progress and impact19 from the 
literature:  
 
Table 1.1 – Indications of advocacy progress and impact on policy 
Indications of progress Indications of impact 
Heightened awareness about an issue 
(e.g. amongst journalists, politicians or the general 
public) 
Changed policy 
Increased dialogue on an issue (e.g. between advocates 
and decision-makers) 
 
Changed legislation 
Raised profile of an issue (e.g. on media and political 
agenda) 
Policy/legislation change implemented 
Changed rhetoric (e.g. in the media, in political 
debates, speeches, interviews, policy papers, reports, 
and press releases) 
(And in the very long term) change in social and 
economic status of people as a result of the 
policy/legislation change and implementation.  
 (Sources: Davies 2001: 29, Chapman and Wameyo 2001: 21) 
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 See also section 2.6 on Oxfam’s campaign strategy. 
18
 See also the EU Commission fact box in chapter 2. 
19
 The theoretical basis for these indications is relatively weakly described in the advocacy literature selected for this thesis 
(see earlier references in this chapter). Much of said literature still bears resemblance to ‘a-theoretical’ programme 
evaluations and ‘lessons learnt’-essays more than in-depth studies. However, it could be argued that a good part of this 
literature owes a debt to mass media effects theory and policy process theories, particularly those concerning agenda-setting 
and policy cycles. Some of these theoretical strands are elaborated further in chapter 3.  
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However, in order to further limit the scope of the thesis, only the following indications of 
progress and impact have been selected for analysis:  
 
1. Raised profile of an issue – in the media: Which refers to changes in media 
coverage of events or issues concerned with sugar regime reform – both those stories 
that referred to the campaign and those that did not. Media coverage was singled out 
because it has been of particular importance to Oxfam (see also next section). The 
sample of coverage has been limited to the UK only.  
2. Change in rhetoric: Which refers to changes in rhetoric from the UK government 
ministers and from the EU Commissioners20. As indicated above, change in rhetoric 
can be seen as a stage towards change in adopted policies and legislation.  
3. Content of the legislative proposal on sugar: Which refers to the EU Commission’s 
formal legislative proposal for sugar reform from June 200521, and which ultimately 
shows how much the Commission’s final position ended up aligning with Oxfam’s 
demands.   
 
1.6 Research objective 
 
Underlying all Oxfam’s work is the need to use the media to campaign against poverty 
and injustice. 
- from Oxfam Great Britain’s web site22 
 
Robert A. Dahl’s now classic definition of power was that “A has power over B to the extent 
that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do” (1961: 203)23-24.  Under 
this definition outcomes of policy processes can often be explained by bargaining power, or 
                                                 
20
 ‘Rhetoric’ is defined here as the expression in speech, text or other media - by any individual or collective actor (e.g. an 
organisation). The sources for rhetoric necessarily had to be limited. The actual sources (e.g. policy reports, press releases, 
interviews, speeches, etc.) used in the analyses in chapter 4 are listed under the relevant methodology sections or in Appendix 
C.  
21
 The final sugar legislation was not adopted by the Agriculture Council until late 2005/early 2006 (see section 2.9). It is not 
the object of analysis, as Oxfam’s efforts centred on influencing the Commission’s final legislative proposal, in the 
recognition that once this proposal was out, “it would be very difficult to change” (Oxfam 2005a: 1).  
22
 http://www.oxfam.org/en/news/ 
23
 Robert Alan Dahl (b. 1915) is the Sterling Professor Emeritus of political science at Yale University. In the 1960s he was 
involved in a landmark dispute over the nature of politics in the United States, where he opposed the view that America’s 
governments are in the grasp of a unitary and demographically narrow power elite. Dahl responded that there are many 
different elites involved, who have to work both in contention and in compromise with one another. In perhaps his best-
known work, ‘Who Governs?’ (1961), he examined the power structures in the town of New Haven, Connecticut, and found 
that the study supported this view. 
24
 Power is a highly contested concept, but it is usually discussed in terms of four dimensions: 1) ‘Direct power’ (e.g. Robert 
Dahl) - which would also include bargaining power; 2) ‘agenda-setting power’ (e.g. Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz); 3) 
‘mind-controlling power’ (e.g. Steven Lukes); and 4) ‘structural power’ (e.g. Michel Foucault). The three first dimensions 
focus on agency and the last one – obviously - on the structural aspect of power. (For an overview, see Christensen & 
Daugaard Jensen 2001.) 
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in other words: ‘A can offer or withhold from B something that can get B to do something 
that B would not otherwise do’. Civil society NGOs in the North, however, generally tend to 
have the least economic or political bargaining power compared to other actors who are not 
formal decision-makers, but also engage in lobbying, such as industrial interest groups 
(Heywood 1997: 255; Leen 2003: 12). Therefore they often turn to complement their 
lobbying with public campaigning and mobilisations (e.g. demonstrations), the effect of 
which they try to enhance via media work25.  
 
An important goal in Oxfam’s case was to “generate an outrage” by “highlighting [the] 
inequity of distribution” between ‘rich farmers’ in the EU and ‘poor farmers’ in the 
developing world that - according to Oxfam - was the result of the sugar regime (Leadbeater, 
interview)26. Or put in another way, Oxfam would try circumventing its lack of bargaining 
power by appealing to morals through research documenting how ‘unfair trade’ in sugar 
affected developing countries. This information would then be disseminated to the public, 
grassroots, EU farmers and sugar industry, the media and decision-makers in the form of 
slogans, symbols, specific framings and phrasings, plus case-stories - all designed to invoke 
empathy and identification with the farmers in developing world. Documents on Oxfam’s 
campaign strategy reflected this emphasis on the mass media as an important pathway to 
influence, arguing that it was necessary to strengthen national media work, and the capacity of 
developing countries to engage in the media (Oxfam 2003a: 2, 2005a: 1). Oxfam’s media 
focus most likely came to be because the rising influence of the media on politics has pressed 
politicians to sometimes adjust their policies if found in conflict with what is perceived to be a 
majority of public sentiments. And in general it is through the mass media that politicians - 
and their policies - become visible to a population in which an increasing percentage of the 
electorate has no firm allegiance towards a particular political party. (See elaboration of this 
subject in section 5.3.2.) Such developments notwithstanding, the question still remains: to 
what degree is the media really a ‘shortcut’ to influence for NGOs outside of the formal 
policy process? 
 
First of all, even if the previous outline is intended to only illustrate the prominence of the 
mass media in Oxfam’s campaign strategy, it does also suggest an overly simplified linear 
cause-and-effect model: ‘first there is change in media coverage, then rhetoric and then 
adopted policy/legislation’. Such an interpretation needs to be cautioned against from the 
beginning. The process of influence (via the media) is more complex. This regards both the 
                                                 
25
 See section 3.2 for an elaboration and for references. 
26
 Jo Leadbeater was until 2005 head of Oxfam’s advocacy office in Brussels. See appendix D for all interview references 
and transcriptions. 
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chronology of causal factors leading to change, as well as the importance of the factors. And 
any policy process is influenced by numerous actors with varying degrees of authority, 
influence, bargaining power and access to the decision-making process, and is in turn shaped 
by many different institutions that enable or constrain action. Also Oxfam’s campaign itself 
uses other strategies than media work to influence the political process, e.g. lobbying. Some 
of the problems regarding chronology and attribution of causal factors will be discussed in the 
methodological sections in chapters 6 and 7. For now it should just be made clear that the 
attention to the role of the media only serves as an analytical focus, which is of interest due to 
the prominence it is given in Oxfam’s advocacy work, and because this in turn may yield 
insights into the opportunities and limitations for development NGOs in their new roles as 
advocates. These considerations finally lead us to the research objective for this thesis. It is 
to analyse: 
 
To what degree has Oxfam’s advocacy influenced the UK and EU sugar reform process 
via the media – and why?  
 
Definitions: ‘Influence’ is broadly defined as indications that changes in the political rhetoric 
so as to incorporate, wholly or in part, Oxfam’s framings of the sugar issue or demands for 
sugar reform that can be attributed to Oxfam – and in particular to media coverage reflecting 
Oxfam’s framings of the sugar issue. This definition also covers indications that any points in 
the Commission’s final sugar reform proposal that matched Oxfam’s demands could be 
attributed, or partly attributed, to Oxfam. (See section 2.5 and 3.2.2 for an elaboration on 
Oxfam’s demands and framings of the sugar issue. See also the methodology sections for 
more on the problems of attributing campaign effects.)  
 
Associated research questions: The research objective can be broken up into several 
dimensions. Thus, it also includes analysing to what degree Oxfam’s advocacy influenced: 
 
1. media coverage in the UK 
2. the rhetoric of the UK government 
3. the rhetoric and legislative proposal of the EU Commission on sugar reform  
 
- and the linkages between these dimensions. 
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The 3 specific issues of interest in the political rhetoric and in the Commission’s legislative 
proposal on sugar are: The institutionally fixed prices, policies on market access for 
developing countries and on EU sugar export subsidies27. 
 
1.7 Structure of thesis 
 
Chapter 2: A GUIDE TO THE EU-SUGAR REFORM PROCESS. The sugar regime is a 
notoriously complex system, and Oxfam’s campaign and the political process involves a large 
number of actors and institutions, which necessitates an overview before the analysis. This 
chapter therefore contains an elaboration of the workings of the sugar regime, Oxfam’s 
critique, campaign strategy, reform process timeline and its results compared to Oxfam’s 
demands.  
 
Chapter 3:  A GOOD STORY OR NO STORY - UK MEDIA COVERAGE ON SUGAR 
REFORM. In order to analyse possible effects of media coverage on the political rhetoric in 
the UK, it is necessary to discern the level and content of media coverage first. This chapter 
therefore starts out with theoretical considerations on media visibility, resonance and framing; 
how Oxfam framed the sugar issue and potential problems with its frames. An analysis 
follows of UK media coverage of sugar reform 1999-2005 – before and after the campaign. 
Lastly, to understand the obstacles for advocating NGOs in the media, the analysis is 
supplemented with explanations for patterns in the UK media coverage, based on theory about 
the norms, rules and routines of news creation. 
 
Chapter 4: ‘A SCANDALOUS SITUATION’ OR ‘A BENEFIT FOR DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES’? – DECISION-MAKER RHETORIC ON SUGAR REFORM. This 
chapter contains the analysis of the influence by Oxfam’s campaign and media coverage on 
political rhetoric in the UK and in the EU. A comparison is made between rhetoric before and 
after the campaign in order to discern how much rhetoric of decision-makers deviated from 
Oxfam’s demands, and if the campaign had an effect on issues where opinions differed. 
 
Chapter 5. THE MEDIA AND THE POLICY PROCESS: This chapter sets the stage for 
explaining why – or why not – advocacy via the media influenced sugar reform the way it did. 
It starts with theoretical considerations about the institutional environment in which policy-
making takes place and how the mass media can affect the policy process in general. These 
                                                 
27
 Since, as mentioned earlier, it is only the Commission that is empowered to propose legislation on the EU sugar regime, 
only rhetoric will be analysed with regard to the UK government. 
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are summed up into 7 key questions used to guide the remaining analytical inquiry in chapters 
6 and 7. 
 
Chapter 6: A BROKEN FRAME: THE MEDIA AND UK GOVERNMENT 
RHETORIC ON SUGAR. This is the analysis of the explanations for the extent of Oxfam 
and media influence on UK government sugar rhetoric. 
 
Chapter 7:  AGAINST THE TIDE – OXFAM’S CAMPAIGN AND THE EU SUGAR 
POLICY PROCESS. This chapter contains the analysis of explanations for the scope of 
Oxfam and media influence on EU sugar rhetoric and the Commission’s final legislative 
proposal. It also includes an excursion that discusses to what degree the Make Trade Fair-
campaign has enabled Oxfam and developing countries to better influence EU trade and 
agricultural policy in the future. 
 
Chapter 8: CONCLUSION: ‘CORNFLAKES WITH SUGAR?’ In which it is argued that 
although Oxfam and the media had very limited impact on the political process, the campaign 
still established Oxfam as a player in the political process to be reckoned with.  Even so 
media bias away from development, the alliance of prominent EU states and a foods industry 
bent on liberalisation (whenever it increases their own competitiveness), and the tendency for 
some developing countries to engage in rent seeking via preferential access to the EU market - 
all continue to present different obstacles to NGO campaigning for pro-development trade and 
agriculture reforms. 
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2. A guide to the EU-sugar reform process 
 
The Community sugar regime is so perfect that it has been called by some a work of art.  
- EU Commissioner for Agriculture Franz Fischler28 
 
2.1 Overview 
Before the main analyses, it is necessary to provide a brief overview over the EU sugar sector, 
its role in the Common Agricultural Policy, an elaboration of the major critiques of the regime 
and a resume of how the reform process ultimately played out. As indicated in chapter 1, the 
EU sugar regime works through a system of secured high prices upheld via production quotas 
and import tariff barriers, and exports financed with subsidies. However, the EU also has 
preferential trade agreements, such as of the Sugar Protocol and the Everything But Arms 
agreement under which some developing countries are allowed to export a very limited 
amount of sugar to the EU at higher prices than those on the world market. Elaborated in this 
chapter are Oxfam’s principal criticisms that export subsidies and overproduction suppress 
world sugar prices and that tariff barriers keep out the majority of developing country sugar 
exports from the EU. Oxfam’s main demands for reform have been 1) that price reductions in 
the EU should only be to a level where a remunerative income was still secured for 
developing country exporters; 2) immediate greater market access for developing countries, 
and 3) abolishment of export subsidies. Oxfam attempted through media work and lobbying 
to influence the Commission and key EU states, but Oxfam’s demands on prices and access 
were neglected in the Commission’s final legislative proposal for sugar reform from June 
2005 - and by the UK government - while their positions on export subsidies to some extent 
matched Oxfam’s. In chapter 3 Oxfam’s media work in the UK will be analysed, setting the 
stage for an analysis of its effects on the sugar reform policy process in the following chapters 
and a discussion of why these effects were so relatively limited or at times even ambiguous. 
 
2.2 At a glance: The Common Agricultural Policy  
The EU sugar regime has remained virtually unchanged since 1968. Its persistence cannot be 
understood without delving briefly into the history of the Common Agricultural Policy of 
which it is a part29. The CAP was created in 1959 with the primary objective of securing 
European food self- sufficiency, which had become an issue of concern in the wake of World 
War II. The CAP set up a comprehensive support program for farmers through an array of 
different policy instruments, such as taxing imports, subsidising exports, and purchasing 
                                                 
28
 Franz Fischler speech 04/257: “The Future of the Community sugar regime”, at the Gewerkschaft Nahrung-Genuss-
Gaststätten Sugar Conference, 19 May 2004.  
29
 The following section is based on Halderman & Nelson 2004 pp. 16-20 - unless otherwise noted.  
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farmers’ products when market prices fell below a given level (intervention buying). In the 
1980s, however, storing and exporting agricultural surpluses became an increasingly 
expensive burden. Maintaining the CAP became more costly, even as declines were evident in 
agriculture’s share in European GDP and as the sector employed a lower percentage of the 
population. In 1984 and 1988 some supply control mechanisms were therefore established, 
such as production quotas. Externally, the US insisted on making agriculture central to the 
GATT’s Uruguay Round30, spurred by the relative decline of the US agriculture export 
volume throughout the 1980s. Trade conflicts had already escalated as the existence of EU 
surpluses resulted in depressed agricultural commodity prices at the global level. So the 1992 
MacSharry-reforms31 became the beginning of a deeper reform process where CAP policy 
instruments for the first time were subject to change: Price supports were increasingly 
replaced with direct payments to farmers. This was an attempt to discourage overproduction, 
as increases in future production could not expect to be met by similar increases in subsidies. 
Significantly, in agricultural support was introduced the key element of ‘modulation’, a 
mechanism under which EU farm spending was transferred from market-related support 
payments to rural development measures32. However, the Agenda 2000 reforms (of 1999) 
again saw only policy setting adjustments, primarily of the dairy and beef support regimes 
with small support price reductions. The 2003 reforms, however, continued the move towards 
more ‘decoupling’, i.e. breaking the link between producer support and actual production. A 
new ‘single farm payment’ became linked to environmental, food safety and animal welfare 
standards. Even so, the agreement represented a very diluted version of the first proposals 
presented by Agriculture Commissioner Franz Fischler. The CAP budget was not reduced 
and, at around € 43 billion a year, still represented nearly half of the total EU budget. 
Furthermore, the reforms did not directly address the key issues of market access and export 
subsidies. But whether or not the glass was half empty or half full, the 2003 reforms did 
signal the beginning of change for the sugar product regime that thus far had ‘escaped’ CAP 
reform33.  
 
 
                                                 
30
 The Uruguay Round was a trade negotiation lasting from September 1986 to April 1994 that transformed the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) into the World Trade Organization (WTO). It was launched in Punta del Este in 
Uruguay (hence the name). 
31
 Ray MacSharry was the European Community Commissioner for Agriculture at the time. 
32
 This emphasised what is now regularly referred to in today’s discussions and debates about the CAP as the 
‘multifunctionality’ of agriculture. The term basically refers to the argument that agriculture is much more than simply the 
production of food and fibre but that it is also directly involved in protecting the environment, including rural landscapes, and 
promoting sustainable development, including the economic viability of rural areas. Today, this type of support (also called 
‘pillar II’ support) is thus linked to compliance with certain criteria concerning the environment, rural development, food 
safety and food quality, and animal welfare (Halderman and Nelson 2004).  
33
 A more elaborate analysis of the reasons for changes to the CAP since the early 1990s, and how they ultimately shaped the 
type of sugar reform that was adopted, can be found in chapter 7.  
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2.3 Profile of the sugar regime 
This section contains an elaboration of how the sugar regime works, as regards to its principal 
instruments: support prices, production quotas, tariff barriers and export subsidies. Also 
outlined are the major preferential trade agreements that to date exist with sugar producing 
developing countries. 
2.3.1 Support prices 
These are the minimum prices for processed sugar at which intervention agencies are obliged 
to buy-in eligible sugar offered to them, but import duties and restriction of available 
quantities has kept market prices above the level of intervention34. There is also a minimum 
price for sugar beet, which is the price at which sugar manufacturers are required to buy beet 
from growers. The prices, however, are guaranteed only for production within the production 
quotas in order to prevent production from booming. Until the recent sugar reform the price 
had been frozen by the EU since 1993/94 at €631.90 per tonne for white sugar and €523.70 
per tonne for imported raw sugar (EUC35 2004b: 1)36. In contrast, world prices for white sugar 
were on average about €160 per tonne in 2004 (Oxfam 2004c: 39)37.  
2.3.2 Production quotas 
Quotas are fixed for each country on the basis of white sugar equivalents.  There are two 
kinds of quotas – A and B quotas. Countries with high production costs have been given 
greater A quotas than countries with lower production costs. The total quota amount is 17.4 
million tonnes per year for the EU 25. Sugar produced above quota (‘C-sugar’) must be 
exported without subsidies (see below) (EUC 2004b: 2). 
2.3.3 Export subsidies  
The EU 25 is in net terms the world’s second largest exporter. Export subsidies ensure that all 
sugar produced within quota limits, but surplus to consumption38, can be sold profitably on 
the world market, without depressing the internal market price. On average for the marketing 
year 2002/03 export refunds were €485 per tonne. In 2004 the EU had allocated €1.7 billion 
in total for sugar subsidies, with the majority of €1.3 billion allocated for export subsidies and 
the rest went primarily to cane sugar refining aid and production refunds to the chemical 
                                                 
34
 Intervention buying was only used at the early years of the CMO and since then the need for its application has not risen. 
35
 All ’EUC’ references refer to the European Commission. 
36
 Also the price for sugar beet was € 46.72 per tonne for A-quota sugar, and €32.42 per tonne for B-quota sugar (see section 
2.3.2 for explanation of quotas). 
37
 Although there is no single world price for sugar, a standard international reference is the price computed daily by the 
International Sugar Organisation. Due to distortion by other producers than the EU, this price is not a 100%  ‘pure’ market 
price either (although it is much closer to such a price than the internal EU price). It has for example been argued that the 
world’s largest exporter, Brazil, has provided ‘hidden subsidies’ to its exports by giving support to the country’s large ethanol 
production programme, which is based on cane sugar. Other countries such as the US and Japan subsidise their sugar as well, 
but their exports make up a relatively marginal part of world exports (World Bank 2004; Ryberg 2005: 2). 
38
 I.e. surplus A and B, but not the ‘C’ sugar. 
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industry (EUC 2004c: 23). Refunds are also paid for raw cane sugar imported under the ACP 
Protocol and the Agreement with India (see below) and then re-exported to world markets by 
EU sugar refineries, such as Tate & Lyle39. Processors and growers together are charged a 
levy to meet the costs to the EU budget of exporting surplus quota sugar. But the EU 
consumers ultimately finance these levies, and therefore the EU export subsidies, indirectly 
through the inflated prices. Also, the levies meet less than half of the costs of this export. 
Around  €800 million of the subsidy costs are still financed directly through the CAP budget 
each year - and hence through taxes (Oxfam 2004b: 46).  
2.3.4 Import tariffs  
Tariffs protect the EU internal market from inflows of cheaper sugar from third countries. A 
fixed duty of €419 per tonne is applied to imported white sugar and €339 per tonne to 
imported raw sugar from non-preferential suppliers who want to sell sugar in the EU (Oxfam 
2004c: 39). But although the sugar CMO exhibits a high degree of protectionism, the EU has 
granted a whole range of bilateral trade concessions to selected preferential suppliers in the 
developing world. This is reflected in the complex system of discriminatory tariffs and trade 
preferences (generalised, country-specific, and region-specific) applied to different trading 
blocs, some of which will be described below. First, though, it is necessary to clarify the term 
‘developing countries’, in the context of the sugar regime: 
 
Which developing countries export sugar to the EU? 
 
The ACP: This group consists of 19 sugar-exporting countries from the so-called African, Caribbean 
and Pacific group. These are predominantly former British and French colonies that have been 
granted special trade preferences. They are: Belize, Congo Brazzaville, Côte d’Ivoire, Fiji, Guyana, 
Jamaica, Kenya, Barbados, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Uganda, St. Kitts and Nevis, Surinam, 
Swaziland, Trinidad and Tobago, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Many of these countries have parts of their 
populations living below the poverty line40, but most of them are not in general counted amongst the 
poorest countries in the world. In addition, the sugar industries of the Pacific and Caribbean island 
states are often characterised by high production costs and therefore low competitiveness on the 
world market. Thus they are very dependent on the preferential access to the EU, even if it’s limited. 
Many island states have few export alternatives to sugar.  
 
The LDCs: The second group consists of 10 so called Least Developed Countries that export sugar to 
the EU. LDCs are defined by the United Nations as 50 extremely poor countries with an annual per 
capita income of less than US $1 per day (UNCTAD web site). These 10 LDCs were in 2004: The 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Malawi, Myanmar, Mozambique, Somalia, 
Sudan, Tanzania, and Zambia. Madagascar, Tanzania, Malawi and Zambia are also members of the 
ACP41. There are 16 LDCs that produce sugar but so far do not export to the EU42. 
                                                 
39
 Sugar contained in exported food and drinks also qualifies for export refunds to compensate manufacturers for the higher 
costs of using EU-sourced raw materials. 
40
 In this context the poverty line is that set by the World Bank. It defines extreme poverty as living on less than US$ 1 per 
day, and moderate poverty as living on less than $2 a day, measured in terms of purchasing power parity (World Bank web 
site). 
41
 Mozambique also became signatory to the Sugar Protocol in 2005. 
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2.3.5 The Sugar Protocol  
19 countries from the African, Caribbean and Pacific group and India are signatories to the 
ACP-EU ‘Sugar Protocol’ and ‘Agreement with India’. They benefit from preferential access 
to the EU sugar market, as the EU imports an annual quota of approximately 1.3 million 
tonnes of sugar from these 20 states on a duty-free basis, and at guaranteed prices just below 
those paid to EU farmers. The Sugar Protocol is in principle of “indefinite duration” (ACP 
Sugar web site), and ACP partners and India were granted further preferential market access 
in the 1995 ‘Agreement on Special Preferential Sugar’ (SPS) for about 220,000 tonnes of 
sugar. In a challenge against the EU at the WTO Dispute Settlement Body43, Brazil, Australia, 
and Thailand claimed that an amount of sugar equivalent to the raw sugar imported from ACP 
countries was illegally re-exported by the EU with subsidies and that this practice violated the 
EU Uruguay-Round export subsidy reduction commitments. In the Uruguay Round, the EU 
committed to reduce its subsidised sugar exports to a maximum of 1.3 million tonnes per 
year. But these EU exports amount to almost three times that amount. For the Panel found that 
the C-sugar exports from the EU are in fact cross-subsidised by the high guaranteed prices 
paid for A and B sugar, which results in overproduction that then becomes C-sugar 
automatically. In April 2005, after numerous appeals by the EU, the WTO finally ruled that 
this complaint was valid, that the EU had to stop the illegal exports after a certain 
implementation period, and that nothing in this ruling would compromise the EU commitment 
to import from the ACP (as the EU otherwise had claimed). However, in the fall of 2005 the 
EU asked the WTO for over a year and a half to carry out implementation, thereby postponing 
any immediate changes to the status quo (WTO 2005a, WTO 2005b). 
2.3.6 ‘Everything but Arms’  
Under the 2001 ‘Everything But Arms’ (EBA) initiative, 49 Least Developed Countries 
benefit in principle from duty and quota-free access to EU markets in all product areas but 
arms. In practice, however, this arrangement was watered down in the areas of sugar, rice, and 
bananas due to intense lobbying from EU producers (Lamy 2001: 1). Thus, for sugar, the 
LDCs would only be given duty and quota-free market access in 2009, 8 years after the 
agreement was adopted. In the meantime, 10 LDCs have been granted an extremely limited 
quota (starting at 74,185 tonnes in 2001) to export raw sugar to the EU on a duty-free basis. 
The quota size will increase by 15% per year until full access is granted in 2009. Estimates 
about the actual export capacity of the sugar LDCs vary wildly from about 0.9 million tonnes 
to 2.7 million tonnes per year, but at any rate the current market access to the EU is far below 
                                                                                                                                                        
42
 These countries are: Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Chad, Guinea, Haiti, Liberia, Mali, Nepal, Niger, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo and Uganda. Most of these countries are members of the so-called Brussels LDC Sugar Group, 
which also includes some LDCs, such as the Central African Republic and Rwanda that do not produce sugar yet, but 
apparently are working to establish a sugar industry with a view to exporting to the EU (Nöhle 2004: 707-708). 
43
 The WTO institution that resolves trade disputes between WTO members. 
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it (Nöhle 2004: 704; Oxfam 2004b: 38)44. The gradual increase in EBA sugar import quotas, 
however, has been deducted from the quotas for LDCs that are also members of the ACP. In 
addition, the EBA agreement was severely undermined on the promise of ‘free access’, since 
it contained a provision about ‘special safeguard measures’ that still allowed the EU to restrict 
access once again - in case there was a sudden “surge in imports”45 after 2009 (Benedek 
2004: 4). While the LDCs under the EBA do benefit from the high internal EU price level, 
unlike the ACP, they do not get a guaranteed price. The actual price for EBA sugar is 
negotiated with importers, but with the EU beet or ACP sugar as the only available 
alternative, prices for LDC sugar exported to the EU come out far above world price levels46. 
 
2.4 Oxfam’s critique of the sugar regime  
 
Low world sugar prices and the dumping of sugar are a problem … I would like to see 
sugar subsidies cut and a global levelling of the playing field. European farmers should 
farm something more suitable to their climate. This would allow developing countries, 
particularly the small-scale growers, to grow more sugar cane for the world market, 
which would improve my situation. I can’t grow anything other than sugar cane. 
 
Mzo Mzoneli, smallholder sugar farmer, Kwa Zulu province, 
Natal, South Africa47 
2.4.1 EU export subsidies depress world sugar prices 
As indicated previously, Oxfam’s first criticism is that the EU sugar production surplus of 
approximately 5 million tonnes per year is exported overseas supported by a system of direct 
and indirect subsidies. The extra sugar sold at an artificially low price contributes to 
suppressing prices in other markets, to which more efficient developing country producers 
could export sugar. In addition to the average expenditure of approximately €1.3 billion in 
sugar export subsidies, the EU is, according to Oxfam, further subsidising sugar exports with 
around €833 million as regards the nominally unsubsidised sugar exports (the C-sugar). 
Again the argument is that there would not be produced so much extra C-sugar, if A and B 
sugar in the EU did not receive price support. Oxfam has used the volume of 2002 sugar 
exports, and the assumption that the existence of the CAP (and its subsidised exports) lowers 
                                                 
44
 Oxfam cites estimates from the EU Commission and the International Sugar Organisation about LDC production capacity 
in 2008/2009. The estimates are based, though, on largely speculative assumptions about production capacity, changes in 
prices, and other factors. 
45
 The special safeguard arrangement has been negotiated in the WTO Agreement on Agriculture. Under its provisions, 
additional duties can be charged on imports when import prices fall below a specified trigger level. The trigger level was set 
during a reference period when the only imports into the EU came under preferential access arrangements: In other words, 
the trigger is set at a high level relative to world market prices. 
46
 Minor preferential access agreements also exist for the Western Balkans, the European Overseas Territories, and others, 
but these are not dealt with here, since the ACP and the EBA schemes are of most relevance to the research objective.  
47
 Quotation from Oxfam 2004b: 5. 
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the unit value of sugar on international markets by 23 %, as a basis for calculating the 
foreign exchange losses incurred by Brazil, South Africa and India that also export sugar. 
According to this calculation, depressed world market prices cost Brazil $494 million, 
Thailand $151 million, and South Africa and India around $60 million each in 2002 (Oxfam 
2004b: 1ff). EU sugar exports also compete directly with developing country exporters in 
third markets. For example, South Africa faces subsidised competition from EU exports to 
Nigeria, Angola, Egypt, and Kenya; and India faces similar competition in Bangladesh, 
Indonesia, and Singapore (Oxfam 2004c: 12). 
2.4.2 Market access to the EU is too restricted 
The aforementioned trade preferences (via the Sugar Protocol, SPS and the EBA) mitigate the 
losses caused by the sugar regime – but only marginally. The ACP countries have quotas 
below export capabilities and although the Everything But Arms agreement has helped some 
of the sugar producing LDCs, they are only allowed by the EU to export sugar equivalent to 1 
% of total EU consumption (Oxfam 2004b: 1). Several LDCs have significant potential to 
develop viable long-term sugar industries as they are among the most competitive producers 
of sugar in the world48.  Oxfam has estimated the costs of EU sugar import restrictions for a 
number of LDCs, by calculating the foreign exchange that they would have gained, if their 
exports to the low-priced world market had been transferred to the EU at current EU prices 
since 2001. Mozambique, for example, could have expanded exports to the EU to earn an 
additional $38 million in 2004 and Malawi an additional $32 million in foreign exchange 
(Oxfam 2004b: 35-38)49.  
 
However, as with most emerging industries, the sugar sectors of the LDCs need time and 
stability to reach their full potential. Stable access to high European prices could help the 
LDCs to cover the costs of investment, development and expansion of their industries (Oxfam 
2004c: 4, 15). Therefore the LDCs in March 2004 asked the Commission to propose a reform, 
which for a temporary period would insure them continued stable sugar export revenues. If a 
reform inevitably would see the EU prices fall it was important for the LDCs that this fall 
would not be too steep or too sudden, before they were capable of exporting more sugar. 
Specifically, they requested a period until 2019 of progressively increasing - but still quota-
limited - access to EU markets in return for keeping the EU price at a “remunerative” level 
                                                 
48
 For example, Oxfam (2004c: 16) has calculated that if the average ex-factory costs 2001-2003 of sugar production of the 
world’s leading sugar exporters - Brazil, Australia, Thailand, South Africa and Guatemala - are set at index 100  - then the 
comparative costs would be 93 for Malawi, 102 for Zambia and 135 for Mozambique.  
49
 It should be borne in mind, though, that these calculations overvalue the losses that would be incurred in a free market with 
lower prices in the EU as well. They are based on the (rather idealistic) premise that as long as the EU prices are high they 
should be of more benefit to poorer third world producers relative to EU producers. This argument is also the basis for the 
LDC proposal for an EBA amendment, described next. 
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(LDC Sugar 2004)50. The implicit trade-off was then that the EU did not have to open markets 
fully to LDC sugar in 2009, but could postpone this move for 10 years longer. The LDCs, on 
the other hand, would get to export relatively more sugar, and they would still get a higher 
price for it than in other markets. Oxfam supported this request and proposed an immediate 
improvement of LDC access with individual country quotas set in accordance to export 
capabilities. They also supported lower EU price reductions with longer implementation 
periods, without going into specifics on the preferred price level, though - mainly for tactical 
reasons (Oxfam 2004b: 46)51.  
 
2.5 Oxfam’s demands for reform  
In September 2002 Oxfam’s specified its first demands for sugar regime reform. The demands 
were not entirely consistent over time, but can be summarised in the following main points:  
 
1) Price cuts should be lower than the percentage proposed by the Commission, although 
an exact level was not specified;  
2) Market access should be improved for the LDCs immediately;  
3) Export subsidies and dumping should end. This should be facilitated by cuts in the 
EU’s own production quota.  
 
During 2004 and 2005 Oxfam also increasingly insisted that adjustment aid should be 
provided to the ACP countries that would no longer be able to maintain viable sugar sectors 
under a reform scenario with drastic price cuts. As indicated, Oxfam had to adjust their 
demands slightly throughout the campaign, when the political situation changed. The table 
below gives an overview these changes in Oxfam’s 3 key demands on sugar reform52 2002-
2005:  
                                                 
50
 The LDCs in 2004 requested a “second stream” of quota-sugar, that was not to be taken from the ACP quota, and which 
would also be increasing at 15% per year, like the first stream, but from a much higher starting level of about 450,000 tonnes. 
This gradually increasing - but still restricted - access would then last until 2019 (LDC Sugar 2004).  
51
 The preferred level of price cuts was never publicly announced by Oxfam, purportedly in order not to ‘split the developing 
countries’ who themselves found it difficult to agree on a remunerative price level. Internally, it was the understanding, 
however, that a reduction level of about 20% would be acceptable, which was eventually the position the LDCs coalesced 
around (Oxfam trade policy advisor Penny Fowler, interview; LDC Sugar 2005: 2). (See also section 6.2.6.) 
52
 For the sake of maintaining an overview many details in conjunction with Oxfam’s demands are not dealt with in this 
analysis. These were for example various technical proposals for ACP aid packages and their funding, proposing additional 
support for the LDCs in developing their sugar industries, technical specifications about the level and timing of quota cuts, 
and calls for improved environmental and labour rights in sugar industries in the EU and the LDCs. 
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Table 2.1 Key Oxfam demands over time 
 
Prices Market access Export subsidies 
September 2002 Not yet formalised, but 
high prices strongly 
criticised in the first 
Oxfam sugar report. 
Full and immediate 
market access to LDCs  
 
Maintain ACP quotas. 
March 2004 Not yet formalised but 
it was stated that “deep 
price cuts” would have 
“serious 
consequences” . 
November 2004 “Shallower” price cuts 
and longer 
implementation 
periods. 
Improved LDC market 
access at 
“remunerative” prices 
  - but still managed in 
quotas according to 
export capabilities. 
End all dumping through 25% quota 
cuts.  
 
Stop all export subsidies. 
 
Stop C-sugar immediately. 
 
(Sources: Oxfam 2002c: 28, 2004b: 3, 46-47 and 2004c: 6)  
2.6 Oxfam’s campaign strategy on sugar 
Oxfam wanted to influence the EU Commission (specifically the Agriculture and Trade 
Commissioners) indirectly via key national governments, particularly the UK, Germany, 
France, and Spain and directly via lobbying from Oxfam’s small office in Brussels53. Also, 
alliances were built with other NGOs, at first the European Consumer Organisation, BEUC54, 
and later the World Wildlife Fund (WWF); while there was also a close liaising with the ACP 
and LDC sugar lobby groups in the EU. Concrete actions were timed as much as possible 
with each other to create maximum synergy. These included:  
 
• Research: Publication of 3 reports critical of the sugar regime and some briefing 
notes. 
• Participation and consultation: submission of memoranda to and participation in the 
UK government and initial EU Commission sugar reform stakeholder consultations (in 
2003 and 2004).  
• Grass roots mobilisation: happenings and events (such as dumping of sugar outside 
of the offices of sugar processors) designed to gain media attention and mobilise 
volunteer supporters 
• Internet: publishing of case-stories and information on the Internet about the plight of 
poor sugar farmers, and several petitions for fair trade and ‘stop the sugar dumping’ 
that were e-mailed directly to the relevant EU Commissioners or UK ministers, 
supported by celebrity endorsements for fair trade in general. 
• Media work: including a stream of press releases commenting on developments in the 
reform process, personal contacts to key journalists. As mentioned earlier, getting 
                                                 
53
 Oxfam’s advocacy office in Brussels was created in 2002 and at the height of the campaign had a staff of 2 persons (2004).  
54
 Bureau Européen de Unions des Consommateurs. 
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media coverage was one of the most important goals of Oxfam’s strategy since this, it 
was assumed, would amplify the awareness of and importance attributed to Oxfam’s 
advocacy. 
 
It was also attempted to time campaign actions with political events, such as the various 
stages of the WTO rulings and appeals, EU Council meetings, WTO Ministerials, etc., in 
order to maximise potential interest for the press55. As noted in chapter 1, great effort was put 
to combine the ‘moral argument’ which, it was argued, would appeal to grassroots and the 
mass media, with more elaborate pragmatic and technical arguments for the political decision-
makers as well (as evidenced particularly in the sugar reports)56. Oxfam furthermore tried to 
influence the reform at the earliest stages in the policy cycle in order to maximise influence, 
so a lot of campaigning activity on sugar was realised in early 200457. This overview of 
Oxfam’s strategy brings us, then, to a short presentation of Oxfam’s primary campaign 
targets. 
2.6.1 At a glance: The UK government and EU Commission 
The government of the United Kingdom is currently (January 2007) led by Prime Minister 
Tony Blair and his New Labour party. New Labour won a landslide victory in the 1997 
general election exceeding 40% of the popular vote. It won another large majority in 2001 and 
a smaller victory in 2005, which saw their number of seats in the lower house of Parliament 
reduced to 356 seats out of 646. The original Labour Party grew out of the trade union 
movement and socialist political parties of the 19th century. Under Tony Blair’s leadership, 
however, the party has adopted a number of free market-oriented policies. The British 
Parliament is divided into The House of Lords, which is the upper house and the House of 
Commons, which is the lower. Most Cabinet ministers are from the House of Commons, 
rather than the House of Lords. The UK government contains a number of ministries known 
mainly as departments. A Government Minister who is often a Secretary of State and a 
member of the Cabinet leads the departments. He or she may also be supported by a number 
of junior Ministers. The official opposition party is the Conservative Party who holds the 
second largest number of elected members of Parliament (Wikipedia58).  
                                                 
55
 It should furthermore be noted that other campaign initiatives calling for fair trade in general - such as reports critical of 
other CAP subsidies, petitions and lobbying rallies to the UK Parliament for fair trade and Make Trade Fair-concerts sporting 
various popular music groups - all may have added synergy to the sugar component of the campaign, and vice-versa.  
56
 The language – or frames - that Oxfam used to promote its messages is elaborated in section 3.2.2. A brief analysis of the 
language of the sugar reports is found in Appendix A. 
57
 References for section 2.6 on Oxfam’s campaign strategy include: Oxfam 2002c, 2003a, 2004b, 2004c, 2005a; Leadbeater 
interview; Fowler interview; Guardian Economics editor Larry Elliott interview; Make Trade Fair web site, LDC Sugar web 
site. 
58
 Wikipedia is the world’s largest online encyclopaedia. It has been criticised for low reliability since in principle anyone 
with access to the Internet can update it. However, a sample study by the science magazine Nature revealed that Wikipedia 
only contained about 4 errors on average per page, as compared to the Encyclopaedia Britannica’s 3 errors average (BBC 
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Primary targets of the Oxfam-campaign in the UK government 
 
 
Margaret Beckett  
 
UK Secretary of State for 
Environment,  
Food and Rural Affairs 
2001-2006. 
 
 
Patricia Hewitt  
 
UK Secretary of State 
for Trade and Industry 
2001-2005. 
 
Statements made by UK Secretary of International Development, Hillary Benn, was also 
analysed in this thesis, because his support in theory would have increased the chances of 
agreement on a  ‘development friendly’ UK position on sugar reform. 
 
The European Commission is the executive body of the European Union. Alongside the 
European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, it is one of the three main 
institutions governing the Union. Its primary roles are to propose and implement legislation, 
and to act as a ‘guardian of the treaties’ that provide the legal basis for the EU. During sugar 
reform the Commission was lead by chairman Romano Prodi (1999-2004) and José Manuel 
Durão Barroso (2004 -). In 2005 it consisted of 25 Commissioners, each one selected directly 
by a member state government. It is supported by an administrative body of several thousand 
civil servants in departments called Directorates-General (DGs). The Commission is intended 
to represent the interests of the citizens of the EU as a whole, but during development of 
legislation it does keep in close consultation with member states’ delegations and may have 
take into account specific political alliances in the Council so as to prepare legislation that is 
likely to be adopted. In the case of agriculture and trade this consultation takes place 
especially in the Special Committee on Agriculture  (SCA) (and its Working Party on Sugar 
and Isoglucose)59 and in the Article 133 Committee60. Formally, EU decision-making on 
sugar falls under the so-called consultation procedure, in which the Commission sends its 
proposal to both the Council and European Parliament, but it is the Council that officially 
consults Parliament and other EU bodies, and it is not bound by their positions (Wikipedia, 
EU Commission web site). 
                                                                                                                                                        
News Online, “Wikipedia survives research test”, 15 December 2005). Wikipedia information has only been used for 
referencing very general information in this thesis. 
59
 The Special Committee on Agriculture is a committee under the Council responsible reviewing the Commission proposals 
on agricultural legislation before they reach the Council. The Working Party on Sugar and Isoglucose is specifically 
responsible for reviewing and presenting the Commission with feedback on legislation pertaining to the sugar regime. 
60
 The Article 133 Committee is a committee under the Council responsible for reviewing the Commission’s proposals on 
trade policy. It has been criticised for non-transparent decision-making processes and for possessing an unclear mandate in 
the EU treaties (Drury 2003). 
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Primary targets of the Oxfam campaign in the Commission 
 
 
 
Franz Fischler 
 
European 
Commissioner for 
Agriculture 1999 -2004 
 
Pascal Lamy  
 
European 
Commissioner for 
Trade 1999 - 2004. 
 
Mariann Fischer Boel 
 
European 
Commissioner for 
Agriculture 2004 -
present.   
 
Peter Mandelson 
 
European 
Commissioner for 
Trade 2004 - present. 
 
Statements on sugar made by EU Commissioners for Development and Humanitarian Aid, 
Poul Nielson (2000-2004) and Louis Michel  (2004-present), were also analysed in this thesis, 
because their support would presumably have increased the chances of a ‘development 
friendly’ Commission proposal on sugar reform. 
 
2.7 Timeline: The EU sugar reform process 
2003 - September: The EU Commission launched the reform process with its ‘Extended 
Impact Assessment’ of the sugar regime (EUC 2003), which followed up on a yearlong period 
of consultations with stakeholders from industry, trading partners, and civil society. The 
report presented four reform scenarios: 1) No reform, 2) Fixed quotas for both producers and 
all future imports, 3) price reductions and some quota adjustments or 4) full liberalisation. 
The Commission initiated a further round of stakeholder consultations in the member states 
about these four scenarios. 
 
2004 - March: The LDCs officially requested a period until 2019 of progressively increasing, 
but still quota-limited, access to EU markets at remunerative prices. This was in effect a 
request for an amendment of the Everything But Arms agreement that otherwise promised full 
duty-free access for sugar after 2009.  
 
2004 - May: As part of the ongoing WTO negotiations on trade61, the EU proposed to 
eliminate all export subsidies – including sugar - over an unspecified period, if the US did the 
same (EUC web site)62. 
 
                                                 
61
 The so-called Doha Development Round initiated in 2001 in Doha, Qatar. 
62
 Source: EU Commission press release: “WTO-DDA: EU ready to go the extra mile in three key areas of the talks”, IP 
04/622, 10 May 2004. In October 2005 the EU did propose a 2013 end date, though, but at the time of the Commission’s 
final legislative proposal in June 2005 this had not yet been conceded. 
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2004 - July: The new stakeholder consultations were then used as a basis for outlining the 
Commission’s first communication about a single preferred sugar reform scenario in July 
2004 (EUC 2004a). Among a number of other elements63, this communication proposed 
 
• Prices: 33% cuts in the guaranteed high price for sugar processors in 2008/9 and 37% 
for beet producers (and also for preferential imports).  
• Market access: Nothing about the LDCs’ proposal for amending the EBA on market 
access. 
• Export subsidies: Nothing on export subsidies, but proposed quota cuts of around 2.8 
million tonnes by 2008/09 which, it was argued, would result in a projected fall of 
exports by 2.5 million tonnes per year.  
 
2004 - Fall: The EU Council’s Special Committee for Agriculture and Working Party on 
Sugar and Isoglucose debated the Commission’s communication.  
 
2005 - April: The World Trade Organisation’s Dispute Settlement Panel rules that the EU 
must stop illegally exporting sugar equivalent to its ACP-imports because this is in excess of 
the EU WTO commitments to reduce subsidised exports. ‘C-sugar’ is also ruled to be cross-
subsidised.  
 
2005 - June: Based on feedback from the SCA, the Sugar Working Party and other EU 
actors, the Commission presented its final legislative proposal. The following list compares 
the developments since the July 2004 communication on key issues – from an Oxfam 
perspective:   
 
• Prices: Worse. A significant reduction of 39% of the institutional support price over 2 
years was proposed.  
• Market access: Status quo. Nothing explicit, but several Commissioners had already 
indicated that the LDC proposal was not feasible (see section 4.4.2).  
• Export subsidies: Status quo and worse. The May 2004 offer on phasing out export 
subsidies was still upheld, but no compulsory quota cuts were proposed for EU 
production that would mean less constriction on exportable surpluses. Also, an 
additional quota of 1 million tones was proposed for C-sugar (EUC 2005a). 
 
                                                 
63
 The other elements concern numerous technicalities on sugar reform, such as abolishing the intervention scheme and 
replacing it with 'reference price'; merging A and B quotas into single quota; allowing transferability of quotas between 
member states, etc.  
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2.8 The UK government’s final position on sugar reform 
The final positions of the UK government on prices, access and subsides were closely aligned 
to what eventually became the Commission’s June 2005 proposal. They are summed up in a 
2004 report which stated that ”the Government agrees that lower prices, lower import tariffs 
and the ending of quotas are all highly desirable objectives for this reform round, whilst 
taking into account the need to avoid massive disruption to ACP preferential suppliers. We 
recognise that without sufficient price cuts, the ending of quotas could create new surpluses 
within the European market” (DEFRA 2004). Although no official negotiating positions were 
formulated until after June 2005, this quotation reflects well the government’s consistent 
rhetoric on the sugar issues, and therefore its preferences. The UK was also sceptical of the 
LDC proposal on market access, but in late 2005 - just before the reform was adopted - the 
UK promised to “examine” the issue of market access, work for a longer transition period on 
price reductions, and increased restructuring aid to the ACP64.  
 
2.9 The reformed sugar CMO that was adopted by the Council 
Although it is the political process up to the Commission’s legislative proposal in June 2005 
that is in focus in this thesis, it should be noted that the final reform that was adopted by the 
EU Council did not deviate particularly from the Commission’s proposal. Over two sessions 
in November 2005 and in February 2006 the member states in the Agricultural Council agreed 
to the new and reformed sugar CMO. The agreement largely matched what was set out in the 
Commission’s proposal, although the price reductions were now only set to be 36% over 4 
years65.  
 
2.10 Comparison to Oxfam’s demands 
From the outline above it becomes clear that Oxfam did not achieve its campaign aims with 
regard to the final legislation proposal on prices and market access, whereas there was a 
conditional promise to phase out export subsidies in the larger context of trade negotiations. 
The following table presents an overview:  
 
                                                 
64
 See chapter 4 for further references and analysis of the UK government’s rhetoric over time.  
65
 EUC press release IP/05/1473: “EU radically reforms its sugar sector to give producers long-term competitive future”, 24 
November 2005. 
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Table 2.2 Did Oxfam’s demands match the final UK position and Commission proposal?  
 
Prices Market access Export subsidies 
Oxfam’s demands 
 
‘Shallower cuts’ – 
about 20%, longer 
transition period66. 
Immediate and improved 
quota based access for LDCs. 
(Amendment of the EBA.) 
25% quota cuts. 
Elimination of export 
subsidies. 
Cessation of C-sugar 
production. 
Commission’s 
June 2005 
proposal 
NO. Price cuts 39% NO. No improved access 
until 2009. 
 
Also no amendment of the 
EBA. 
NO. No compulsory quota cuts 
YES, export subsidies were 
proposed to be eliminated  
NO. More C-sugar allocated 
for export 
UK government 
position 
November 2005 
NO. Price cuts 
supported  
YES. Longer transition 
period supported.  
MAYBE. A promise was 
given to “examine the issue” 
– but earlier indications were 
negative as to amending the 
EBA (see chapter 4). 
 
YES, the UK favoured 
elimination of export subsidies  
 
 
However, many other factors than Oxfam’s campaign and associated media coverage may 
have lead to the relative match between demands and the political outcomes on export 
subsidies. These factors will be analysed in chapters 6 and 7, along with analyses of why there 
was no match on the campaign demands for prices and market access.  
                                                 
66
 The position on prices refers to Oxfam’s positions from March 2004 and onwards when it had become somewhat more 
formalised. 
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3. A good story or no story - UK media coverage on sugar reform 
 
3.1 Overview 
This chapter documents that there was indeed some, albeit rather ‘uneven’, media coverage on 
major sugar reform issues in the UK. Three major media outlets – the Guardian, the Daily 
Telegraph and the BBC News - were selected as sample cases. From analysis of their 
coverage 1999-2005, it is concluded that there was relatively high visibility and positive 
coverage pertaining to Oxfam’s messages in the Guardian, whereas in comparison visibility 
was very low and coverage balanced in both the BBC and the Daily Telegraph. The reasons 
for high visibility in the Guardian can most likely be attributed to the significance this type of 
story had for the outlet. For the BBC visibility was low because development stories were 
generally regarded as attracting low viewer ratings, because of too little airtime for complex 
issues, and because the news day deadline often filtered out coverage of long political 
processes and issues, such as poverty. It was not possible to make any definitive conclusions 
about the Telegraph’s priorities due to lack of interviewees. In all three outlets potential 
problems in Oxfam’s proposals for sugar reform played only a marginal role in the few 
negative stories that came out. The potential problems were that sugar exports and poverty 
reduction are only tentatively linked, that a prominent group of preferential supplier 
developing countries would have to exit the sugar market if EU prices were reduced (which 
Oxfam accepted), and that an end to EU export subsidies and sugar dumping would not 
necessarily result in an end to low world sugar prices in the long run.  
 
3.2 Theoretical background I: The struggle for visibility 
The number of channels of communication (newspapers, magazines, radio stations, television 
networks, etc.) and the size of their respective news holes (pages, broadcasting time, etc.) are 
by necessity limited. Compared to this available communicative space, groups and individuals 
in modern democratic societies make a huge number of attempts to insert messages in the 
public sphere. Of the great variety of attempts to mobilise public attention, only a few can be 
accommodated in the bounded media space. According to media researcher Ruud Koopmans 
two important selection mechanisms affect the diffusion chances of contentious messages: 
Visibility (the extent to which a message is covered by the mass media) and resonance (the 
extent to which others – allies, opponents, authorities, etc.– react to a message) (2004: 367). 
Visibility depends on the number of communicative channels by which a message is included 
and the prominence of such inclusion (e.g. front page). Visibility is a fundamental condition 
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for a message to influence public discourse. A number of gatekeepers67 in mass media 
organisations affect visibility and, other things being equal, the amount of visibility that 
gatekeepers allocate to a message increases its potential to diffuse further in the public sphere 
(Koopmans 2004: 373). The term visibility can be likened to the first level of agenda setting 
(Ørsten 2004: 136ff), i.e. what events or issues that make it to the media agenda, and to Gadi 
Wolfsfeld’s term the ‘struggle over access’ (1997: 13ff). Although political power brings 
important advantages (status, organisation and resources) to those who want to achieve 
exposure in the news media, challengers, such as NGOs, can and do compete. Their capacity 
to do so in turn depends on their ability to initiate and control the flow of events considered 
newsworthy - sometimes through exceptional behaviour - and their ability to generate, or 
exploit, dissent among elites (Wolfsfeld 1997: 20-30).  
3.2.1 Resonance and framing 
Whatever the level of visibility, the career of a discursive message is likely to remain stillborn 
if it does not succeed in provoking reactions from other actors in the public sphere. The 
degree to which a message provokes such reactions can be termed resonance (Koopmans 
2004). Through the reactions of other actors, the message of the original speaker is at least 
partially reproduced and may reach new audiences. For instance, actors such as social 
movements who themselves lack prominence may receive an enormous boost if established 
political actors express sympathy for their demands. Such support carries the message to the 
constituency of the ally in question, and allows the message to profit from that actor’s 
prominence and prestige. This is the type of supportive resonance, which Koopmans terms 
consonance. Consonance often takes the form of favourable verbal statements but includes in 
principle any public action that signals support, endorsement, or encouragement of the NGO, 
its actions, or its aims.  
 
Even negative resonance, or dissonance, may be helpful to the diffusion of the original 
message. The rejection of a demand calls attention to that demand and thereby diffuses it 
further in the public sphere. Also, messages that resonate, be it negatively or positively, 
become in the eyes of journalists and editors more relevant and the actors behind them more 
prominent, thus increasing an NGO’s chances to achieve a high level of visibility for similar 
messages in the future. While to some extent consonance and dissonance can be treated as 
having similar effects because they both increase a message’s salience, in other respects (such 
as in Oxfam’s case) it must of course matter what the balance is between consonance and 
dissonance (Koopmans 2004: 374-375). Although resonance in media space is extremely 
                                                 
67
 Gatekeepers is a much used term in communication and media studies and usually refers to the individuals or organisations 
that have the power to filter messages to certain audiences (such as news paper editors).  
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important, it is important as well for the diffusion of messages that they resonate in other 
contexts - such as resonance in political rhetoric that is not visible in the media.   
 
Given the abovementioned definition, the term resonance is intimately linked to what Ørsten 
(2004: 136ff) refers to as the ‘second level of agenda-setting’ and to what Wolfsfeld dubs the 
‘struggle for meaning’ (1997: 31ff) – i.e. the framing of particular events in the news stories. 
Framing refers to the possibility for journalists (or other actors) through selection, 
presentation and focus to present a particular problematic or actor in a certain perspective, 
whilst ignoring other perspectives (Ørsten 2004: 27-28). A frame typically consists of four 
components:  
 
1) Problem definition (what is the problem);  
2) Causal interpretations (who created the problem);  
3) Moral stance (who’s the ‘hero’, who’s the ‘villain’); and  
4) Presentation of a solution.  
 
Frames promoted by NGOs are obviously contested by frames by other actors, e.g. 
politicians.  
3.2.2 Oxfam’s frames 
Oxfam for their part attempted to frame their criticism of the EU sugar regime as shown 
below in the problem-causes-heroes/villains-solution ‘formula’. What follows is a selection of 
direct quotes that illustrate recurrent phrasings and dominant examples in Oxfam’s reports 
and press releases 2002-2005, which demonstrate how each frame was typically 
communicated. All sources for this section, including the individual quotes, can be found in 
Appendix A.   
 
Framing of the price issue – key phrasings and examples: 
• “Deep price cuts in the EU would devastate the ACP and LDC industries”  
• “The steep, sharp price cut will hurt poor countries that depend on selling their sugar 
to Europe and small producers in Europe … “ 
 
The framing on prices changed notably since 2002, due to the LDC March 2004 proposal for 
keeping a remunerative level of EU prices for an interim period. For example, in the first 
Oxfam sugar report the high guaranteed prices are strongly linked to overproduction that 
prompts export dumping, with phrasings such as: “By any sane assessment European prices 
are too high … “. This rhetoric, however, muted considerably in 2004 and onwards. Press 
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releases on sugar reform from September 2002 and until early 2004 have also been removed 
from principal Oxfam web sites (Oxfam GB, the Make Trade Fair web site and Oxfam 
International’s web site). 
 
Framing of the market access issue – key phrasings and examples:  
• “For every $3 that the EU gives Mozambique in aid, it takes back $1 through 
restrictions on access to its sugar market.”  
• “Mozambique – a country with almost three quarters of the rural population living in 
poverty – has lost the chance to earn an estimated €108m ($106m) by 2004. That’s 
almost three quarters of the EU’s annual development aid to Mozambique of €150 
($136m).” 
• “Oxfam estimate that Mozambique, Ethiopia and Malawi have lost £130 million over 
the past three years through market restrictions into the EU, whereas Tate & Lyle 
receive £105million a year from taxpayers in subsidies alone to dump sugar on world 
markets.” 
 
This framing has also changed somewhat since the LDC proposal became a political reality. 
Thus in 2002 there was much focus on the high tariff barriers and on immediately granting full 
access for the LDCs to the EU market, whereas in 2004 and 2005 the focus shifted to ‘just’ 
granting greater quota-based access right away. 
 
Framing of the export subsidy issue – key phrasings and examples:  
• “European taxpayers and consumers are paying to destroy livelihoods in poor 
countries ...”  
• "The system supported by EU consumers and taxpayers is rewarding big companies, 
like Tate & Lyle at the expense of poor farmers in the developing world … ” 
•  “EU dumping depresses world prices and led to foreign exchange losses in the region 
of $494m for Brazil, $151m for Thailand, and $60m each for South Africa and India 
in 2002.”  
• “ … the EU has been found guilty [by the WTO] of paying subsidies that encourage 
overproduction and allow the dumping of excess sugar overseas, which undermines 
the livelihoods of poor farmers in the third world …” 
3.2.3 Potential problems with Oxfam’s frames 
Before the upcoming analyses of media coverage and political rhetoric it is necessary to 
assess the basis for potential rejections of Oxfam’s frames. Three such possibilities for 
criticism can identified: 1) Sugar and poverty reduction are only tentatively linked; 2) there 
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will be no reform without adjustment costs for poor ACP countries; 3) and elimination of 
export subsidies may not affect world prices in the long-term. In this section each of these 
problems are elaborated: 
 
1. Sugar and poverty reduction are only tentatively linked: Even if the LDCs were 
allowed to export more sugar to the EU at a remunerative price level, it is far from certain that 
it would translate into significantly more poverty reduction. Increased exports to the EU will 
of course give the countries a better possibility to reduce poverty, especially in the form of 
increased foreign exchange earnings to sugar mills/plantations and export firms, and in the 
form of more jobs for sugar workers and out growers, as well as in the form of benefits from 
the local social and health programs that usually are sponsored by sugar companies (Oxfam 
2002c: 25ff, 2004b: 33ff, 2004c:). But domestic entrepreneurs in poor countries seldom have 
sufficient capital for investment in the sugar industry, and experience shows that where 
multinational sugar corporations are involved, large estates are the favoured system of 
production, allowing for a better control over the whole production-processing-marketing 
chain. Foreign private investors simply do not have much direct economic incentive to 
involve small growers, who would bring no benefit in terms of access to land. Smallholder 
production is therefore likely to play only a marginal role in the industry’s future development 
(Wandschneider & Garrido-Mirapeix 1999; Marini 2001)68.  
 
2. Many developing countries will also loose out from sugar reform: Oxfam has 
consistently portrayed itself as an advocate for developing countries69. However, during the 
trade campaign, Oxfam also recognised that there would be developing country winners and 
losers from a sugar reform involving price cuts, and accepted price cuts as politically 
“inevitable” (Oxfam 2004c: 36). This meant that Oxfam could not unconditionally support all 
developing countries, particularly those that wanted little or no price reductions. Ryberg 
(2005) summarises existing impact studies and concludes that under the Commission’s 
proposed 37% price reduction70 from July 2004, the sugar industries of only one-third of the 
ACP sugar countries are likely to survive and perhaps even expand, while all of the remaining 
are in jeopardy of contraction or even extinction. This concerns particularly the Caribbean 
                                                 
68
 Aside from these constraints, many other political, social and economic factors obviously influence how the poorest social 
groups will benefit from extra earnings in an emerging sugar industry. In recent years the international donor community has 
emphasised the importance of ‘sound’ national economic policies, mostly liberal in nature, as well as social redistribution 
policies, all of which must be supported by sufficient institutional capacity and ‘good governance’. However, many African 
developing countries have severe problems particularly regarding the latter two (see e.g. Martinussen & Pedersen 1999: 279-
80). 
69
 See for example Oxfam International’s web site: http://www.oxfam.com. 
70
 EUC 2004a.  
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nations71. At the heart of the problem is the link between prices, production and exports. High 
prices prompt higher production and the quota system has consistently proved that it is not a 
sufficient control mechanism to avoid surplus production and the subsequent dumping of ‘C-
sugar’72. Price reduction was therefore necessary for the EU in order to reduce exports and 
live up to the WTO rulings on exports. And before EU production was lowered, it was not 
politically feasible to increase LDC (or ACP) quotas. In response to this problem, during 2005 
Oxfam demanded a comprehensive aid package from the EU to ACP producers that had to 
exit the industry. However, this could in principle be construed as being at odds with the 
‘trade is a part of the solution to poverty’ message at the heart of Oxfam’s campaign.  
 
3. Elimination of EU export subsidies does not guarantee higher world prices: Even if the 
EU export subsidies disappeared overnight, along with the surplus C-sugar, it is by no means 
certain that the average world market price would increase and remain at a new, higher level. 
World sugar prices are very volatile, not only because of continued – albeit lesser - 
subsidisation from other exporters, but also due to the unpredictability of world production 
patterns in general. If the world’s largest exporter, Brazil, for example, keeps increasing its 
sugar production available for exports - as it has done explosively since the mid-1990s due to 
internal conditions73 - the world price may continue its fall, no matter what the EU does. Such 
a scenario is far from implausible given the recent victory in the WTO dispute, which could 
compel Brazil to boost its exports (Chaplin & Matthews 2005: 12)74. Oxfam has argued that 
the immediate effect of eliminating all EU surplus exports would be that the average world 
price rises between 19 and 24 %75. However, calculating the effects on world prices of 
removing EU subsidies depends very much on which scenarios, time frames, calculation 
models, etc., that are used, and Oxfam has (perhaps wisely) avoided this discussion in its 3 
sugar reports. To illustrate the contrast between different assessments, one study for the 
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 As mentioned in chapter 2, the Commission ended up with a 39% proposal for price reductions, which was then lowered 
by the Council to 36% when it adopted the new sugar CMO in late 2005/early 2006. At 37% Ryberg’s assessment falls right 
in between. More specifically, Ryberg argues that under this scenario Swaziland and Zimbabwe are likely to be able to 
expand production and even gain market share. Malawi, Tanzania and Zambia are relatively efficient producers that are 
likely to survive and, depending on the extent to which they could rationalise their industries to increase efficiency, might 
even expand market share in the EU. On the other hand, serious competitive problems would be created for Belize, Congo, 
Fiji, Guyana and Mauritius. These countries are predicted to have a chance of survival – but probably with some contraction 
– depending on the extent to which they are able to further rationalise their industries.  Finally, under the same scenario the 
sugar industries in Barbados, Cote d’Ivoire, Jamaica, Madagascar, St. Kitts and Nevis, and Trinidad and Tobago will most 
likely disappear (Ryberg 2005: 5).  
72
 Oxfam (2004b: 47) proposes to solve this by reducing the following year’s EU quotas with any surplus from the previous 
year, or by introducing punitive taxes on surplus production. The last suggestion, however, is at odds with the political reality 
that a central objective in the CAP reform process since the early 1990s has been to eliminate production surpluses that have 
been costly to store, export or destroy (e.g. the infamous ’butter mountains’ of the 1980s). See also section 2.2. 
73
 Particularly the state-supported ethanol for fuel programme, which was mentioned in an earlier footnote.  
74
 The capacity to export cheap sugar in Brazil is in fact so great that in the event of complete EU liberalisation, Brazil could 
easily meet EU import needs 100% (FIAN 2002: 41). 
75
 Minutes of evidence from DEFRA Special Committee hearings on sugar reform April and May 2004: 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/cmselect/cmenvfru/550/4042613.htm 
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Global Alliance for Sugar Trade Reform and Liberalisation argued that elimination of EU 
export subsidies and C sugar exports would only see world prices rise between 2 and 4 % in 
2013 (CIES 2002: 17-18). In any case, the net effect of eliminating the subsidies is in the 
longer term quite unpredictable, when other actors in the market react to the rising prices and 
possibly increase their exports as well, thereby driving the prices down once again.  
 
3.4 Methodology I 
After having reviewed theoretical and practical considerations pertaining to media visibility 
and Oxfam’s framings of the sugar issue, the next section will review the methodology used 
in the upcoming media analysis. 
3.4.1 Assessing visibility 
In the UK: Visibility was quantified by counting media stories from the web site archives of 3 
UK media organisations: the BBC (News department only), the Guardian and the Daily 
Telegraph. As it was not possible to survey all papers and television channels in the UK, let 
alone other media such as radio or Internet, these three were selected to represent traditional 
political biases in the British media (see below). If a story matched the keywords ’Oxfam’ and 
’sugar’ and ’EU’, and referred to sugar reform, or related topics, it was included in the 
analysis76. The selection period was 1 January 1999 - 23 November 2005 (when the process to 
adopt the final legislative proposal was begun by the EU Council), so as to give a good 
indication of developments in coverage before and after campaign launch77. Also similar 
stories containing the keywords ’EU’ and ’sugar’ - but without the keyword ’Oxfam’ - were 
selected in order to assess to how much of the visibility on sugar Oxfam was a direct 
contributor. Obviously, the above survey gives only an indication of how prominently the 
issue may have figured in all UK television channels and newspapers, and although it tries to 
balance potential political biases in coverage, it does not purport to be in any way 
representative. Below, then, follows a brief presentation of each of the three selected UK 
media outlets: 
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 Some stories that only mention the regime in passing were deemed irrelevant to the analysis.  
77
 Stories found on the Guardian and Telegraph web sites are the same as those published in print, except where copyright 
concerns do not allow this (Guardian web site, Telegraph web site). According to the BBC (telephone communication) there 
is no set policy for the relationship between what is published on the web site and what is shown on the various BBC News 
channels. Thus, some stories may not be accompanied by video clips and still have been shown on television. Some video 
clips may not have been used on television, but have been put on the BBC News web site anyway. Due to time and resource 
constraints it was not possible to consult the British National Television archive for copies of BBC News transmissions in the 
period of analysis, and the BBC does not have an archive service for individuals or researchers, only for commercial 
customers. However, according to one BBC journalist, if a video clip has been put on the site it was “highly likely” that it 
was also aired (Matt Prodger, e-mail communication). Therefore this has been the working assumption. Furthermore, it has 
been assumed that stories without accompanying clips were not aired.  
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The Guardian  
 
A newspaper owned by the Guardian Media Group. It is published Monday to Saturday. The Guardian 
Media Group also includes The Observer Sunday newspaper and a selection of local newspapers. 
Editorial articles in the Guardian are generally in sympathy with the liberal to left-wing ends of the 
British political spectrum. According to a MORI poll taken in 2004, 44% of Guardian readers vote 
Labour and 37% vote Liberal Democrat78. In November 2005 the Guardian had a certified average 
daily circulation of 378,618 copies, as compared to sales of 904,955 for the Daily Telegraph, 692,581 
for the Times, and 261,193 for the Independent (Wikipedia). 
 
 
The Daily Telegraph  
 
A daily newspaper owned by the Barclay Brothers. Its sister paper, the Sunday Telegraph, was 
founded in 1961. The Telegraph traditionally caters to Conservative readership. In November 2005, it 
was the highest selling British broadsheet (see above). According to a MORI survey conducted in 
200479, 61% of Telegraph readers were Conservative Party supporters compared with 31% of the 
British population in general (Wikipedia). 
 
 
BBC News 
 
BBC News and Current Affairs is a major department of the British Broadcasting Corporation 
responsible for the corporation’s newsgathering and production of news programmes on BBC 
television, radio and online. It is the largest news broadcaster in the world and produces almost 100 
hours of output daily. The Television News section of BBC News is responsible for the main news 
bulletins on BBC One and BBC Two, news output on BBC Three and BBC Four and the news 
channels BBC News 24 and BBC Parliament. The channel BBC World also receives 22 hours of 
programming each day from the department. The BBC is required by its charter to be independent of 
political views80, but - perhaps not surprisingly - the BBC is regularly accused by the government of 
the day of bias in favour of the opposition and, by the opposition, of bias in favour of the government 
(Wikipedia).  
 
 
Visibility in the EU: Limited resources prevented analysing even a representative sample of 
the entire national, European and international news media output that the EU Commissioners 
would have been exposed to during the sugar policy process. Thus it was not possible to make 
any reasonable assumption about European wide visibility and consonance/dissonance on 
Oxfam’s sugar reform views in the media. This was obviously an obstacle to satisfactorily 
carrying out the research objective. However, it should be remembered that the principal 
focus of the research objective was not to gauge media visibility per se but the possible effect 
of any given media visibility on the policy process. Therefore Koopman’s concept of 
resonance was used in the EU level analysis as an indication of the role of the media, as it 
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 http://www.mori.com/polls/2004/voting-by-readership.shtml 
79
 Ibid. 
80
 http://www.bbc.co.uk/guidelines/editorialguidelines/edguide/editorialvalues/impartialitydiv.shtml 
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was for the UK, but without the option of being able to compare it with a sample of actual 
coverage.  
3.4.2 Assessing resonance in the media 
Resonance was analysed qualitatively by highlighting illustrative examples of consonance or 
dissonance from the 3 chosen media outlets. This method constituted an analytical 
generalisation, which means that recurring themes or patterns were exemplified but not 
quantified (Halkier 2001). Examples of resonance were defined as the reproduction of 
Oxfam’s frames - or parts of these frames81 - by other actors in the media after campaign 
launch. Indications of consonance were other actors citing a ‘problem-cause-solution’ 
perspective similar to Oxfam’s, or reproduced specific phrasings or key examples used by 
Oxfam (see section 3.2.2). Indications of dissonance were other actors’ rejections in media 
stories of Oxfam’s frames (or rejection of similar frames). As mentioned earlier, resonance 
need not be restricted to the media sphere, but can be assessed for other expressions in speech 
or writing in the public sphere that are not necessarily visible in the media. In this case the 
analysis focused on the political sphere, where it was attempted to discern resonance - 
according to the previously mentioned criteria - in the rhetoric of UK or EU policy-makers 
and officials. This type of resonance is analysed in chapter 4. 
3.4.3 Assessing media framing 
Positive resonance from an actor does not equal a positive media story. How the whole story 
is framed obviously affects its reception more than isolated quotes (although it doesn’t 
determine the reception). So where the first analysis focused on a series of examples that 
could illustrate patterns resonance, the analysis of framing focused on whether or not the 
whole story came out as positive, neutral or negative towards Oxfam’s messages. Overall 
framing was assessed quantitatively by rating each selected media texts as either:  
 
• ‘Positive’ if they 1) contained frames and quotes on sugar reform exclusively pertaining 
to Oxfam; or 2) if opposing views and quotes were only token or framed negatively;  
•  ‘Balanced’ if they contained both Oxfam’s frames and opposing frames in fairly equal 
measure;  
•  ‘Negative’ if they 1) contained frames and quotes on sugar reform exclusively pertaining 
to actors in opposition to Oxfam; or 2) if Oxfam views and quotes were only token or framed 
negatively.  
 
                                                 
81
 A part of a frame pertaining to Oxfam could - for example – be arguing that poverty in sugar producing developing 
countries is being expounded by lack of EU market access, but without mentioning other parts of Oxfam’s frame, such as 
who the ‘heroes’ and ‘villains’ are.  
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Aside from these guidelines, the rating did not follow more stringent criteria, as this would 
have become impracticable. Thus each rating depended on a subjective assessment of the 
balance between consonance and dissonance in any given story. Stories before campaign 
launch, and stories without mention of Oxfam, were also rated in order to assess the overall 
tendency in framing of the issue by a particular outlet. In stories without Oxfam, views 
similar to Oxfam’s (e.g. that developing countries should have more immediate market 
access) were then labelled as frames that supported Oxfam and vice-versa for frames 
oppositional to Oxfam. This procedure, however, posed some methodological problems, 
which will be discussed in the course of the analysis. The complete list of stories, rating, etc., 
which forms the basis for the conclusions in the UK media analysis can be found in appendix 
B. This appendix also includes comments on individual ratings.  
 
3.5 Analysis I: UK media coverage of sugar reform 1999-2005 
3.5.1 The Guardian  
Visibility: Out of a total of 58 stories with significant coverage of the sugar regime, 55 were 
printed after campaign launch. Of those 58 stories only 1 story mentioned Oxfam before 
campaign launch and 34 mentioned Oxfam after. Thus, the initial results show that Oxfam 
succeeded in gaining both relatively high visibility in the Guardian - and in getting mentioned 
in a majority of the articles about the problems of the sugar regime. Issues of prices, market 
access and export subsidies were covered almost evenly, and often in the same articles, with 
most focus on export subsidies. However, it should be kept in mind that visibility is a relative 
concept. Even 55 stories do not necessarily equal a high level of visibility if they are spread 
out over 3 or more years and compared to the level of coverage that other political and 
economic issues received in the same period82. On the other hand, it should also be mentioned 
that a quick search on the Guardian web site reveal many more stories on the inequities of 
trade in general in this period, some of which mention sugar in passing. So the overall 
coverage of ‘the trade and development issue’ was much higher than the sugar coverage alone 
would indicate, and this may have given the sugar stories more prominence in the eyes of 
regular readers, because they were not isolated examples of ‘unfair trade’.  
 
                                                 
82
 It was tempting to try to compare sugar coverage with coverage of other events or issues, but ultimately it was decided not 
to allocate time and resources to do a meaningful comparison in this area. For example, a search on the key word ‘Iraq’ in the 
Guardian archives yielded 8873 results for the year 2004 alone (!). These results, however, include all news events, opinions, 
analyses, etc., pertaining to the Iraq conflict, including the almost daily reports on civilian or military casualties, and 
therefore little information is derived from such a comparison. A more usable comparison may have been to other types of 
EU coverage, but again it is difficult to argue as to why certain types of EU events or issues would be more meaningful to 
compare with sugar coverage than others (e.g. all EU news, agriculture only, articles about the Commission only - or … ?).  
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Resonance: In general, resonance with other actors was very sporadic and only found in a 
minority of all the articles after campaign launch. In terms of consonance the few significant 
episodes were: an article quoting British member of the European Parliament, Glenys 
Kinnock, on concerns about compensating the ACP (which coincided with Oxfam’s concerns 
at the time); some mentions of trade secretary Patricia Hewitt’s labelling of the sugar regime 
as “scandalous” (but where she relegates responsibility for this ‘scandal’ to the EU); support 
to the negative framing of the UK sugar industry by another NGO (CAFOD83); and a quote by 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown, who noted that Mozambican sugar producers 
“cannot compete” because of EU subsidies84. In terms of dissonance notable examples were: 
Some quotations from Tate & Lyle sugar cane importer and processors, whose spokespersons 
argued that their company practice in effect supported the poor cane cutters, because of the 
benefit that the ACP receive from preferential access to the EU85. Also the new (2004) EU 
Development Commissioner Louis Michel was quoted for bluntly telling the ACP ministers 
that: “Reform is necessary, cannot be put off and should not be watered down” and added 
that he accepted that those ACP/LDCs which are less competitive would loose out. Lastly, 
new (2004) Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson was quoted a number of times where he 
usually dismissed the problems for the ACP as a result of an “unsustainable” sugar regime. 
He added that “new solutions” would have to be found to draw these countries out of 
poverty86. This wasn’t necessarily ‘out of sync’ with Oxfam’s stance in 2004/2005 that 
focused increasingly on restructuring aid to the ACP, but it wasn’t consistent with other 
articles that portrayed Oxfam as the defender of ACP and LDC vs. steep price cuts. Focus on 
sugar export links to poverty reduction and uncertainty about export subsidies and world price 
levels were all but absent. 
Overall framing: Stories that mentioned Oxfam were rated as ‘positive’ in 25 cases, 
‘balanced’ in 7 cases and ‘negative’ in 0 cases87.  Also it is worth noting that the Guardian 
devoted a significant amount of leader space to the sugar regime critique (7 articles in all) 
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 Catholic Agency For Overseas Development. 
84
 Guardian: “Europe can help make poverty history in the Caribbean”, 14 October 2005; “Idealistic Brown lays into CAP”, 
29 June 2005; “Hewitt: scrap Europe’s farm subsidies”, 29 July 2004; “Sugar lobby fights to keep virtual monopoly” 23 
February 2004; “Sweet smell of cynicism”, 19 January 2004; and “Hewitt says EU is to blame for sugar scandal”, 23 June 
2003.  
85
 Coding these quotations as dissonance can be debatable. See discussion in the section on resonance in the Daily Telegraph 
and the box ‘Where’s the villain’ below. 
86
 Guardian: “For real trade justice, barriers must come down gradually”, 3 October 2005; “G8 will not end poverty, warns 
Brown”, 3 July 2005; “Royal farms get £1m from taxpayers”, 23 March 2005; “Another countryside”, 23 March 23 2005; 
“MPs to grill Mandelson over trade plan”, 7 February 2005; “Anger over ‘crippling’ sugar cuts”, 25 January 2005; “This is 
our 21st century challenge”, 1 December 2004; “Now he’s taking on the world”, 19 September 2004; and “Washington and 
Brussels ordered to cut subsidies”, 9 September 2004. 
87
 3 Guardian sugar stories (2 with and 1 without Oxfam) were deemed non-categorisable as either ‘positive’, ‘balanced’ or 
‘negative’. Usual reasons were that stories did not address the issues of reform, although they dealt with sugar. 
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and several more to criticising CAP subsidies in general88. A large majority of all articles (39 
of 58) were critical of export subsidies, often repeating Oxfam’s framing that ‘dumping 
destroys livelihoods’ in different variations. 5 articles used Oxfam’s example about 
Mozambique’s export losses to the EU being higher than their level of EU aid89. Also there 
was a focus in articles and leaders on the British sugar processors and large beet farmers that 
received a large amount of EU export subsidies in a “rigged market”90. As for prices, 
initially most articles criticised the EU prices for being too high, leading to overproduction 
and dumping. But in 2004/5 many articles also begin to focus how price cuts would affect 
the ACP and the LDCs, coinciding with Oxfam’s increased emphasis on this problem. In 
most cases, however, this did not lead to framing of entire articles negative to Oxfam, 
because the price problem usually was reframed in the article, for example as the sugar 
lobby’s “attempts to mislead public opinion” concerning a “small group of developing 
countries”91, or because Oxfam was portrayed as siding with the poor countries in 
demanding lower price cuts or adjustment aid.  
Of the 23 sugar stories without Oxfam only 1 was printed before the campaign and 14 of 
these were rated ‘positive’. The only notable difference was that there were 4 ‘negative’ 
articles in the category of articles without Oxfam, as opposed to 0 articles in the category 
with Oxfam. Some of these articles were actually critical of the sugar regime as a whole, but 
didn’t quite gel with Oxfam’s later framings of the price issue. For example, in one article it 
was somewhat inaccurately argued that bringing the EU price down would give developing 
countries a “huge economic boost”92. This also illustrates the methodological problems on 
rating. An article, such as the aforementioned, may still have contributed to an otherwise un-
informed audience’s impression that ‘something needed to be done’ about the sugar regime, 
which in principle would have been supportive of Oxfam’s agenda, even if it was more 
problematic ‘what had to be done’ - in terms of setting prices. Thus, a quantitative measure 
of framing, such as this, obviously need not reflect the actual reception of different receivers 
or groups of receivers. Furthermore some receivers, such as decision-makers may have an 
interest in downplaying their impression of media coverage.  
3.5.2 The Daily Telegraph  
Visibility: In the Telegraph there was much less visibility on the sugar issue, and Oxfam as 
an organisation was not mentioned very often. Out of a total of 22 stories relating to the sugar 
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 These leaders, however, are not listed in the appendix for media stories. This observation refers to a personal impression 
based on the general reading and browsing of the Guardian’s output. 
89
 See Appendix B for a complete listing of these articles.  
90
 E.g. Guardian: “Family's £25m sugar bonanza”, 14 April 2004 and ‘The great sugar scam’ (leader), 15 April 2004. 
91
 Guardian: “Sugar lobby fights to keep virtual monopoly”, 23 February 2004.  
92
 Guardian: “Bitter taste to EU’s sugar policy”, 25 June 2004. 
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regime, 19 were printed after campaign launch. Of those stories 0 mentioned Oxfam before 
the launch and 6 mentioned Oxfam after. Prices and export subsidies were mentioned in 
almost all articles, slightly more than the market access problem.  
 
Resonance: Obviously, due to the low coverage, there were only few examples of resonance 
in all of the articles after campaign launch. In terms of consonance they were a single 
reference to Gordon Brown’s talk about the Mozambique-example, and in terms of 
dissonance mostly a couple of articles where Tate & Lyle defends the sugar CMO as a 
”conduit for money” to developing countries due to the preferential scheme for ACP cane 
sugar93. Tate & Lyle’s defence of their industry got significantly more prominence and longer 
quotations in the Telegraph than in the Guardian. Coding these quotations as ‘dissonance’ 
again presented some problems, though, as it is by no means clear-cut who is really the 
‘villain’ here (see the box below). In another article Commission spokesman on agriculture, 
Michael Mann, summed up the EU rejection of Oxfam’s framing on the price issue: “We have 
been criticised for having inflated domestic prices and making up for that by dumping our 
sugar on other markets, thereby harming developing countries. Now we’ve taken it upon 
ourselves to do something about it and we’re being criticised for harming the guys in the 
developing world who export to us. It’s a no-win situation”94. 
 
Overall framing: Of the 6 stories that mentioned Oxfam 3 were rated as ‘positive’, 2 
‘balanced’ case and 1 ‘negative’. Of the 9 sugar articles that did not mention Oxfam, 4 were 
rated ‘positive’, 5 ‘negative’ and 0 ‘balanced’95. Again most articles with Oxfam just cite that 
the EU prices are artificially high, without much elaboration. Only in one case did the pricing 
problematic play a part for the framing of Oxfam and its messages: In an opinion piece from 6 
July 2005 where Oxfam’s concern for price cuts are used as a direct argument that developing 
country dependency on high prices is a problem in itself. It is added, without much 
elaboration, that trade cannot alleviate poverty alone96. The problem about calculating the 
effects of export subsidies is not mentioned at all. Generally, the Telegraph stories devoted a 
greater amount of space to the EU sugar industry’s side of the story than the Guardian. For 
example, whenever the price discussion came up, the consequences for EU sugar producers 
(such as impending lay-offs) were usually in focus - and not the consequences for developing 
countries. These articles, however, were rated as ‘positive’, as they aligned with Oxfam’s 
message at the time about the need for lower price cuts. Again this tension posed an obvious 
methodological problem, since Oxfam also tended to portray the EU industry as ‘villains’ 
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 Daily Telegraph: “Sugar refiners slated over ‘sweeteners’”, 14 April 2004. 
94
 Daily Telegraph: “The sour taste of Europe’s sugar reforms”, 7 August 2005. 
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 2 Telegraph articles without Oxfam were also deemed non-categorisable for reasons mentioned earlier. 
96
 Daily Telegraph: “Leadership is the only route out of economic mire”, 6 July 2005. 
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despite the correspondence of interests, at least on the pricing issue97. Rating these stories 
‘positive’ with regard to Oxfam’s framing of the price issue was thus problematic, but what is 
interesting is not the methodological problem per se, for which there is no ready solution, but 
that the problem itself emphasises the obstacles to Oxfam’s communication during the 
campaign (see section 6.2.6 for further discussion of this point).  
 
Where’s the villain? 
 
The references to the export practices of UK-based sugar processors Tate & Lyle constitute a good 
example of the difficulty in framing sugar regime criticism, because of the way the system both confers 
costs and benefits to some groups of developing countries. Oxfam has consistently criticised Tate & 
Lyle for ‘collecting’ export subsidies, which contribute to distorting the world sugar market. Tate & Lyle 
counters that they ‘have to’ export with subsidies because of the high fixed price in the EU - which 
they also have to pay for their raw sugar imports from the ACP. They argue that they would not be 
competitive otherwise, and that the EU has ruled out cheaper imports from other suppliers, such as 
Brazil98. Furthermore they call attention to the benefits the ACP receives from this import scheme. 
Neither argument is necessarily incorrect. For on the one hand Tate & Lyle is ‘helping’ the ACP 
because it is part and parcel of their preferential access to the EU (the company refines about 1.1 
million tonnes of the ACP 1.3 million tonne quota). On the other hand Tate & Lyle also does contribute 
with their subsidised exports of cane sugar to driving down prices for the ACP (and other sugar 
exporters) in third markets. However, this ambiguity fits poorly into Oxfam’s strategy to single out 
‘villains’ of the sugar regime, Tate & Lyle’s objective of justifying their export practices, and the mass 
media’s norm about framing news-stories into clear-cut conflict scenarios (see section 3.6.1).  
 
 
3.5.3 The BBC News  
Visibility: From 1999-2005 the BBC News brought up the sugar regime only 5 times 
mentioning Oxfam and a further 6 times without mentioning Oxfam. No stories with Oxfam 
were aired before the campaign began, so it might be assumed that the campaign, at least, has 
been responsible for almost 50% of the BBC’s interest in the issue after campaign launch, 
whereas the rest may be ascribed to primarily the news value of EU meetings or the situation 
of the ailing European sugar farmers.  
 
Resonance: What to note about the general trend in the (very limited) BBC coverage was not 
any particular consonance or resonance with Oxfam’s frames, but the superficiality that 
characterised the presentation of different actors’ viewpoints on television, often more so than 
in the printed press. For example, one story reproduced most of Oxfam’s framing on “the 
great sugar scam” about the limited market access for developing countries, but also quoted 
the Commission as saying that the EU imports more from developing countries than the US 
and others countries combined. In the following interview, an Oxfam spokesman says in 
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response that it is “sad” that the EU is “playing this game of the least bad” and that sugar 
imports constitute “only a tiny fraction” of EU consumption99. It is never discussed further, 
though, who is ‘right’ or elaborated that the EU presumably refers to all of its imports and not 
just to sugar, which makes the EU rejection of Oxfam’s frame somewhat irrelevant100. In 
another story Oxfam’s then senior policy advisor, Kevin Watkins, says that reform would 
remove taxpayer and consumer-financed sugar surpluses in the EU and create “market 
opportunities for countries like Ethiopia and Mozambique”101. In response to this, a Tate & 
Lyle spokesman argues (as in the Telegraph and the Guardian) that developing countries are 
already getting increased access and benefiting from the higher price. But then the clip just 
returns to Oxfam’s point of view stating that sugar in the EU is ‘given subsidies three times 
worth the price’. There is no attempt to resolve if the developing countries actually get ‘much’ 
or ‘little’ access. 
 
Overall framing: Of the 5 stories with Oxfam 3 were rated ‘positive’, 2 were ‘balanced’ and 
0 were rated ‘negative’. Most of the overall framing reflect Oxfam’s own framing of the 
subject: i.e. that the prices are too high and consumers and taxpayers pay for it, that there is 
too little access, and subsidies are too high and used to dump produce in the third world 
driving prices down. There are references to the first Oxfam report, but not to any other 
Oxfam communication product. The tension between Oxfam’s later emphasis on lesser price 
cuts and their initial critique of high prices is evident upon a closer look, but nothing the BBC 
focuses on. All ambiguities about prices are left out and the ‘classic’ argument about more 
access for the ‘cheaper LDC producers’ is instead the focus in these stories. Again, there is no 
discussion of the links between sugar exports and poverty reduction or the problems with 
predicting world price developments if the EU stops dumping. 
 
BBC coverage without Oxfam focused more (as the Telegraph) on the EU beet farmers’ 
concerns about price reductions, and in a few cases on the similar concerns of developing 
country farmers. All 6 stories were rated ‘positive’ due to the coinciding of beet farmers and 
third world farmers’ interest in maintaining high prices, a rating which obviously posed the 
same methodological tensions as were highlighted above.  
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3.6 Theoretical background II: The creation of news 
Having concluded that coverage was very uneven between the selected outlets, it is now time 
for some theoretical considerations about the creation of news media output. These 
considerations will guide the analysis of why the coverage patterns in the 3 cases came out as 
they did. The main argument is that news doesn’t just ’happen’ but is created by the 
journalists themselves and shaped by a number of institutionalised norms, rules and 
routines102-103.  Institutionalisation means that these norms, rules and routines have achieved a 
certain stability and validity over time in the news organisation.  
 
Key definitions I – Institutionalised norms, rules and routines 
 
Norms: An informal prescript for appropriate or expected behaviour within a particular social context 
in a given situation.  
 
Rules: Formalised prescriptions for behaviour, usually enshrined in laws, regulations, adopted 
policies, etc. 
 
Routines: Usual patterns of behaviour which are rarely conscious and can be highly individual (e.g. 
work patterns, whom to contact for different types of information, etc.) 
 
 
In the upcoming sections each of these norms, rules and routines will be outlined further and 
related to Oxfam’s communication on sugar. 
3.6.1 Institutionalised norms 
Two of the most basic journalistic norms are adherence to the news criteria and adherence to 
the deadline.  
 
Studies of the news criteria had already started in the 1960s and in the following decades 
quite a few different numbers and definitions of criteria emerged. However, based on a review 
of the literature Mark Ørsten concludes that today especially 5 criteria stand out. According to 
Ørsten, these criteria are particularly prevalent in the teaching literature used in journalistic 
schools and educations, and it is therefore highly probable that they are also representative of 
the actual practice of most journalists when they subsequently go on to work in media 
organisations (Ørsten 2004: 108ff).  
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Key definitions II – News criteria 
 
Sensation: The remarkable, unusual or unsuspected that is expected to make a powerful impression 
with the audience.  
 
Conflict: Opposing forces or individuals that pique the curiosity of the reader.  
 
Identification: Understood as either 1) Personification, i.e. putting people, especially elites or 
celebrities, at the centre of the story; or 2) Geographical or cultural proximity  
 
Actuality: Which refers to that a given event has just happened, or never previously been publicised. 
Sudden and dramatic events have high actuality.  
 
Significance: Refers to the importance of the event for society at large. This is perhaps the most 
subjective news criterion. A development NGO would obviously deem development issues very 
important for society to know about. For a tabloid it might be the lives of the rich and famous. 
 
 
In order for an event to become ‘news’ it must therefore, in the eyes of the journalist, match 
one - often several - of the news criteria104. For example, the news criterion identification 
contributes to events being presented with focus on individuals who act. An event is thereby 
transformed into the story about persons who act and the consequences of their acts. The 
consequence is often that structural causes of events are ignored. Not surprisingly, then, an 
analysis of Danish foreign policy coverage in 2000 (Holm et al.) concludes that in foreign 
news coverage journalists tend to focus first and foremost on the criteria of identification and 
conflict in order to ‘sell the story’. It could therefore be expected that media products (press 
releases, reports, case stories, etc.) with identification and conflict themes are the ones that are 
most likely to interest the press. And Oxfam’s communication products, in particular their 
reports, do cater to these two news criteria, as can be inferred from the previous presentation 
of Oxfam’s frames (in section 3.2.2). Also Oxfam has tried to use both aspects of 
identification: personification (with the poor farmer via case stories), and geographical 
proximity of the problem (‘big business reaps subsidies’, ‘consumers pay too high prices’) in 
many of their primary communication products. (For a further analysis of Oxfam’s 
communication products on sugar, see Appendix A.) 
 
The second norm to be considered is that of the deadline. Since the mass media products, such 
as newspapers or television news, are renewed every single day, ‘journalistic time’ is seldom 
more than 24 hours. In this way, ’news’ usually ends up referring to events that have taken 
place within the ’news day’. This fragmentation of time leads to an a-historic worldview 
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characterised by episodic reporting as opposed to focusing on structural or historic contexts. 
Or put in another way: ’Substance has no events’ - as issues, such as poverty or 
unemployment, generally remain static. With regard to the case it must be assumed this 
problematic is potentially enhanced. For example, the EU is characterised by longwinded, 
complex political processes fitting very poorly into the news day. The result is little reporting 
about issues, such as the link between trade and poverty, unless it can be associated with some 
type of (new) event105. 
3.6.2 Institutionalised rules 
On the formal level media organisations consist of a number of rules, defining the 
organisational purpose, division and hierarchy of work, payment and affiliations of 
correspondents, etc. In this way rules regulate the division of responsibility and work within 
the organisation, wherefore rules can be seen as organisational structures that precede the 
journalistic work process per se. In this particular case the focus is on the rules of economy, 
particularly the resources available for journalistic research. The increasing demands for 
turnover influences the journalist’s work, since research most often takes place without 
leaving the news desk or with only moderate expenses in time and resources (e.g. going to a 
press conference). In contrast, in-depth research with great demands on time is extremely rare. 
The demand for increased turnover is a rule that influences the actions of organisations, as 
well as the individual journalist. In relation to the Oxfam case, it could have meant a lack of 
funds to go to developing countries and interview poor farmers exposed to, for example, EU 
sugar dumping. Also, the increasing complexity of politics, especially EU politics, require 
more time to become familiar with the overall context, and this could also come into conflict 
with the demand for increased productivity.  
3.6.3 Institutionalised routines 
Routines cover the daily practice observable in media organisations and often spring from 
norms or rules, but can also develop independently or in direct opposition to these. In this 
particular case the focus is on the routine relationships between journalists and their sources. 
Journalists have a widespread tendency to prefer official sources, such as politicians, officials, 
the police, judges, etc. (see also Wolfsfeld 1997: 17). This may be due to the importance 
journalists confer to productivity, reliability, credibility, authority and communication skill of 
sources – all of which favour so-called ‘professional sources’. The placing of a media 
organisation’s journalists within or near public institutions (‘news beats’) as for example 
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parliaments, city halls, etc. also favours these institutions in the media. There is an increased 
specialisation amongst public as well as private sources. The use of information subsidies, 
public relations-bureaus and spin doctors all point to the steadily more determined attempts 
by professional sources to control the news flow (Corporate Watch 2003). The advantage of 
information subsidies, such as press releases that resemble finished articles, is that they have 
often been journalistically edited and therefore, without much use of time, can be transformed 
into news ready for print. Thus journalists’ research routines may not only lead them to 
sources that are perceived as ‘reliable’ but also to those that are able to produce useful 
information subsidies. Oxfam’s steady stream of press releases, case stories and reports 
during the campaign may therefore to some extent have made up for their potential ‘lack of 
status’. 
 
3.7 Methodology II 
The importance of the abovementioned norms, rules and routines for shaping UK sugar 
reform coverage106 was assessed in the following ways:  
 
For the Guardian: A phone interview was conducted with Guardian economics editor, Larry 
Elliott. Although the data therefore is limited to one informant, he was as economics editor 
well placed to provide information on the subject, as one of the persons formally responsible 
for selecting which trade and EU events or issues that became news stories.  
 
For the Daily Telegraph: Despite repeated requests it was unfortunately not possible to get 
interviewees from the Daily Telegraph, so conclusions in this case were based on secondary 
sources only. It was decided to keep the Telegraph in this section regardless of this difficulty, 
in order to preserve the insights from the previous analysis of media coverage this right-of-
centre outlet in comparison to the neutral BBC and the left-of-centre Guardian. 
 
For the BBC: In 2000 the British Department for International Development (DFID) 
concluded a study about how development issues were presented in UK television. In terms of 
program production (ranging from news to features and documentaries) 14 informants from 
the BBC were interviewed, from commissioning editors to programme makers, including 
correspondents and journalists. The DFID study is the basis for conclusions about why the 
sugar campaign got relatively little coverage in the BBC News. The advantage of this source 
is that more interviewees are included, thus giving a better picture of the norms, rules and 
routines that in general shape news coverage in this organisation. The disadvantage, 
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obviously, is that the study is from before campaign launch and that the interviewees 
therefore do not comment directly on the campaign. Also it is concerned particularly with 
‘development issues’ in a broad sense and not with other, related issues, such as the EU or 
trade politics. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to assume that the norms, rules and routines 
characterising selection of news in the BBC have not changed overly much since the study 
was commissioned and therefore it can still provide valid insights into what shaped BBC 
media coverage on sugar.  
 
Finally, it should be noted that all explanatory analyses were supplemented with relevant data 
from the media analyses above and that full interview-transcriptions, notes and e-mail 
correspondences can be found in appendix D. 
 
3.8 Analysis II: What shaped UK media coverage of sugar reform? 
3.8.1 The Guardian 
Importance of news criteria: According to editor Larry Elliot, the Guardian has 
traditionally been interested in development issues and macroeconomics, particularly those 
that are of relevance to the UK and the wider European policy process. The technical details 
are not interesting. Instead there is a focus on the greater implications of the regime for the 
economy, or its link to a bigger event, e.g. the WTO rulings. The sugar regime itself is a “dry 
issue”, but in terms of Oxfam’s communication products (reports, etc.), Elliott conceded that 
even though the subject itself plays poorly to the classic news criteria, Oxfam sometimes 
manages to match them “fairly well”. He exemplified this with the story about the ‘sugar 
barons’ that receive a lot of EU subsidies, which according to Elliott, was more likely to get 
coverage (which it did). The Guardian also prioritises EU stories, “perhaps more so than 
other media”, and development stories that are made in cooperation with NGOs. These 
statements clearly indicate that the news criterion significance is shaped by the political bias 
of the media organisation and may with regard to some social issues rank higher than other 
criteria107. Elliott’s comments also reflect well the actual priorities on sugar coverage, where 
significant themes were the WTO ruling (7 articles 58) and the revelations about corporate 
subsidies (7 articles). The stories were presumably easier to frame in terms of conflict and 
identification (understood as geographical proximity of the problem). With regard to 
potential problems in Oxfam’s message, Elliott noted that the Guardian was aware that the 
material they got from Oxfam reflected Oxfam’s position, and that they generally tried to “be 
fair” and get second opinions as well. However, the media analysis showed that the actual 
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coverage was very uncritical of Oxfam’s framing and that second opinions often were 
reframed as conspicuous. (See section 3.5.1 for examples.)  
 
Importance of deadline: One criterion for gauging the significance of the ‘news day’ would 
be to divide the articles into those reporting on current events and those that are more issue-
oriented. However, it is difficult to apply stringent criteria for what constitutes reporting of a 
current event as opposed to solely reporting on an issue. With this in mind it can be noted 
that a review of the 58 Guardian stories showed that only about 6-9 stories of all genres 
(leaders, opinion pieces, interviews and analyses included) could reasonably be rated as ‘all 
issue – no news’. So this - and Elliott’s comment that the regime is a “dry issue” -  supports 
the conclusion that the sugar reform topic fitted poorly into the news day for the Guardian 
staff. 
 
Importance of economy: Elliott indicated that it was not necessarily a condition for 
coverage that there were information subsidies, but that “it certainly is helpful”. For 
example, a comparison between press releases in Oxfam GB’s archive and the Guardian’s 
printed articles shows that the date of 15 out of 24 sugar stories with Oxfam from January 
2004 to October 2005 corresponded almost exactly to the dates of Oxfam’s sugar-related 
press releases (Oxfam web site, Appendix B). This strengthens the thesis that information 
subsidies were relevant in the sugar case. However, if the Guardian in general prioritises EU 
and trade issues, maybe they would have covered these events regardless, even if Oxfam had 
not been there. Although, this conjecture moves into the realm of the counterfactual it would 
be reasonable to assume, since the Guardian, as Elliot said, strives to be attentive to such 
issues in general. Elliott also mentioned that the Guardian has no funds particularly 
earmarked for ‘development stories’, but that it has two full time correspondents in Africa, as 
well as a large network of stringers108. In any event, there were only 4 stories that included 
lengthier quotes from farmers in developing countries out of the total of 58 sugar stories, so 
obviously economy and time did play an important part in limiting this type of coverage.  
 
Importance of routine relation to sources: Elliott noted that when there was a new Oxfam 
report out, the organisation would let the paper know “a week in advance” and then “[send] 
down their press and policy officer to meet with us”. Of course, the balance between routine 
preferences for official sources vs. other sources in the Guardian as a whole cannot be 
inferred from this statement alone. But even if Guardian staff were not particularly pro-active 
themselves in seeking out sources from civil society organisations, they did oblige Oxfam 
with time for meetings when they were contacted. This routine could likely be prompted by 
                                                 
108
 A ’stringer’ is journalistic term for free-lance providers of news stories. 
3. A good story or no story – UK media coverage on sugar reform 
 47
the Guardian’s interpretation of the news criterion significance, as shown above, and the 
paper’s explicitly stated values to “produce progressive, enlightened newspapers  … as well 
as write regularly about corporate social responsibility”109.     
3.8.2 The Daily Telegraph 
As mentioned earlier, it was not possible to reach any conclusions about the low visibility in 
the Daily Telegraph, nor about the importance of particular norms, rules and routines in this 
outlet. However, the Telegraph is, as mentioned earlier, generally viewed as partisan to the 
British Conservative party, which traditionally is a ‘farmers’ party’ according to Jack 
Thurston, former advisor to the UK ministry of agriculture (Thurston, interview; see also 
Newton & Brynin 2001). This editorial bias, as well as the relatively larger amount of stories 
focused on the decline of the sugar industry, may be a principal reason for the lack of interest 
in Oxfam’s campaign (which often criticised industry and farmers). However, it was not 
possible to validate this assumption any further. 
3.8.3 The BBC News 
Importance of news criteria: Some responses from the DFID report do show idealism about 
prioritising news related to developing countries, for example when Richard Ayre, Deputy 
Chief Executive of BBC News, stated that: “We have an obligation to inform a wide-ranging 
UK audience, and to bring to people’s notice what many think they don’t care about”  (DFID 
2000: 156). But in general pessimism reigned as to the chances of increasing coverage on 
development: “Is the developing world important? Yes. Will it get big audiences? No,” said 
Adam MacDonald, Head of Scheduling, BBC Television (156). And News Programme 
Maker, George Alagiah, elaborated:  
 
Anything can be made into good TV – that’s the craft – but editors get into a safety area. Stories 
like ‘banana wars’ have to fight their way in. [Correspondents] have no power over what we do. 
A programme editor can always say ‘That’s not our type of story’. Even for a designated 
Development Correspondent it is difficult to get items on until you’re established (159).  
 
Alagiah also argued that the importance which television channels attribute to viewer ratings 
can block development stories: “There’s an institutional divide between the programme 
editors who are becoming increasingly parochial under pressure to compete with the other 
mass channels, and the producers and correspondents with important foreign stories to tell” 
(167).  So for the BBC strong ideas about audience preferences and the need to compete with 
other, more ‘popular channels’ appear to have gone before any norms about what in general 
constitutes ‘a good news story’110. On the other hand, it could be seen as just another way of 
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adhering to the criterion of significance, which is interpreted in a sometimes tension-laden 
cross-field between the journalists’ and editors’ personal values, the BBC charter as a public 
service station, and the need to compete for audiences.  
 
Importance of deadline: On this Richard Ayre clearly confirmed that “developing world 
output tends to be issue-driven and therefore gets pushed lower down the bulletins, after the 
‘immediate events’” (DFID 2000: 164). Also, George Alagiah agreed that stories that set out 
to explore the relationship between the ‘rich world’ and the ‘poor world’ would get dropped if 
“anything more immediate happens” (ibid.). These comments point to the ‘double-whammy’ 
suffered by development issues: Not only do they contain few events in themselves, but they 
also have to compete with a multitude of other news items, from wars to football matches, 
that can produce new events almost every day. 
 
Importance of economy: Only 2 of the 11 BBC stories opened with scenes from developing 
country sugar cane fields (in Swaziland and Guyana) and included interviews with local 
workers. Again this fact supported the thesis that, as with the newspapers, economic priorities 
did not allow for much of this type of coverage. However, economy is not the sole factor 
determining if sugar stories are ‘boosted’ by interviews with the ‘victims’ in the South. The 
fact is that the BBC is the largest global broadcasting corporation with a budget of £4 billion, 
and 44 newsgathering bureaux around the world (Wikipedia). So in principle the station could 
have focused more on ‘live’ development stories, but the previous responses about norms for 
programme- and news-production make clear why this was not so.  
 
Importance of routine relations with sources: Interestingly, George Alagiah explicitly says 
that some NGOs “like Oxfam” are “very helpful” in providing stories, whereas the big news 
agencies in his view are “a negative influence” because their agenda influences the 
programme editors and can “militate against development stories” (DFID 2000: 160). 
However, the data were insufficient to draw any further conclusions on this matter with 
regard to its potential importance for the visibility of the Oxfam campaign.  
 
Considerations about constraints of the medium: Unlike the printed press, the TV medium 
itself presents some special disadvantages vis-à-vis stories about development issues. 
Explains Vin Ray, Executive Editor for Newsgathering: “We couldn’t fit in many more 
foreign stories, with news programmes only about half an hour long. Time is the biggest 
problem when it comes to explaining complex stories” (DFID 2000: 165). By the same token, 
Oxfam would also have more difficulty in spending the necessary resources to provide 
information subsidies (such as live footage) to television than to the printed press. 
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4. ‘A scandalous situation’ or ‘a benefit for developing countries’? 
– decision-maker rhetoric on sugar reform 
 
4.1 Overview 
In the previous chapter it was concluded that UK media coverage was generally positive to 
Oxfam’s messages, albeit uneven in terms of visibility, and that perceptions of significance 
and audience preferences played a major part in determining the level of coverage. Before an 
analysis of the relation between media coverage and the political process can be undertaken, it 
is necessary to review the UK rhetoric on sugar over a longer period of time. Why was there a 
correspondence between Oxfam and government rhetoric on export subsidies, and not on 
prices and market access, as shown in chapter 2?  And was there already a correspondence on 
subsidies before the campaign began? This chapter analyses UK government rhetoric on sugar 
reform 1999-2005 and shows that it has indeed been remarkably consistent. Price cuts were 
advocated, increased market access was accepted but only under the present EBA 
arrangement, and export subsidies were to be abolished. Some late concessions, e.g. on longer 
transitions periods for price reductions and vague promises to reconsider the market access 
question, do not particularly change this picture. The preferences of the UK government 
therefore never correlated with Oxfam’s on prices and access - but did so all along on export 
subsidies. Commission rhetoric also signalled a preference for deep price reductions, and 
maintenance of the present market access arrangements, but – also as noted in chapter 2 - an 
offer was made to reduce export subsidies, and this offer was promoted quite often as a sign 
of EU ‘goodwill’. Also, it is notable that key Oxfam framings of reform arguments were 
reproduced by UK ministers, but often in such a way that it diverted attention from 
differences between Oxfam and the government on the issues of prices and market access. 
Similar ‘diversions’ were also used by some EU Commissioners with regard to the issue of 
market access, and the Commissioners tried in general also to reframe the problem of low 
world prices as being the fault of other exporters than the EU.  
 
4.2 Methodology III 
The potential effects of media coverage on the rhetoric of the British government and the EU 
Commission were assessed in the following ways: 
4.2.1 Assessing resonance in the political rhetoric 
Primary document analysis 
For the UK: As noted earlier, resonance is not only discernible in the media but also in 
political rhetoric outside of the media. Therefore an analysis was made of selected speeches, 
4. Decision-maker rhetoric on sugar reform 
 50
transcripts from hearings, answers in Parliament, reports, memoranda and other documents 
pertaining to the UK government’s agricultural, trade and development ministries in the 
period 1 January 1999 - 23 November 2005, so as to give a good indication of developments 
before and after the campaign. Some quotes from media stories were also included. 
 
For the EU: An analysis was made of EU Commissioner rhetoric in selected speeches111, 
reports, press releases, interviews, media stories, official communications, press kits, 
summaries of meetings and quotes from various Internet sites (all in English) from the period 
1 January 1999 to 23 November 2005.  
 
Method of selection 
For the UK: 27 documents referring to the sugar regime were selected via various Internet 
searches using the search engines on the Google, UK government and UK House of 
Commons web sites. Selected documents had to address the sugar or related agricultural 
reform issues with regard to prices, market access or export subsidies and not just mention 
sugar in passing.  
 
For the EU: 31 documents referring to the sugar regime were selected from various Internet 
searches under the same criteria as the UK documents using the search engines on the Google 
and EU Commission web sites.  
 
The analysis is strictly qualitative in nature. All quotations are intended to exemplify major 
patterns (e.g. of arguments and framings) in the selected material. Appendix C lists the 
complete set of documents which form the basis for these analyses. As regards specific 
methods, two types of media effects on rhetoric were defined and operationalised as follows: 
 
• Resonance as consonance: This refers to reproduction of Oxfam’s frames - or parts 
of these frames - as they appeared in Oxfam communication products or in the media, 
and in the form of a ‘problem-cause-solution’ perspective similar to Oxfam’s, 
including key phrasings or examples (see section 3.2.2). Consonance in this sense 
need not signify an actual shift in position or preferences on an issue, though, as shall 
be demonstrated below.  
• Resonance as dissonance: This refers to reactions to Oxfam’s frames, under the same 
conditions as noted above – but with a rejection of Oxfam’s framing of the problem.  
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4.2.2 Validity  
Linking decision-maker rhetoric on sugar reform criticism to the Make Trade Fair campaign 
is difficult. If for example the EU in a document counters a critique of export subsidies 
without mentioning Oxfam, it could have been aimed at the general critique from other 
stakeholders. Also it need not have been a reaction to criticism visible in the mass media, but 
could just as well have been a reaction to criticism in NGO reports, on the Internet, at NGO 
consultations, etc. The argument for causality is strengthened, though, if it can be shown that 
decision-maker rhetoric address or reproduce specific phrasings or examples attributable to 
Oxfam’s communication products or to the way Oxfam’s frames were presented in the media. 
It is doubtful, though, that there can ever be a completely satisfactory solution to attributing 
importance to media effects over other causal factors - or to separating media effects from 
these - although more detailed interview guides, coupled with a more elaborate ‘tracking’ of 
resonance in primary documents could do much to alleviate this problem. The downside is 
that such an undertaking puts a far greater demand on research resources with regard to 
collecting, systematising, coding, and interpreting data. As regards, this thesis the analyses do 
include some discussion of the attribution problem, with more specific examples, wherever it 
was deemed relevant. 
 
4.3 Analysis III: UK sugar reform rhetoric 1999-2005 
4.3.1 Before the campaign (1999-2001) 
In this period references to the sugar regime were few and scattered. Some examples of 
general arguments include: 
 
On prices: In January 1999 the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF) stated in 
the House of Commons that “During the [EU] negotiations the UK pressed for the sugar and 
sheep meat regimes to be included in the [CAP reform] package, and it continues to press for 
early reform”112. Also, in the winter of 2000 MAFF made clear that “we are not in favour of 
price increases [on sugar]”113.  And in 2001, the now renamed Department for Environment, 
Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) stated that “Specific [CAP] reforms needed will include 
decisions on market support to align EU prices with the world market”114. 
 
On market access: In 2001 Deputy Minister of Agriculture, Joyce Quin, made clear in the 
House of Commons that “the principle of access for LDC’s is one which the Government 
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support”115. Otherwise few relevant statements were given on sugar market access that year, 
although there was some discussion of the implications of the Everything But Arms treaty in 
general. 
 
On export subsidies: On this subject, Secretary for Agriculture, Margaret Beckett said in a 
2001 speech that “the UK Government wants to see the end of market distorting subsidies … 
if we are to address market distorting subsidies we would also need to seek substantial 
reduction in market management under the first pillar across the range of commodities such 
as  … sugar.”116 And Joyce Quin again explained in the House of Commons that with regard 
to sugar, “specific reforms needed will include decisions ... to align EU prices with the world 
market and end reliance on subsidised exports”117. 
4.3.2 After campaign launch (2002-2005) 
Consonance 
On market access: In 2003 Oxfam’s entry into the debate began to resonate in the UK 
government’s rhetoric. Thus, Secretary for Trade, Patricia Hewitt, directly echoed Oxfam 
when she said that: 
 
… The [EU] system is so distorting that it pays a country like Finland to actually produce 
sugar. Look at Mozambique, one of the poorest countries in the world … Even after recent 
amendments to our sugar regime, European subsidies will this year deprive Mozambique an 
estimated $106 million. The EU gives aid to Mozambique, but it isn’t much more, 
$136million per year. We are giving with one hand but taking away with the other. It is a 
scandalous situation118. 
 
The Mozambique example and the numbers for export losses completely matched those in 
Oxfam’s ‘Great Sugar Scam’ report (Oxfam 2002c: 2). As shown earlier this example was 
reproduced several times in the media as well, particularly in the Guardian (see section 3.5.1). 
This particular example apparently went so well with the UK government that it was, in 
various forms, used on at least 5 other occasions by Patricia Hewitt and by Minister for 
Development, Hillary Benn119 - plus on at least one occasion by Chancellor Gordon Brown, 
(also in section 3.5.1). And this repetition happened well into 2005 after the LDCs had 
changed their position on market access!  
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On export subsidies: In May 2004 DEFRA Undersecretary for Agriculture, Lord Whitty, 
explained in Parliament about export subsidies that “the Government are committed to … 
secure substantial reductions in trade-distorting support, including negotiations with a view 
to phasing out all forms of export subsidy … “120. The government’s critique of subsidies 
were followed up in 2005, this time from Hillary Benn, who also used the ‘trade-aid 
comparison’ that Oxfam had used - albeit in a different version:  “We need to tackle trade 
distorting subsidies and further open our markets … Agricultural protection is damaging to 
developing country producers. It costs them $20 billion a year by shutting them out of EU 
markets”121. Again this criticism corresponded with media visibility on the subject, 
particularly with the Guardian’s persistent reproduction of Oxfam’s ‘dumping that destroys 
livelihoods’ frame. However, in substance it had also been consistent with the government’s 
rhetoric even before the campaign began. So if there were any effect of media coverage in this 
case, it would only have been to contribute to keeping the UK government focused on the 
issue in the EU. 
 
‘Dissonance’  
On prices: Because Oxfam’s position on EU price cuts was more positive before early 2004, 
it may be somewhat misleading to label ‘pro-price cut rhetoric’ from the government as 
‘dissonance’, before 2004, but if compared to Oxfam’s later objectives it must be relegated to 
this category. Thus, in 2002 Lord Whitty stated that: “It has been the UK’s quite long-term 
view that the sugar regime does the liberalising and in the long run that must mean that the 
price comes down … ”122. Earlier that year DEFRA had also lamented in the House of 
Commons that “although the United Kingdom pressed for price reductions in last year’s 
negotiations on renewal of the [sugar] regime, the levels set by the Agriculture Council  … 
for the period to 2006 remain broadly unchanged from the previous regime“123. With regard 
to this, the fate of the preferential suppliers from the ACP was voiced as a strong UK concern 
during 2004, but the solution was not moderate price reductions. Thus, said Margaret Beckett:  
I question, too, whether it is really in the long term interest of the least developed countries for 
significant parts of their economies to remain so dependent on a single foreign subsidy 
regime. Real economic security depends on diversity and integration into world markets, 
rather than prolonging a culture of dependency and protectionism124. 
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Following this, the UK did support an aid package to help the most inefficient ACP producers 
restructure their industries for other exports, or make them more competitive in the face of 
preference erosion in the EU125.  
Market access: As shown above the Mozambique example was used to argue for greater 
market access to developing countries after the LDC proposal to continue limited access. And 
the LDC proposal was not mentioned in any of the selected speeches. In 2004 it was affirmed 
that Benn and Hewitt had not just been talking in a way that at least not ruled out the LDC 
proposal. This happened when Lord Whitty stated in May 2004 that:  “ … we [the 
government] are not in favour of reopening the EBA. Indeed its existence is a driver for 
reform and it is, therefore, part of the pattern where there is pressure on the current regime to 
change radically”126. This was a paradoxical statement, since the LDCs themselves had 
proposed to renegotiate the agreement so the EU wouldn’t have to give up protection its own 
sugar farmers in 2009. Whitty’s statement thus makes the EBA come off as something that is 
on the one hand ‘not up for negotiation’, and on the other hand ‘inevitable’. 
 
As can be surmised from the previous analysis, the UK rhetoric up until the reform proposal 
of June 2005 was generally quite consistent. However, as indicated in chapter 2, just before 
the Agriculture Council would start adopting the new sugar legislation in November 2005, 
Tony Blair assured Caribbean leaders - after ministerial consultations - that he would seek to 
lengthen the transitional period of price reductions, push for an increase in transitional 
assistance, and “examine the issue of greater market access”. Even if the contribution of the 
UK in the Agriculture Council cannot be singled out from that of ‘allied’ member states, it 
was indeed the case that the Council did agree to phase in the new sugar measures over a 
four-year period, instead of the original two. But it must also be remembered that this 
decision would, at least temporarily, benefit the EU sugar industry and give it more time to 
adapt, so it was not necessarily made because the UK delegation went to Brussels to fight for 
a ‘better deal’ for the ACP127. 
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4.4 EU Commission sugar reform rhetoric 1999-2005 
4.4.1 Before the campaign (1999-2001) 
In the period between 1999 and 2002 there was no significant rhetoric about sugar reform in 
the selected Commission documents. The only real point of interest was in 2000 when the 
renewal of the present CMO was negotiated. At that time the member state delegations in the 
Special Committee for Agriculture debated a proposal to extend the regime for merely 2 years 
instead of 5, but only the UK, Sweden and Denmark were in favour. Otherwise, the 
‘rhetorical silence’ may well reflect the fact that at the time the Commission was preparing 
itself for initiating a much wider reform negotiation process, as the Council had also 
mandated it to do no later than 2003 (EUC 2003: 4). Once the reform process was officially 
kicked off the Commission would then make it a priority to engage in a sugar debate, and so 
would other stakeholders. 
4.4.2 After campaign launch (2002-2005) 
Consonance 
On prices: No examples of consonance were found in the material from this period. Although 
criticism of the high prices is mentioned in the first Commission impact assessment in late 
2003 (EUC 2003: 13), Oxfam would half a year later begin to adjust its position against more 
moderate price cuts, and as the reform process moved on, the gap between this stance and that 
of the Commission widened, as will be elaborated in the upcoming section on dissonance.  
 
On market access: Concerns about the LDCs and ACP were almost never mentioned as 
reasons for reform by Agriculture Commissioner Franz Fischler, but sometimes invoked as 
reasons to be cautious about reform. For example, Fischler said in 2003:  
 
Eliminating all trade barriers could benefit the most competitive developed and 
developing countries, such as Brazil … but this would be at the cost of many weaker 
and more vulnerable developing countries. This is because a large number of 
developing countries benefit from preferences on the EU market … 128.   
 
It would be rather forthcoming, though, to definitively label this rhetoric as clearly consonant 
with Oxfam’s framings on market access, since Oxfam focused a lot in its reports on 
promoting further access especially for the African LDCs into the EU market129. But perhaps 
Fischler was only exploiting ambiguities in the text of these reports, where large efficient 
producers like Brazil and Thailand were indeed used to exemplify the size of lost export 
earnings, but then not really mentioned any further (as examples of some of those countries 
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that ‘ought to’ benefit from sugar reform). All the case stories about poor farmers were from 
Africa, which clearly indicated which developing countries Oxfam wanted to first and 
foremost to benefit from the EU sugar market. 
 
On export subsidies: The Commission’s 2003 impact assessment admitted that “… the sugar 
CMO is severely criticised because it organises a vastly surplus sugar production which is 
disposed of on the world market to the detriment of more competitive producers with the aid 
of refunds the cost of which is ultimately born by taxpayers and consumers”(EUC 2003: 12). 
But otherwise phasing out export subsidies was mentioned by Fischler only as part of the 
EU’s overall negotiating offer from before the Cancun WTO Ministerial in September 2003, 
and later in May 2004 before further WTO consultations. And it was always conditioned on 
other states choosing to remove their export subsidies as well. Furthermore, the impetus to do 
something about subsidies to strengthen the EU’s negotiation position in the WTO was a 
much-used argument for sugar reform. In the fall of 2004 the soon-to-be Trade 
Commissioner, Peter Mandelson, followed up on this subject when he once again confirmed 
that the EU was positive about reducing export subsidies, and that the CAP was “financially 
unsustainable”. On the other hand, he also continued the EU argument that with regard to the 
WTO rulings “the real winners would be Brazil, Thailand and Australia” and not the 
LDCs130 . Once again the latter argument came off as an EU attempt to divert attention from 
the real issue. Brazil, Thailand and Australia had a legitimate interest in a less distorted world 
sugar market, and higher world prices would also benefit some LDCs as well in third markets. 
In any case, none of the export subsidy rhetoric can be definitively linked to pressure from 
Oxfam, or from the media, since as noted above in the Commission’s first impact assessment, 
“all consulted parties … agree in condemning the export refund system” (EUC 2003: 12).   
 
Dissonance 
On prices: Generally neither Franz Fischler, nor Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy, focused 
very much on prices in their public rhetoric on sugar reform. The focus was more on the need 
for the sugar regime to ‘align’ with the market-oriented reforms of the rest of the CAP. This, 
of course, meant price reductions. But by framing reform in this way it may have been easier 
to ‘sell’ because it portrayed the Commission as working for a ‘strong and competitive’ 
agriculture in Europe, and shifted the focus away from the – for some – unpleasant reality of 
lower incomes. Fischler did, however, express at consultations with NGOs and business 
interests in 2004 that he was not convinced about long-term viability of LDC trade in sugar. 
What, he asked rhetorically, would be consequences in developing countries if prices were 
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kept higher for 10 years?131 He added that the benefits of EU access went mainly to traders, 
not producers. The argument was not really addressing Oxfam’s case, since the extra income 
that does accrue to sugar plantation workers in the South still is extremely important to their 
livelihood situation, even if it cannot be compared to the amount that trader firms may extract 
from sugar exports. Whatever the merits of Fischler’s comment on prices, his additional 
comments appeared again like an attempt to divert attention from criticisms of the regime by 
downplaying its effects for poor farmers in Africa. 
 
On market access: Fischler argued on several occasions in 2004 about the need to prepare 
the EU sugar sector for the arrival of cheaper EBA sugar in 2009, since if this was not done 
“the EU sugar sector will enter into an attrition scenario, in which even our best producing 
areas will have to dramatically reduce production”132. However, in private consultations with 
NGOs he also stated that the EBA was a “unilateral offer”, which could not be renegotiated 
with the LDCs133. So like Lord Whitty, Fischler again framed the EBA as on the one side 
being ‘inevitable’, and on the other side refused the offer from the other party to renegotiate 
it. In both cases the EBA makes an interesting example of how pro-development rhetoric is 
used to reframe and defend policy positions that otherwise have little to do with meeting the 
express concerns of some developing countries. Taking over Fischler’s arguments his 
successor, Mariann Fischer Boel, also portrayed the EU as a defender of developing 
countries’ rights: “Let me be very clear on the Everything But Arms … It would be a wrong 
signal to roll back our privileges to the LDC’s – particularly in a year where we are trying 
hard to convince the rest of the developed world to follow our example and increase market 
access to developing countries”134.Boel was in this case countering the European 
Parliament’s call to consider the LDC proposal for continued quota-restricted access. Her 
comments make it sound as if the proposal originated within the European Parliament, and 
not within the LDC group itself.  
 
Lastly, in December 2004 Peter Mandelson continued this line of argument, but added a more 
pragmatic justification, when he stated that “ … it would be a mistake to think that putting a 
cap on LDC imports would enable the EU to maintain the current level of prices. EU sugar 
prices will in any case go down: you would only lose out yourselves by self-limiting your 
exports”135. Mandelson may here have been referring to the impending ‘threat’ of future 
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WTO agreements that would see an automatic lowering of EU sugar import tariffs vis-à-vis 
all potential exporters (including Brazil), which would again make a fixed and high internal 
EU price untenable. To this the LDCs later argued that reform could legally take their 
concerns into account on the basis of the so-called WTO ‘enabling clause’ that allows for 
differential treatment of poorer countries when agreeing on trade rules (LDC Sugar 2005). 
However, this option was never discussed further by Mandelson. 
 
On export subsidies: Much was done by the Commission to reframe the WTO dispute by 
Brazil, Australia and Thailand as something that could “destabilise the sugar-dependent 
economies of small ACP countries” by “undermining preferential ACP sugar exports to 
Europe”. The Commission also insisted that the ruling “[threatened] the value of the current 
preferential access arrangements”136, although this was not what the Panel actually had ruled 
(see chapter 2). Furthermore, it tried on various occasions to relegate the main cause of 
depressed world prices to particularly Brazilian exports, but also to those of Australia and 
Thailand. This ‘blame game’ was not merely an attempt to deflect all critique, though. In the 
Commission documents the discussion of prices was often followed by calling attention to the 
EU’s May 2004 offer on cutting export subsidies.  Not unreasonably, Oxfam argued that this 
strategy was a deliberate attempt to show, both to the media and in the WTO, that the EU had 
already taken its share of responsibility on export subsidies and signal that now the EU had 
“done enough” (Leadbeater, interview).  
4.4.3 General observations about the Commissioners’ rhetoric 
It was shown above that even after campaign launch, consonance with Oxfam’s frames was 
extremely low - and virtually non-existent when it came to reproducing specific phrasings or 
dominant examples. Thus, in Commissioner Fischler’s public speeches, there were over a 5-
year period only a few indirect references to criticisms from NGDOs and developing 
countries - and none directly to Oxfam. The examples in the preceding sections may leave the 
impression that at least there was a lot more dissonance and therefore a ‘debate’ going on. But 
resonance directly related to the campaign – both positive or negative – was generally very 
low in all strands of the Commission’s communication. For example, none of the news 
bulletins from DG Agriculture included explicit reactions to the Oxfam campaign during the 
period 2002-2005, and out of the 10 Commission press releases that did explicitly address 
sugar reform most of them were only commenting on the WTO dispute137. In fact, none of the 
selected primary documents - from speeches, over reports to summaries of meetings138 - 
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indicated that the media or Oxfam had played a particular role in considerations of reform, 
although it must also be cautioned that such considerations may not have been written down 
in publicly available documents. In this regard, it can also be noted that it not possible to find 
any substantial comments on the sugar regime reform from Development Commissioners, 
Poul Nielson and later Louis Michel. Despite its importance for developing countries it 
appeared that this issue had in the Commission’s external communication been separated 
from the EU development policy in general. 
 
The only significant public response to the Oxfam campaign itself came at the very 
beginning, when the Commission on 17 April 2002 published a 32-page rejoinder to Oxfam’s 
first trade report, ‘Rigged Rules’. Oxfam subsequently published another rejoinder to the 
Commission’s comments. The dialogue quickly got bogged down in technical details, though, 
about how to measure subsidies, openness to imports and effects of subsidies. Also, sugar was 
not an issue in these publications and due to the highly technical nature of the arguments it is 
doubtful if they were diffused any further in the mass media. (See Oxfam 2002a, 2002b, and 
EUC 2002a.)  
 
In sum, has been shown thus far that whatever the actual level of sugar media coverage in the 
UK and in Europe, resonance was scattered and there was no shift in the UK government or 
the Commission’s preferences except on export subsidies (for the Commission). In the 
chapters 6 and 7 the underlying political and institutional factors that made it so difficult for 
Oxfam to shift the rhetoric of the decision-makers and the final legislative proposal are put 
into focus. The upcoming chapter 5 will lay the theoretical groundwork for these analyses. 
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5. Theoretical background: Mass media effects in politics 
 
5.1 Overview 
This chapter considers from a theoretical point of view the factors at the political level that 
could explain why media coverage did, or did not, affect the sugar reform process. Combining 
insights from the new institutionalism and mass media effects theory, it is posited that media 
messages are filtered through the receivers’ social environment, which in this case is defined 
as the formal and informal institutions shaping the preferences and strategies of political 
actors. On the basis of the selected theoretical material, the chapter concludes that in this type 
of analysis, the various coalitions of actors and their stated preferences should be placed first. 
After that it is necessary analyse the following 6 elements that either enable or constrain 
media impact on the policy process and their relative importance and interplay:  
 
2. The institutionalised rules that structure:  
a. Interest group participation in policy-development;  
b. Delegation of authority between formal decision-makers;  
c. International commitments; and 
d. Distribution of costs and benefits of a contentious policy;  
3. Norms about interest group legitimacy and prevailing paradigms about economic 
development;  
4. The relative value of media outlets and public sentiments for the decision-makers;  
5. How different framings of the relevant policy issue played out in the media (as 
analysed in section 3.5);  
6. The concrete strategies of the actors ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ the political process;  
7. The degree of elite dissent and uncertainty as regards a controversial policy.  
 
5.2 The institutional environment of decision-makers and media messages 
Linear communication models typically involve the concept of a sender, a medium and a 
receiver (Henriksen 2001). Somewhat simplified, one can say that traditionally in 
communication theory there has been a distinction between models that emphasised 
communication as transmission of ideas, and those that emphasised communication as a 
process in which the participants mutually create and share information (Windahl & Signitzer 
1992: 6-18). Communication in this thesis is primarily analysed as a linear transmission 
process, but this is does not signal a rejection of the role of interactive communication 
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processes. It is merely a pragmatic consideration given the scope of the research field139. But 
even when considering communication as primarily transmission, the receiver’s 
understandings of media messages are still filtered through their beliefs, attitudes and values, 
which are in part formed by the people with whom they are in social contact and by 
discussions with these people. Thus, a plethora of factors influencing how media messages 
are processed could be placed in a category termed ’the social environment of the receiver’, 
such as age, gender, family, ethnicity, education, religion, and so on (Maletzke 1978: 81-82; 
Henriksen 2001: 30). The extent of the filtering process is dependent on the strength of the 
individual’s attachment to the group’s norms. However, in relation to this thesis, the primary 
receivers are the political decision-makers, who are influenced in particular by the political or 
bureaucratic groups that they belong to or must somehow relate to. Defining the parameters 
of this particular type of social environment is where communication studies can fruitfully be 
informed from political science. 
 
Much of political science is concerned with the institutions that either enable or constrain 
political action. Thus, it is not only ‘self-interest’ in the wider sense (such as maximising 
personal power, economic benefits for their constituency, or gaining influence for their party 
or organisation) that compels the actions of decision-makers, but also institutionalised norms 
and rules, as was discussed in the case of media organisations140.  In simple terms, institutions 
can be said to structure politics because they: 1) Define who is able to participate in the 
particular political arena, 2) shape the actors’ political strategies by providing expectations 
about how other actors will behave, and 3) influence what these actors believe to be both 
possible and desirable (i.e. their preferences) (Steinmo 2001: 1). Thus, political institutions 
will also shape how the media affects politics in a given context.  
 
This is where the new institutionalism provides valuable insights in how to analyse the 
interplay of the mass media with the policy process. Within the new institutionalism three 
major schools are usually identified: rational choice institutionalism, historical 
institutionalism, and organisational institutionalism141. The three schools attribute importance 
to different aspects of social reality but many concepts, such as ‘norms’, overlap between the 
schools, and researchers have also made quite a few attempts at cross-fertilisation between the 
schools (e.g. Thelen 1992; Hall 1996; Campbell 1998). It is beyond the scope of this thesis to 
provide a more detailed comparison between central tenets of each school, including 
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conceptual and methodological discussions. Instead the focus will be on explaining selected 
useful concepts and how their source of inspiration can be linked to individual schools. As for 
the on-going discussion of ‘structure vs. agency’142, it is the perspective in this thesis that 
agency and structure can be considered mutually constitutive. Social life is not just the sum of 
actors’ activities, but neither can social activity be explained by concluding rigidly that social 
structures, such as institutions, determine behaviour. Social structures are reproduced or 
changed by individual activities from ‘below’, but they also constrain or enable action from 
‘above’.  
 
To take this point a little further, different types of institutions may lend themselves better to a 
particular methodological perspective than others. For example: Institutionalised rules about 
access to the policy process and delegation of authority could easily be explained in terms of 
rational and conscious calculations about how to regulate behaviour in order to reduce the 
transaction costs and uncertainty of collective interaction. On the other hand, a norm about 
who is considered a legitimate stakeholder in a given policy process may be better understood 
as a mental template for appropriate behaviour (‘who should we take seriously?’) that have 
become so entrenched that it continually shapes individual preferences in this regard, and with 
the actors rarely being conscious about it.  
 
What follows, then, is the definition of a number of terms used in the upcoming comparison 
of perspectives on institutions. These definitions do not necessarily match those generally 
used within the schools, but in order to make a concise - albeit simplistic - comparison it is 
necessary to ‘lock’ some definitions143 from the outset:  
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question about to what extent collective human action is the sum of individual preferences and behaviour - or - to what extent 
it is shaped, or even determined, by enduring norms, routines and other cognitive frameworks that the actors themselves are 
not necessarily aware of. Classic Marxism is for example very preoccupied with structural factors that elicit ‘class 
consciousness’, whereas neoclassical economics is known for its emphasis on the autonomy of individual behaviour. In the 
late 1970s British sociologist Anthony Giddens took steps to reconcile the two approaches in his structuration theory. (For an 
overview see for example Gilje & Grimen 1998: Chapter 8; Andersen & Kaspersen 1996: Chapter 24.) 
143
 Norms, rules and routines were already defined and exemplified in chapter 3. 
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Key definitions III  - Concepts from the new institutionalism 
 
Rational (action): Calculating the costs and benefits of each choice, based on known information, 
and choosing the action, which confers the most benefits.  
 
Institutionalised policy programmes: Policies that have spawned a set of organisations that 
implement, or even perpetuate, them. (E.g.: The CAP with its complementary EU institutions, 
ministries, organised lobbies, etc.) 
 
Paradigms144: Rarely contested political, social or economic assumptions about the world that are 
usually prevalent among the elite (politicians, academia, etc.). They constrain the range of imaginable 
solutions to a problem. (E.g.: ‘Only free markets can promote economic growth’.) 
 
Public sentiments: Rarely contested norms, or assumptions about the world, usually prevalent in the 
public. They constrain the range of legitimate political solutions to a problem. (E.g: ‘EU policies should 
not ‘harm’  developing countries economically’.) Obviously public sentiments can very fluid, variable 
and sometimes contradictory between and within geographic regions. 
 
Path dependency: A system (e.g. an institutionalised policy) exhibits signs of path dependency, if 
initial moves in one direction elicit further moves in that same direction, because there are self-
reinforcing mechanisms or positive feedbacks in the system. In this sense, it is the equivalent of the 
increasing returns concept in economics. It is not a strictly deterministic concept, but rather it implies 
the perpetuation of constraints on future choices145. Thus, path change can and do occur - for example 
as a result of exogenous shocks (e.g.: the WTO rulings on CAP export subsidies). 
 
 (Sources: Heywood 1997; Campbell 1998; Kay 2003, 2004.) 
 
After clarifying these terms, it is time to present the central perceptions of institutions in the 
policy process, which are used in this thesis. The presentation has been inspired by the 3 
schools – but is not a strict categorisation of concepts used within each school. Also, as will 
be demonstrated in the upcoming analyses, concepts like norms, rules, and paradigms cannot 
be completely separated from each other, or from policy struggles in which interests, 
resources and power loom large (Campbell 1998: 379). They are primarily analytical 
distinctions. The table below is then intended to give an overview of the theoretical 
considerations underlying some of the key questions, which are used to guide the analysis and 
which will be outlined in the section on methodology: 
                                                 
144
 The term ‘paradigm’ is within the natural sciences most often associated with Thomas Samuel Kuhn (1922 – 1996) -  an 
American intellectual who wrote extensively on the history and philosophy of science. The term ‘paradigm’ is in this thesis 
used in a less formal sense than Kuhn’s, and is inspired by John Campbell (1998: p. 385ff). 
145
 Path dependency is not a theory or model, for it does not provide a general list of variables that can be used to organise 
‘diagnostic and prescriptive inquiry’, nor does it provide hypotheses about specific links between variables. Instead, path 
dependency is an empirical category - a concept, which can be used to label a certain type of temporal process (Kay 2003: 
406). It is usually associated with the school of historical institutionalism.  
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Table 5.1 - Three perspectives on institutions 
Source of 
inspiration 
Rational choice 
institutionalism 
Historical institutionalism Organisational institutionalism 
View of 
individual 
behaviour 
The individual is a utility 
maximiser 
The individual is a 
‘satisficer’.  
The individual is expressing identity. 
What are 
institutions 
and what do 
they do? 
 
Institutions affect 
behaviour by providing actors 
with degrees of certainty 
about the behaviour of other 
actors.  
 
They are rules that provide 
information on enforcement 
mechanisms, penalties, 
delegation of authority, etc. 
 
  
Institutions affect behaviour 
by providing actors with 
mental templates for 
interpretation and action – but 
these are to some degree 
conscious and contested by 
others.  
 
They are norms and rules that 
enable and constrain 
(particularly) economic 
action. 
Institutions affect behaviour by 
providing actors with mental 
templates for interpretation and 
action - but these are rarely 
conscious or contested. 
 
They are deep-rooted assumptions 
about the world, which determine 
what one can imagine oneself doing 
in a given context.  
What are 
their 
relations to 
actors? 
 
Institutions are the 
aggregation of actors’ 
behaviours. 
 
Actors’ behaviour is widely 
determined by institutions. 
Institutions and individual action are 
mutually-constitutive.  
 
 
Because deviation from the 
rules will make the individual 
worse off than will adherence.  
 
 
 
Because individuals often 
turn to established patterns of 
behaviour to attain their 
purposes. 
 
 
Why do 
institutions 
persist?  
 
Because institutionalised rules structure economic incentives 
and distribution of costs. This limits future choices and may 
lead to path dependency146.  
 
Because it enhances the social 
legitimacy of the organisation, group 
or the individual to reproduce them. 
 
These acts of reinforcement, 
however, are rarely conscious. 
When do 
institutions 
change? 
When it contributes too little 
to the resolution of collective 
action dilemmas.  
When it is challenged by 
actors who bear the costs of 
its existence, or by changes in 
the external environment. 
This in turn may also 
influence associated norms. 
When there are changes in the 
internal or external environment, but 
this may take a longer time 
depending on how geographically 
widespread and deeply entrenched 
the institutions are.  
 
Examples of 
objects of 
study  - in 
this thesis 
Rules on access to decision-
making for special interests.  
 
Rules delegating authority in 
the UK and EU. 
 
The WTO trade rules and 
dispute settlement procedures. 
The CAP subsidy system. 
 
Norms about legitimacy of 
stakeholders. 
 
Elite paradigms about the economy 
and agriculture in the economy.  
 
Public sentiments on trade, 
agriculture, developing countries, 
etc. 
Key 
questions 
Questions # 2a,b, and c. Questions # 2d and 3a. Questions # 3b and 4b. 
(Based on: Thelen 1992; Hall 1996; Campbell 1998; Tallberg & Jönsson 2001.)  
 
                                                 
146
 Peter Hall (1996) argues that institutionalised rules that structure economic incentives have a prominence in both rational 
and historical institutionalist approaches. 
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Leaving institutions for now, the next sections will approach media-policy process 
interactions from the ‘side of the media’.  
 
5.3 A brief history of media effects research 
According to Windahl and Signitzer (1992: 191ff) the history of communication effects 
research can be divided into three phases: In the first phase mass communication was 
considered a ‘magic bullet’ that could bring about wide-ranging effects and which met with 
little or no resistance from the audience or receivers. The experiences of propaganda effects 
before and during World War II had in particular reinforced this view. In the second phase 
researchers started doubting the strong effects-view, finding no evidence for it. Especially the 
studies of Paul Lazarsfeld147 on voting behaviour seemed to confirm that interpersonal 
communication was much more important in changing attitudes than mass communication, 
and this type of research birthed the limited effects-view of communication. The last and most 
recent phase has witnessed a shift back to the potency of the mass media spearheaded by, 
among others, Marxist researchers who have highlighted the role of the mass media in 
legitimising the social and economic order of capitalist societies. The focus, however, was 
often different from phase one, in that it now concerned which different types of effects that 
were actually possible to achieve, particularly with regard to public agenda setting. In contrast 
to phase one it was now accepted that even if the media didn’t tell us what to think, they could 
very well tell us what to think about. Recent effects research has thus been relatively open-
ended, attempting to map a variety of media effects. In this thesis, however, the focus is 
limited to a particular set of effects defined as changes in political rhetoric and legislation, and 
is concerned with why - or why not - mass media coverage contributed to these changes.  
 
In this regard one can distinguish between the media-centric models which attribute great 
power to the media over politics and the world politics-models which emphasise geo-strategic 
interests and relative power of political actors as explanations for policy outcomes (Robinson 
2001: 524). World politics models tends to downplay the possibility that journalists might 
actually take sides (either consciously or unintentionally) during elite debates over policy, or 
even take the side of non-elites such as NGOs. On the other hand the media-centric models 
tend to ignore instances where the media are more or less controlled by the elites, such as in 
the 1991 Gulf War (Robinson 2001: 528). In this fashion, the theoretical positions on mass 
media influence on politics bear a clear resemblance to the positions within mass media 
                                                 
147
 Paul Felix Lazarsfeld (1901-1976) was originally a prominent sociologist and the founder of Columbia University’s 
Bureau for Applied Social Research. He approached sociology through his expertise in mathematics and quantitative 
methods, participating in several early quantitative studies, including what was possibly the first scientific survey of radio 
listeners, in 1930-31 (Wikipedia). 
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effects-research in general. Again, this analysis is not a priori set towards either position, as 
the focus is on explaining the effects of the media in a concrete case - or the lack thereof.  
5.3.1 The ‘medialisation of politics’ confers rising influence to the mass media 
The opportunity to influence decision-makers via the media arises because the modern 
political system exhibits an increasing competition for the electorate’s attention and a virtual 
mass media monopoly on political communication. The rising influence of media on politics 
is thus assumed to press politicians to adapt their public engagements as well as their policies 
to the strategies, time frames and worldviews of the media. For it is in general through the 
mass media that they - and their policy - become visible to a population in which an 
increasing percentage of the electorate has no firm allegiance towards a particular political 
party. This development has been dubbed the medialisation of politics. It has also contributed 
to increasing fluidity in politics; political parties no longer adhere to fixed ideologies in the 
same way as they may have done earlier. In some instances, particularly before election 
campaigns, it has thus become the norm to adjust not just the presentation of policies, but also 
the themes and content of them in accordance with, for example, the feedback from focus 
groups and public opinion polls. Specifically, as politicians prefer good publicity in order to 
increase their standing amongst the electorate, they may ultimately adjust their political 
positions, if these are framed in the media as conflicting with the sentiments of a large part of 
potential voters (Wolfsfeld 1997: 64; Schudson 2002: 270; Koopmans 2004: 370, Ørsten 
2004: 14ff; Heffernan 2006: 582).   
5.3.2 Media value determined by size, status and audience voting power 
The value decision-makers attribute to certain media, are crucial variables for media effects 
on politics. Media value is generally determined by 1) size of publication (i.e. publication 
numbers for the printed press); 2) status (i.e. credibility); and 3) voting power of its audience. 
In this respect television is often seen as having the greatest value because of its large 
audience (Wolfsfeld 1997: 57-59). Without relegating political reactions to the media agenda 
to rational, strategic calculations only, it is the argument here that when the perceived costs of 
persistent, critical media coverage of a certain political position on an issue (or for not solving 
a certain social problem) exceeds the benefits of maintaining positions (or doing nothing) 
decision-makers will choose to change positions and/or act to solve the problem (Wolfsfeld 
1997: 66). It’s not possible though, to propose a fixed set of parameters for why and when this 
happens, because it depends so strongly on the given context and on the particular decision-
makers involved. Also, it is far more likely that decision-makers will try to reframe their 
position or reframe an alleged problem, and promote this framing in the media - before doing 
something that is not in line with their initial preferences. And both governments and the 
private sector often have more resources at their disposal to do this than many NGOs. 
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However, in the next section some general situational variables will be outlined that enhance 
the chance of media influence, and which form the theoretical basis for key question 7.  
5.3.3 Elite disagreement and policy uncertainty open for media influence 
Piers Robinson (2001) proposes that when elite conflict exists with respect to an issue there is 
a far greater possibility that news media can influence the political debate. Obviously there is 
always a certain level of disagreement within democratic political systems, so the level of 
conflict has to be significant and involve prominent politicians - preferably within the same 
party or government - to become interesting for the media (cf. the news criteria). On the other 
hand the media tends not to be interested (or critical) if there is broad elite consensus on an 
issue. In other words, when there is a political conflict we can expect to observe a surge of 
both critical and supportive coverage. At that point the news media may come to play a more 
prominent role in policy formulation because the possibility exists for a majority of the media 
to actually take sides in the elite debate. Due to the aforementioned perception of media value 
for decision-makers this can then enhance the influence of some of the actors embroiled in a 
political struggle, be they NGOs, private interests or politicians (Robinson (2001: 531)148.  
 
The influence of the media is compounded even further if there is already uncertainty about 
policy, i.e. if for example the government does not have a clearly formulated position 
regarding an issue when it rises on the media agenda. This consideration also points to the 
importance of NGOs outside of the political process trying to influence the media (and 
political) agenda at an early stage in the policy cycle, before political actors have negotiated 
agreements, or even adopted legislation. However, like Wolfsfeld, Robinson also emphasises, 
that if there is strong elite consensus on the direction of policy, then policy-makers are most 
likely to try to insert their own framings of the contentious issues into the media in order to 
legitimise their choices (Robinson 2001: 536).  
 
5.4 Methodology IV 
5.4.1 Focus of the inquiry – the 7 key questions 
The theoretical considerations have been distilled into 7 key questions, which were used to 
guide the analytical inquiry of the media’s role in the UK and EU sugar reform processes. The 
purpose was to ‘map’ the social environment of the political decision-makers, with a view to 
explaining the political and institutional factors that contributed to the entrenched decision-
                                                 
148
 In fact, conflicts are often ‘set in motion’ by journalists themselves who pro-actively contact different parties and ask for 
an opinion about an ‘issue’ that may then develop over time as the journalist manages to get more and more reactions. In this 
case, it is important that responsibility for a problem can be attributed to individuals, such as ministers, who can then be 
interviewed and queried about ‘what they are going to do’ (see e.g. Ørsten 2004: 179ff).   
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maker positions on prices and market access, and explaining how these factors also played a 
role in prompting the offer on export subsidies. The questions are elaborated on by attaching 
to them empirical focal points, i.e. specific actors, organisations, rules, etc.  
 
Not all of the 7 questions are used for the EU analysis, as it was intuitively evident before this 
analysis that being only one, relatively minor, player among many other players at the EU-
level (the 25 member states, other private and civil society interests, etc.) this fact alone 
would go along way in explaining why the June 2005 legislative proposal matched Oxfam’s 
demands so little, whatever the level of media coverage throughout Europe. As the possible 
effects of media coverage in the EU were to a large extent discussed in chapter 4 through 
analysing Commission rhetoric, the second EU analysis in chapter 7 will concentrate on 
explaining the political and institutional dynamics of the reform process; and in doing so 
demonstrating the general difficulties NGOs, such as Oxfam, and the media, for exerting 
influence. 
 
The 7 key questions  
 
1) What were the preferences of the major actors in the UK and EU sugar reform process?  
a. Which prominent actors were involved from civil society, the private sector, the political level and 
Southern delegations and what were there their stated preferences on prices, market access and 
subsidies? (Only detailed for the UK.) 
 
2) How did institutionalised rules and policy programmes affect the sugar reform process? In 
this thesis these are: 
a. Rules for access: special interest consultation and access to existing advisory boards and 
committees. 
b. Rules delegating decision-making authority between the political actors.  
c. Rules concerning international trade: WTO trade rules and dispute settlement rulings 
d. Policy programmes: The Common Agricultural Policy  
 
3) Which institutionalised norms and paradigms shaped the preferences of the actors? In this 
thesis these are:  
a. Norms about the legitimacy of various stakeholders and their interests.  
b. Economic paradigms, with particular focus on the status of agriculture in the economy. 
 
4) Which media outlets and public sentiments were considered important by decision-makers? 
a. Which media outlets were important to the UK government in terms of size, credibility and value? 
(For the UK only.) 
b. Which public sentiments were considered important to the UK government and the EU 
Commission? 
 
5) How did the frames of key actors play out in the media? 
(For the UK only. See section 3.4.1 again for elaboration.)  
 
6) What were the strategies of key actors?  
 
7) To what degree was there elite dissent and policy uncertainty on sugar reform? (For the UK 
only.) 
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Differences between the EU and the UK analysis: The EU analysis in chapter 7 generally 
follows the same structure as the UK analysis in chapter 6, although with some moderations. 
The first question regarding actors and their preferences has been reduced to an overview of 
the preferences of member states, since it was not deemed relevant to detail as well the 
preferences of all major civil society actors and private sector interests operating in Brussels. 
The second question regarding institutionalised rules, policy programmes and the third 
question regarding norms and paradigms have been merged because this enhances the 
understanding of the chronological developments in the overall CAP reforms, of which sugar 
reform is a part. Also, for reasons explained earlier, some of the 7 key questions have been 
left out entirely for the EU, particularly those regarding media value; frames in the European 
media, and elite consensus and policy certainty.  
5.4.2 Explaining the role of the media in the sugar policy process in the UK and in EU 
Guided by the 7 key questions analysis was performed using triangulation between primary 
document analysis, interviews of key informants and reviewing secondary sources. With 
regard to the first two categories, analysis was carried out using the following sources, 
methods of inquiry and operationalisations:  
 
Primary document analysis  
In the UK (influence on rhetoric only): In the UK this analysis mainly relied on other 
sources than primary documents, such as interviews and secondary works. 
 
In the EU: This refers to the explicit reference in Commission documents to factors in the 
formation of the Commission’s policy considerations during reform process. These sources 
are, unless otherwise noted, the same as those listed in Appendix C.  
 
Interviews, debate notes and e-mail correspondences: 
For the UK: 
• Andrew Kuyk, Head of Arable Crops Division, DEFRA, Kuyk was the official in 
charge of the UK sugar policy (phone interview).  
• Jack Thurston, Transatlantic Fellow of the German Marshall Fund of the United States 
and Senior Research Associate at the Foreign Policy Centre, former special advisor to 
the UK agricultural ministry 1999-2001 (phone interview).  
• Penny Fowler, Oxfam’s trade policy advisor and co-responsible for Oxfam’s sugar 
policy research (phone interview).  
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For the EU: 
• Poul Nielson, EU Commissioner for Development 1999-2004 (debate notes149 and e-
mail correspondences).  
• Jo Leadbeater, until 2005 head of Oxfam’s advocacy office in Brussels (full 
interview). 
• Sonia Vila-Hopkins, until 2004 Oxfam advocacy officer in Brussels (phone 
interview). 
• John Nordbo, coordinator of the Danish NGO Coalition, the ’92-group’150 (full 
interview).  
 
All interview transcriptions, notes, and e-mail correspondences can be found in appendix D. 
5.4.3 Validity and reliability of interviews 
In order to limit the influences of stakeholder bias it was attempted interview informants from 
‘inside’ as well as ‘outside’ the policy process. The interviewees were asked, albeit in 
different formulations, about the importance of Oxfam’s campaign and of media coverage 
vis-à-vis other factors in influencing sugar reform.  It was difficult to structure all interviews 
or debate questions according to a stringent set of criteria, due to the differing interview 
contexts, and because the opportunity to do an interview didn’t always match the progress in 
formulating the research design. For the same reasons it was difficult to operationalise and 
include key concepts such as political preferences, institutional constraints in the interviews in 
a consistent way in the interview design. However, the analysis of the responses did use the 7 
key questions as a guiding line, which served to attribute the proper interview data to the 
relevant conclusions. Also conclusions were usually based on several sources, e.g. secondary 
works, and not only interviews. Telephone interviews or debate notes were sometimes not as 
detailed as longer interviews. Some were written down just as notes, some as quotations based 
on memory and notes. Validity and reliability, however, can still be considered strong for this 
information, as the interviewees who got to read the quotations or notes either approved them 
or edited them before approval.  
 
As with other methods for retrieving information about mental states (attitudes, opinions, 
thoughts, and so on) it should of course be cautioned that people’s mental states can only be 
accessed through their own verbal descriptions of these states, which may again be subject to 
a number of flaws, biases and individual interpretations of the informant and later of the 
                                                 
149
 From a debate with Poul Nielson, arranged by Frit Forum, Copenhagen, 14 February 2005. The notes were transcribed as 
quotations that were then approved by Nielson via e-mail, see appendix D. 
150
 The Danish ’92 Group’ originated in conjunction with the international summit on the environment in Rio de Janeiro in 
1992. It lobbies for international trading and environmental policies, which can be more beneficial for developing countries. 
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researcher151. In order to mitigate the consequences of this unavoidable methodological 
problem it has again been attempted throughout the analysis to assess interview statements 
critically, and base conclusions on as many different sources as possible. 
5.4.4 Excursion: Progress towards other advocacy objectives at the EU level 
In order to broaden the perspective on Oxfam’s achievements in sugar advocacy, an excursion 
was been added to chapter 7’s EU analysis. It departs from the main focus of the research 
objective and instead moves briefly to the second objective of advocacy, which was also 
mentioned in chapter 1: Capacity building of advocating NGOs to increase their advocacy 
efficiency, as well as to enable their ‘clients’ (here developing country governments) to better 
influence the political process in the North on their own. It is not a new analysis, but a 
discussion, and it is limited in scope. It should also be remarked that ‘capacity building’ is a 
term with a long history in the development discourse152 and usually denotes a relatively large 
expansion of the organisational capacity of especially developing country governments. This 
type of capacity building was obviously not a realistic priority for the Oxfam trade campaign. 
Therefore only some minor indications will be discussed of how the present campaign may 
have enabled Oxfam and the developing countries to influence the EU in the future.  The term 
‘enable’ is deliberate as it denotes any indication of improvement in the developing countries’ 
ability to influence the EU political process on trade and agriculture, or in the ability to do so 
of their advocate, Oxfam. It does not imply a wider or deeper organisational or institutional 
change. Time and other resource constraints prevented a larger collection of data for this 
inquiry and thereby also limited the number of indications of progress that were dealt with. 
Thus, only the validity and significance of two indications are discussed: 1) The standing 
Oxfam has gained with the EU Commissioners – understood as positive or negative 
perception of Oxfam; and 2) if contributions from Oxfam have enabled developing countries 
to better influence the EU independently via the World Trade Organisation’s Dispute 
Settlement Panel153. Conclusions are obviously hypothetical in nature as they concern 
assessment of the importance of Oxfam’s present advocacy results for future advocacy efforts 
in this policy area. 
                                                 
151
 Some social science disciplines, such as discourse psychology, even posit that people always position themselves 
differently in different social contexts, and that it is therefore not possible to attribute to them a ‘true’ sentiment, opinion, 
value, or belief (see e.g. Potter & Wetherell 1987). 
152
 See for example Martinussen & Pedersen 1999: pp. 59-62 for an introduction. 
153
 Also, progress towards this advocacy objective is implicitly considered the result of a broad range of campaign actions of 
the advocate and its allies  - including lobbying and including other advocacy for ‘fair trade’ in terms other products, services 
or issues – and not chiefly the result of media work, but this premise is not investigated further. 
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6. – A broken frame: The media and UK government rhetoric on 
sugar 
 
6.1 Overview 
In this chapter it is demonstrated that the mass media played only a small role in the UK sugar 
process for the following reasons: First, key players, such as the government and the sugar-
using industries, were in favour of a more liberal sugar regime. Second, although DEFRA 
officially had authority in the reform process, all of the relevant departments were in overall 
agreement on the preferred stance for the UK and on not to contest the WTO rulings. Also, 
the Labour government had looser informal relations with the farming lobby than its 
Conservative predecessor. Furthermore, the paradigm about the benefits of free markets had 
from the beginning been adopted into Tony Blair’s ’revamped’ New Labour party, as the 
basis for many of its policies on economy and development. The importance of this political 
current is difficult to disentangle, though, from the fact that UK (sugar) farmers also tend to 
be the most efficient in the EU, and therefore less vulnerable to price reductions. The 
emergence of the Department for International Development (DFID) as a prominent 
department under Blair did not prompt a special ‘tailoring’ of the liberalisation approach for 
developing countries, as DFID’s basic perception of economic development was also to a 
great extent aligned to the free market paradigm. In addition, the government presumably 
attached relatively low value attached to sugar coverage in the media and public sentiments 
on fair trade, compared to the salience of other issues. Also informants agreed that media 
visibility in general had been too low on sugar, particularly on the issues of prices and access. 
This problem was enhanced because Oxfam for tactical reasons could not go public with a 
price recommendation. Lastly, the conflict potential in the sugar story in Britain was generally 
low, and although the sugar industry temporarily got ’rapped’ in the media, there were 
otherwise no prominent individuals in the UK who were left with responsibility for the 
regime’s faults. 
 
6.2 Analysis IV: Government rhetoric and the role of the media 
6.2.1 What were the preferences of the major actors in the UK sugar reform process?  
Below follows an overview of the preferences of major UK actors on each key issue as of 
May 2004, when DEFRA initiated a consultation on the preferred sugar reform scenarios:  
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 Table 6.1 – Overview: Stakeholder preferences in the UK sugar reform process154   
 Price reduction Increased, but still 
managed LDC market 
access 
Elimination of 
export subsidies 
UK government155 Yes No - EBA must be 
implemented as it is 
Yes 
UK Industrial 
Sugar Users Group  
Yes – “as large as possible” 
 
Max. 4-year time frame 
No156 Yes – but only when 
sugar prices are lowered. 
Biscuit, Cake, 
Chocolate & 
Confectionery 
Association 
Yes  
 
Max. 5-year time frame 
No – EBA must be 
implemented as it is 
Yes - but only when 
sugar prices are lowered. 
CAFOD and 
Oxfam 
Yes – but prices should be 
“remunerative” 
Yes Yes 
 
LDC London 
Group  
Yes – but only if they are 
“gradual, modest and 
predictable” 
 
12 to 15-year time frame 
Yes ? 
British Sugar  Yes – but no preferred level 
disclosed.  
 
Yes ? - Issue should be 
“addressed” but no 
position stated. 
National Farmers’ 
Union  
Yes – but no preferred level 
disclosed 
 
10-year timeframe. 
Yes No 
Tate & Lyle sugar 
processors157 
No  – because proposed cuts 
restrict supply from 
ACP/LDCs and market is still 
closed for alternative 
suppliers, such as Brazil 
Yes ? 
ACP London Sugar 
Group 
No – and any decrease 
should be “slow and 
gradual” 
Yes Yes 
 
(Source: Minutes of evidence from DEFRA Special Committee hearings on sugar reform 
April and May 2004.)  
 
                                                 
154
 The UK environmental NGO, the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds, was also consulted, but its views had mostly 
to do with the environmental implications of a regime change, and it was therefore left out of this overview. 
155
 Formal government positions to reform were not yet formulated in May 2004. However, it is clear from the analyses of 
rhetoric in chapter 4 that the UK government did have its own preferences for reform already by 2004, and those are the ones 
that form the basis of the UK’s entry in the table above. The UK government was not a neutral arbiter between different 
NGOs, developing countries and industrial interests, but was itself very much a stakeholder in the process. Otherwise, where 
nothing explicit was stated in memoranda of the various stakeholders, their general preferences have been inferred from the 
minutes of evidence for the actual hearings.  
156
 No specific comments were made on the LDC proposal, so presumably they adhered to the Commission’s position. 
157
 Tate and Lyle’s refinery in East London is the largest in the world. It represents 2/3 of EU port refining capacity and 
imports and refines from the ACP and LDCs about 1.13 million tonnes of sugar per year.  
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Two things stand out when considering the publicly expressed preferences of the UK sugar 
stakeholders: On the one hand the government and powerful industrial interests were pitted 
against an equally powerful farm lobby, with NGOs and developing countries somewhere ‘in 
between’. On the other hand all private or civil society sector actors appeared almost 
‘fatalistic’ about significantly changing the overall course with regard to EU sugar reform, as 
outlined by the Commission, and therefore no one fought hard to maintain status quo. This 
overview also shows that the coalition leaning most towards deep price reductions was 
composed of both the government and industrial interests, and therefore it was difficult from 
the outset to force a change to these positions, even though there was a somewhat paradoxical 
‘alignment of interests’ between Oxfam, the developing countries and the farmers in keeping 
the price reductions modest, each for their own reasons. 
6.2.2 How did institutionalised rules and policy programmes affect the sugar reform 
process? 
As mentioned, all parties (including the ministry itself) were formally consulted on reform by 
a DEFRA Select Committee during several days of stakeholder consultations during 2004. So 
in principle the rules of formal access to the policy process were not barring any stakeholder 
from being heard, and did not give any party asymmetrical influence on the process. Sugar 
being part of their area of responsibility, DEFRA obviously was delegated the primary 
authority with regard to formulating the final UK negotiating position to reform. However, 
all of the relevant government departments, particularly the ministries of trade and 
development and the prime minister’s office were in overall agreement on the preferred stance 
for the UK (Lord Whitty158; Fowler, interview). Also, the sugar dispute at the WTO, and the 
ongoing WTO negotiations on trade rules were being referred to as important constraints on 
the government’s position (Lord Whitty159). So from a broad perspective, there were no 
particular rules that constrained the British government’s preferences for a more liberalised 
sugar regime, rather the opposite was the case. And with regard to international trade, not 
only did the existing rules correspond with the general preferences of the UK government, but 
they could – and were - also used to strengthen the government’s argument for a more liberal 
reform. 
6.2.3 Which institutionalised norms and paradigms shaped the preferences of the 
actors? 
‘Behind the scenes’ the UK sugar farmers appeared not to have gained any ‘extra influence’ 
on the British sugar policy. As in other EU countries, traditionally there has been a strong 
corporatist relation between farmers and the UK ministries of Agriculture. It was established 
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when the Conservatives were in power for 18 years, as politically farmers are usually 
Conservative voters, but it weakened again in 1997 when New Labour took office. Labour 
was sympathetic to the needs of agriculture but unlike the Conservatives it was not the norm 
that it was ’a farmers’ party’ (Thurston, interview). And, as mentioned in the previous section, 
this was important as farmer concerns about reforms that were too drastic, especially on 
prices, also aligned with the concerns of the preferential suppliers from the ACP and LDC 
groups. 
 
DEFRA’s looser relations with the farm lobby may furthermore have been a natural 
consequence of New Labour’s economic policies being much closer in alignment with the 
neo-liberal paradigm than those of the older Labour Party160. As Orton and Ratcliffe put it: “ 
… while some subordinate elements of New Labour are different from those of the New Right 
of the 1980s and 1990s, New Labour remains a neo-liberal dominated alliance” (2005: 270). 
A key assumption adopted from neo-liberalism was then that free markets were a crucial way 
to economic growth, something that did not harmonise with continued agricultural 
protectionism. But it was not unimportant either that Britain, despite its so-called ‘EU budget 
rebate’, still pays more to the CAP than it receives back in subsidies161. Also, in the case of 
sugar, the UK government’s stance was that their best sugar farmers could compete even 
under price reductions because of their relative efficiency and size compared to sugar farmers 
elsewhere in the EU (Keeler 1996; Thurston, interview).  
 
The creation of the Department for International Development (DFID) as an independent 
department did not, in the sugar case, prompt a special ‘tailoring’ of this approach to 
farm/trade policy for the benefit of developing countries. And this was despite the fact that 
with the DFID, development policy had ‘graduated’ to receiving hearings at Cabinet level, 
more strategic focus, more funding, and cooperating more with other departments (Porteous 
2005: 283-84). But while on the surface this strengthening of British development policy, 
may have contributed to the political rhetoric for ‘fair trade’, the deeper objectives for 
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 The term ‘neo-liberal paradigm’ refers to a set of assumptions about optimal performance of the national and international 
economy that underlies what is popularly known as neo-liberalism. In its most uncompromising form, neo-liberalism is an 
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philosophy and neoclassical economics, and confusion with the ambiguous term ‘liberal’, some advocate the term 
‘neoclassical philosophy’. New Labour does not subscribe to ‘pure’ neo-liberalism, though, and many of its economic 
policies mix liberal and traditional socialist perspectives (Wikipedia, Clift & Tomlinson 2007).  
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economic development were still firmly based on the neo-liberal paradigm162 (Thurston, 
interview). The slogan became “pro-poor economic growth” and “free and fair trade” which 
signified the application to the developing world of New Labour’s ‘third way’ effort to 
combine liberal market economics with social justice (Porteous 2005: 296). Therefore, in the 
case of trade, even if the DFID had at times expressed the need for temporary protection of 
vulnerable developing country economies, it still emphasised that “the lesson of history is that 
the alternative to open markets – protecting your own goods by handouts and taxes against 
competition from imports – doesn’t work in the long run.” (DFID 2002: 8).  
 
The primacy of the neo-liberal paradigm in terms of shaping the UK sugar reform stance is of 
course debatable, since it can be linked to assurance about of the competitiveness of the UK 
farming sector and to influence from the interests of the food producing industries. This 
highlights the difficulty of operationalising indicators of an ‘institutionalised paradigm’, 
particularly an economic one, since it is difficult to isolate any single indicator of this merely 
being the idea of ‘how the economy should function’. However, it would also be premature to 
conclude that in the sugar case the free market arguments were used solely as rhetoric to 
promote the interests of, for example, the sugar-using industries. And even if a neo-liberal 
ideological current in the UK agricultural policy under Blair was more pronounced than 
hitherto, it could nevertheless easily accommodate the reality that farmers would still receive 
over 60% of their income loss in direct support payments from the CAP budget, plus the fact 
that despite reform the market would still be managed with fixed prices and quotas for the 
foreseeable future. 
6.2.4 Which media outlets and public sentiments were considered important by 
decision-makers? 
Andrew Kuyk, Head of DEFRA’s Arable Crops Division, argued that there were no media 
that had been of particular value or non-value to DEFRA when it came to sugar coverage 
(Kuyk, interview), but this may have reflected a reluctance to admit to potential influence of 
the media. As a matter of fact, it initially appeared that many conditions in the UK media 
were favourable to Oxfam’s sugar advocacy: As noted in chapter 3 there is a strong 
correspondence between voting Labour and reading the Guardian – the paper that featured 
most sugar articles163. Also, two thirds of Labour MPs regularly read the Guardian, but only 
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trade (in chapter 1). 
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around a quarter read the Daily Telegraph, The Daily Mail or The Sun164. Furthermore, the 
Guardian is considered in general to be a very credible newspaper, having won a plethora of 
awards for its quality of journalism (Guardian web site165). Last, but not least, one could also 
point to Prime Minister Tony Blair’s well-known preoccupation with getting ‘good press‘ 
(Heffernan 2006: 583ff) and it would be reasonable to assume that positive coverage of the 
government’s engagement in sugar reform, at least from this particular newspaper, would 
have been of high value for DEFRA. As for public sentiments, former advisor to the UK 
agricultural ministry, Jack Thurston, acknowledged that the UK government has realised that 
fair trade has become a popular and even ”sexy” issue amongst voters, particularly Labour 
voters (Thurston, interview). This is underscored in the 2005 Labour election manifesto and 
on the party web site where it says explicitly that “we are making fair trade a top priority”166. 
Add to this that a 2004 survey showed that 58% of all Britons “have a favourable opinion of 
fair trade” and 87 % of Britons support giving development aid (Audley 2004: 8, 12).  
 
However, as noted in earlier chapters, the Guardian does not have a particularly large 
audience compared to other newspapers. Compared to a circulation of about 380,000 copies 
there were, for example, 9.5 million Britons who voted Labour in the 2005 election 
(Wikipedia). Similarly, it needs to be remembered that development and trade policy usually 
are relatively low profile issues in election politics in the UK, as in other Northern countries. 
This fact was once again witnessed in the UK 2005 elections, where different polls converged 
on health, tax, crime, immigration, education, and the domestic economy as the most 
important issues for voters – with the Iraq war as a prominent ‘outsider’167. Obviously the 
media-savvy UK government would have been aware of these trends. Finally, ‘fair trade’ is a 
concept that can be associated with many different things: Supporting sale and consumption 
of fair trade goods, eliminating export subsidies, advocating the inclusion of labour rights in 
the WTO rules, and so on - all of which the Labour government officially and publicly 
endorses (DFID 2002). Reluctance to support developing countries on two points regarding 
sugar reform, doesn’t necessarily dent this image in the eyes of the majority of voters, who 
may not deeply informed about (and only marginally preoccupied with) a fair trading policy 
to begin with. 
6.2.5 How did the frames of key actors play out in the media? 
From the media analysis it becomes clear that the issues where Oxfam and the British 
government differed, namely on the specifics of market access and price cuts, were not 
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covered as much as, for example, than the ‘scandalous’ export subsidies, where there was 
already agreement between Oxfam and the government. For example, only 3 out of 35 
Guardian stories with Oxfam, in the period of 1999-2005, specifically address the concern 
that steep price cuts will be detrimental to developing country suppliers - and many other 
articles actually criticise the high prices, as did Oxfam’s initial reports. So to begin with the 
sugar regime equalled the perfect example of unfair trade, but once it became clear that EU 
price fixing was also in the interest of developing countries, this part of the frame weakened. 
On the other hand, eliminating export subsidies and ‘dumping’ in order to promote fair 
competition with developing countries was a more ‘straightforward’ message, which got 
much more coverage. And although, the stories in the Telegraph and the BBC dealt more with 
the price cuts, it was often with focus on EU farmers and not the developing countries. And in 
any case, the level of visibility for stories in these two outlets was negligible.  
 
Also, from the point of view of the receivers, visibility was low. Thus, Andrew Kuyk noted 
that in his view there had been no ‘concerted front’ of the media with regard to criticising 
certain aspects of sugar reform (Kuyk, interview). As mentioned before, some caution needs 
to be exercised when evaluating the statements of a government official in this case who is 
currently in office, but also former DEFRA advisor Jack Thurston agreed that in general there 
simply hadn’t been enough media coverage on sugar.  
6.2.6 What were the strategies of key actors? 
Oxfam’s planned strategy has already been dealt with in section 2.6, so this section highlights 
key problems with their implemented strategy in relation to that of other actors. According to 
Oxfam (2004b: 3), British Sugar and the National Farmer’s Union did initiate a ‘Save our 
Sugar’ campaign when the reform process started, but as the analysis in chapter 3 shows it 
was almost invisible in the media, so presumably these actors worked more in the realm of 
lobbying. However, despite some media portrayals of the UK reform process as having “been 
hijacked by a well-organised lobbying campaign”168 by British Sugar and the NFU, section 
6.2.1 showed that during DEFRA’s consultations both these actors - as well as Oxfam and the 
LDC/ACP groups – in fact converged on continuing some form of managed sugar market. 
Also, as mentioned earlier, most of the stakeholders were hesitant to come out clearly about 
their position on the key issue of prices, before having coordinated it with other EU industries 
or states in the ACP/LDC. In the case of Oxfam, trade policy advisor Penny Fowler 
explained:  
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We felt that we couldn’t come out with a price level recommendation if the ACP and 
LDC did not do the same. And a good reason for them not having done this is probably 
that it would split those groups internally … it’s not been the key stumbling block, 
though. The debate has been more on the implementation period of the price cuts and 
that’s where there are a lot of differences, not in the least in the ACP and LDC groups 
internally.  
 
Thus, the actors that to different degrees were opponents of deep price cuts were hesitant and 
sometimes internally divided. In contrast, the pro-liberalisation actors could from the 
beginning send a clear message that the price reductions should be as deep as possible and 
carried out in as short a timeframe as possible. All other things being equal, this strengthened 
the position of the foods industries. 
6.2.7 To what degree was there elite dissent and policy uncertainty on sugar reform? 
As seen above, there was strong elite consensus, not only in the government but also between 
the government and some of the major interest groups. Also there was no significant 
uncertainty about the substance of reform, for example the choice between complete 
liberalisation and status quo – only about how to adjust the settings and instruments of the 
present sugar CMO for the foreseeable future. Thus, there was agreement that the price should 
still be fixed, albeit at a lower level. No one disputed that imports would still be restricted for 
Brazil, Thailand, Cuba and other sugar producing countries with populations living in poverty 
and which would not get free EU market entry in 2009 under the EBA169. Export subsidies 
would eventually go, a fact which most of the stakeholders appear to have accepted, except 
the NFU. All of this contributes to explaining the rather uneven media interest. The conflict 
potential of the sugar reform story was limited, and the moral case of Oxfam was in part 
obscured by technicalities and ambiguities on issues of prices and access. Furthermore, none 
of the selected media stories on sugar really criticised the UK government - or individual 
ministers – for ‘not doing enough’, but many, particularly the Guardian leaders, were instead 
focused on what appeared more like a ‘rallying call’ to the UK government against the EU 
sugar regime170. The last minute softening of the UK position on the transitional period for 
price reductions (see section 4.3.3) was almost certainly more attributable to heavy lobbying 
on a ministerial level from the ACP before the November 2005 EU Council meeting, and not 
any particular media concern at the time. Also, Blair’s small concession could be related to a 
norm in British foreign policy of being attentive to the concerns of their old colonies 
(Thurston interview). However, the vague language also indicated that Britain was very much 
committed to reform along the lines laid out by the Commission.  
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7.  Against the tide - Oxfam’s campaign and the EU sugar policy 
process 
 
7.1 Overview 
In this chapter it is explained why the mass media, as well as Oxfam’s campaign, also played 
a minimal role in the EU sugar process by analysing the political and institutional factors that 
make it difficult for NGDOs to influence the EU Commission on trade and agriculture. Until 
the late 1980s the CAP appeared immune to change due to a highly institutionalised subsidy 
system that inter alia caused asymmetrical dispersion of policy costs, encouraged rent-
seeking and prompted exclusivity for farm-lobby interests in influencing the Commission’s 
policy-making. But the rising budget costs of the CAP combined with shifts in member state 
alliances, and Commission policy entrepreneurship coincided with the necessity of 
implementing WTO export subsidy reduction commitments to prompt first a series of CAP 
reforms, and then finally, sugar reform. These changes in internal EU coalitions and the 
external institutional environment also paved the way for the neo-liberal paradigm and the 
rhetoric that agriculture could and should conform more to market conditions. The 
Commission was arguably attentive to any negative public sentiments about the legitimacy of 
the EU institutions, but there were great differences throughout Europe in how negatively 
populations viewed EU agricultural policy. In addition, the Commission was focused on 
promoting a globally oriented and globally price competitive EU value-added food-products 
industry together with pro-reform member states, including major players like the UK, 
Germany and France, all of which strengthened the impetus to propose deep price cuts and 
retain the EBA unaltered. The offer to eliminate export subsidies should be seen in the context 
of its significance for the wider WTO negotiations, and it is doubtful how much Oxfam or 
media pressure contributed to prompting this initiative from the Commission. Despite the 
meagre political results and the inherent difficulties in gaining influence on the EU trade and 
agricultural policy process, there are good indications that Oxfam has become a player that 
particularly the Directorate-General for Trade takes seriously when responding to NGO 
criticism. Claims about the Oxfam campaign’s contribution to encouraging developing 
countries to take up legal action against the EU in the WTO appear to be somewhat dubious, 
though. 
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7.2 Analysis IV: Political and institutional drivers in EU sugar reform  
7.2.1 What were the preferences of the major actors in the EU sugar reform process? 
Initial member states positions did not become entirely clear until well into the reform 
process. But in general it can be said that from the outset the pro-reform lobby consisted of: 
the UK, Sweden, Denmark, Estonia, Cyprus, and with some reservations, the Netherlands and 
Germany. France was initially opposed to reform, but in the end came out on the supporting 
side. In late 2004 an official anti-reform coalition emerged consisting of: Greece, Spain, 
Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Finland, Poland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia. The sugar 
industries of many of these member states would likely cease to exist even with ‘just’ the 
proposed price cuts. In January 2005 the ACP and the LDC sugar exporters officially joined 
forces with these countries, during a joint meeting in the Spanish Ministry for Agriculture171. 
The anti-reform alliance in principle possessed enough votes in the Council to block the 
Commission’s proposal. But their influence was countered by the fact that three of the largest, 
and politically most influential172, member states - the UK, Germany and France - were all 
leaning towards the Commission’s envisioned reform scenario with significant price 
reductions (although the latter two had more reservations than the UK)173. Their stance was 
presumably reinforced by impact assessments that made clear that production in these states 
would not be significantly affected - even after a price reduction above 30% - due to the 
efficiency of these countries’ sugar farms174. The Commission had to take into account all of 
these positions during its refinement of the final proposal to increase the possibility of its 
adoption by the Council, but in the end the June 2005 proposal came out closest to the 
positions of the pro-reform states.  
7.2.2 To what degree did rules, policy programmes, norms and paradigms constrain 
the reform process? 
The abovementioned outcome was not an isolated event in CAP reform history. It was 
strongly shaped by institutional developments that preceded the current reform process, and 
although they eventually lead to a reform long desired by development NGOs it was not 
necessarily ‘pro-development’. The following two sections outlines why this came to be so. 
 
As described in chapter 2, the CAP remained virtually unchanged until 1992. The principal 
reason for this was that the CAP had become a highly institutionalised policy programme. 
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7. Against the tide – Oxfam campaign and the EU sugar policy process 
 82
This lead to path dependency of CAP policy as the CAP itself created “feedback 
mechanisms” that in turn led ministers, officials and interest groups to continue to favour 
courses of action that made it persist for longer and longer (Kay 2003: 411ff). The most 
important of these feedback mechanisms were: 
 
1. A subsidy system that created rents which encouraged groups to mobilise for the 
maintenance of the programme (Kay 2003: 412).  
2. A commitment to a certain set of production patterns based on subsidies, involving 
sunk costs in terms of equipment, etc., and a rising debt-equity ratio for farmers and 
losses due to inflated land prices, if prices or subsidies were lowered (Kay 2003: 413, 
Daugbjerg 2003). 
3. That CAP costs were transferred to others, such as consumers who have not had 
sufficient incentive to ‘fight back’ due to food absorbing a declining share of the 
family budget throughout Europe (Keeler 1996: 130-131); and to other member states, 
where net recipients had limited incentive to agree for reform given that the CAP was 
based on shared financing; and to countries outside the EU - via import tariffs and 
export subsidies (Keeler 1996: 128).  
 
As the successful implementation of the CAP became dependent on group-controlled 
resources (e.g. information, skilled personnel) it also resulted in increased influence to 
especially farmer associations operating at the EU level. Thus, in terms of rules of access to 
decision-making, the European organisations for farmers usually has had 50 % of the 
membership of the Commission’s advisory, management and regulatory committees that exist 
for each of the CAP product regimes (Kay 2003: 412). The Commission was also closely 
monitored by member state representatives in the Article 113 Committee during international 
negotiation and, hence, possessed only limited space for pursuing its own preferences for 
reforming the CAP (Lynggaard 2004: 14).  
 
Thus, the CAP became over time a highly sectorised EU policy field in which it was the 
norm that only a ‘club-like’ Agriculture Council, DG Agriculture, the Special Committee for 
Agriculture and the European farm lobby associations, COPA and COGECA, were 
considered legitimate decision-makers. In addition, the European farm lobby pursued its 
interests via national neo-corporatist networks, and most member state agricultural sectors 
enjoyed uniquely privileged relations with ‘their’ ministry and special connections with 
powerful parties (Keeler 1996: 138, 141ff; Daugbjerg 1999; Hasha 1999; Pappi & Henning 
1999; Roederer-Rynning 2003; Lynggaard 2004: 13).  
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Lastly, since its inception the CAP has been founded on the paradigm of agricultural 
exceptionalism. In this paradigm it is assumed that agriculture cannot function in a socially 
optimal way in the free market because it faces severer environmental constraints (such as 
climate), which other economic sectors do not  (Skogstad 1998). Therefore it follows that 
agriculture should not function on the same terms as other sectors. State support is both 
acceptable and necessary. As in the case of the UK, though, it is difficult to isolate any 
indication of this paradigmatic thinking as devoid of other influences. Obviously, the 
promotion of agricultural exceptionalism is also influenced by the self-interests of its 
proponents. But this does not make it an idea that is principally promoted strategically to 
serve farmers’ interests. For example, in large parts of Southern Europe it is a common 
perception in the public that farmers in general constitute a vulnerable socio-economic group 
that must be protected, and that the CAP therefore is necessary, even if large-scale corporate 
farms receive most of its subsidies (Nordbo, interview; Oxfam 2004b: 22). 
7.2.3 To what degree did rules, policy programmes, norms and paradigms enable the 
reform process? 
While the policy feedback mechanisms of the CAP institution served to maintain it, they also 
had the effect of producing endogenous pressures that eventually would divert the existing 
policy path towards change (Kay 2003; Akrill & Kay 2004). The direct link between 
production and support stimulated production and, through raised prices, contributed to the 
suppression of demand growth. As surpluses emerged and expanded, so the costs of export 
subsidies and storage of agricultural surplus became more pronounced. The consequence was 
the continual rise in budget costs as production and surpluses were driven ever upwards – all 
combining to create crises almost ‘by design’. The budgetary problems were then exacerbated 
when the EU decided to take in 10 new member states by May 2004, predominantly from 
Eastern Europe. In the absence of further reform, the old member states would be forced to 
see their net contribution to the EU budget rise considerably in an enlarged EU175 with a 
number of new, poorer member states that were less efficient at producing agricultural goods, 
including sugar (Skogstad 1998: 481; Hasha 1999: 10; Leetma 1999: 15; Cochrane 1999: 22; 
Roederer-Rynning 2003).  
 
Externally, the progression in agreements on international trade rules also served to 
challenge the status quo of the CAP. Thus, US pressure in the 1986-1994 GATT negotiations 
played a key role in prompting the current reform-oriented phase of the CAP (Daugbjerg 
1999: 409; Fouilleux 2004: 241; Akrill & Kay 2004: 9). In 1991, during the MacSharry 
reform negotiations, officials from DG Agriculture moved to reorganise their policy units so 
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as to become more independent from the farm lobby (Keeler 1996: 144; Coleman & 
Tangermann 1999: 395). In the following years, the Commission then deliberately pursued a 
strategy to ‘reform the CAP in order to save it’. The strategy was based on changing only the 
necessary policy settings (e.g. price levels), and instruments (e.g. moving from price support 
to direct payments) just enough “to deal with immediate problems” (Poul Nielson, debate 
notes; Hasha 1999: 14). It was precisely this carefully orchestrated “policy layering strategy” 
that was needed to gain the support from the Council for any kind of reform (Daugbjerg 2004: 
4)176.  
 
Also, the exclusivity of agricultural policy networks was broken at all the key moments in the 
life of the CAP. The MacSharry reform process saw countervailing forces, particularly other 
industrial sectors, gaining a foothold. Unlike consumers and taxpayers, they were motivated 
to challenge agriculture. Particularly industrial lobbyism in Germany during the McSharry 
reforms prompted Germany to move away from its traditional support for France on 
agriculture, which lead to a breakthrough on CAP reforms that reverberated through EU 
politics for the rest of the 1990s. It also further prompted the Commission to work for CAP 
reforms, so negotiations in the WTO – e.g. on services or opening third markets to EU 
industries - would not be stalled each time agriculture came up177-178. It has thus been argued 
that the concrete motivating factor behind the Commission’s reform proposals was that the 
sugar sector was one of the few remaining obstacles to the promotion of a globally oriented 
and globally price competitive EU value-added food-products industry (CTA web site; 
Nordbo interview; Thurston interview). This is supported by the references for the need to 
increase sugar sector competitiveness, which can be found in numerous Commission policy 
documents (see for example EUC 2003: 8-14, 39; 2004a: 4, 2005a: 3-4, 2005b: 2, and 2006: 
1-2).   
 
All of these developments paved the way for propagation of the neo-liberal paradigm and the 
proposition that perhaps agriculture could and should conform more to market conditions. 
Sugar was one of the last unreformed agricultural sectors and it became increasingly difficult 
to argue that this sector should have preferential treatment in the overall CAP reform process. 
The Commission repeatedly emphasised this in its sugar reports and bluntly stated that “if 
unchanged, the EU sugar policy will become an anomaly deviating from the fundamental 
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principles of the new Common Agricultural Policy … “ – principles, which were of course 
based on increasing market orientation (EUC 2005a: 4; see also Poul Nielson, debate notes).  
7.2.4 Which public sentiments were considered important by decision-makers? 
Moving now to the relations between public sentiments, media coverage and policy 
formulation, it is clear that from one perspective the Commission presented a more difficult 
target for direct media pressure than the national governments, since the Commissioners 
themselves do not risk being sanctioned at an upcoming election for having accumulated a 
negative image in the media. However, the Commission has in recent years shown 
considerable interest in maintaining the legitimacy of the EU in the eyes of the European 
public, particularly on trade policy (Hoven 2002: 5). The legitimacy concern has also been 
fuelled by other events in the EU, such as: Poor electoral support in referendums on EU 
treaties; negative public perceptions of EU bureaucracy; the widespread perception in the 
public and many political parties (both left and right-wing) that the EU ‘impinges’ on national 
affairs outside of its jurisdiction; plus the occasional, but highly visible scandals in the EU 
system itself179 (Wikipedia). Through various initiatives, the Commission has therefore 
sought to heighten EU legitimacy, particularly through increased consultations with a wide 
spectrum of civil society interests on development and trade in the so-called ‘Civil Society 
Dialogue’; and through a strengthening of external communication in the Directorate-General 
for General Press and Communication180 (Hoven 2002; DG Trade web site). Given these 
considerations, it can therefore be argued that the Commission would have been attentive to 
Oxfam’s attempt to ‘shame’ the EU’s sugar and agricultural policy in the eyes of the public.  
 
However, several factors moderate the assumptions on the importance of public sentiments 
for the Commission. Firstly, the medialisation of politics, which links political agendas closer 
to public agendas, is still largely a phenomenon in national states. One reason for this is that 
although a relatively well-developed transnational EU community exists at the elite level, the 
EU still lacks a transnational community at the wider public level. Also, public opinions on, 
knowledge of, and experience of ‘belonging to a European Community’ are deeply 
fragmented across and within EU member states (Ørsten 2004: 14-15; Smith 2004: 19). In 
fact, public opinion surveys show that agricultural policy is rarely a salient issue in European 
public discourse, that the European public generally is quite uninformed about how the CAP 
works, and that there is much higher support for the CAP in Southern European member 
states than in the North (Thurston 2002: 22-24). So from this front the Commission had no 
need to be overly concerned about public sentiments on the CAP or on sugar, even if it had to 
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defend the CAP and the sugar regime in its rhetoric towards the media and other audiences 
(see chapter 4). 
7.2.5 What were the strategies of key actors? 
Finally, the strategies of the participants in the political process should be touched upon 
briefly. For the sake of overview this section deals with only one major player, namely the 
Commission itself. The aforementioned impetus to secure a globally competitive EU foods-
industry prompted the Commission to work hard for retaining the proposal for steep price 
reductions and reject continued restrictions on LDC market access beyond 2009, presumably 
since it would shield the EU sugar production for too long. However, the Commission did 
want to manage access to some extent, but according to their own timetable. So there would 
be no concessions for immediate expanded LDC access (that would force immediate EU 
production quota cuts). Opening the markets completely had to wait until the EU farmers had 
had time to transition to other crops funded by the direct compensatory payments from the 
CAP and/or gradually increased their competitiveness (EUC 2006: 2)181.  
 
As regards export subsidies, although conditional, the Commission’s offer to eliminate all 
export subsidies should be seen in the context of the broader WTO negotiations. It was 
prompted mainly by three factors: 1) The WTO Doha Development Round declarations about 
the intention to phase these subsidies out completely (WTO web site); 2) The expiration of 
the WTO ‘Peace Clause’ in January 2004 which made it possible for other WTO members to 
challenge the EU legally for not abiding to the WTO rules; 3) And because of the 
aforementioned pressures to strengthen the general EU negotiating position in the WTO. 
Ultimately, given these political and economic considerations, it would be tempting to 
conclude that media or NGO criticism of export subsidies ranked very low in prompting the 
Commission’s offer. However, it should also be remembered from chapter 4 that the 
Commission’s offer presented a great public relations opportunity, and was used as such. And 
as long as the US was reluctant to reciprocate on export subsidies this apparent boost to the 
EU’s image would be ‘free of charge’. 
 
A final – and successful – strand in the Commission’s strategy (supported by the pro-reform 
member states) was to increase the proposals for an augmented compensation scheme with 
direct payments to beet farmers. This made the sugar reform package more palatable for the 
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 The special safeguard measures, mentioned in chapter 2, would still be in place, though, under any reform scenario. This 
emphasises the complexity of the Commission’s strategy, to balance many different interests, or, some might argue, simply 
that concerns about developing countries never ranked very high anyway - despite the lofty rhetoric on the benefits of the 
Everything but Arms-agreement. For on the one hand it was a stated objective to have more outside competition, so a 
constriction of the EBA was refused. On the other hand the competition would still be controlled (i.e. Brazil, for example, 
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11 countries that had been blocking the deal. The ACP was also given €40million in aid (of 
the €500 million that was requested) from the EU development budget to restructure or 
dismantle their sugar industries, with indications by Commissioner Mandelson that the 
amount may rise to €100 million per year until 2013 (CTA web site). 
 
7.3 Excursion: Progress towards other advocacy objectives 
It has been shown above how a wide range of powerful players and institutional developments 
(such as the emergence of the WTO) prompted a sugar reform, but not necessarily one in line 
with the wishes of the developing countries or Oxfam. Advocacy in this area can therefore be 
considered a very protracted process, where political results will only emerge after having 
strengthened the advocate’s position and alliances over a long time. Thus, the last two 
sections broaden the inquiry with a brief discussion of indications that Oxfam improved the 
future possibilities for itself and for developing country ‘clients’ to campaign or lobby against 
EU policy.  
7.3.1 Oxfam’s standing with the EU Commissioners  
It is Oxfam’s own experience that they have thus far managed to be taken quite seriously in 
the EU political process since establishing their presence in Brussels in 2002, which would 
appear to bode well for future advocacy on trade and agriculture. Said former Head of Office 
for Oxfam in Brussels, Jo Leadbeater: 
 
I think there is a recognition [in the EU] that NGOs generally, and Oxfam in particular, plays 
a really important role in terms of bringing well-researched data to the table to justify the 
development case … I am talking about [Trade Commissioner Pascal] Lamy being able to, for 
example, go into a Council meeting and say, ‘Look, there … are millions of people mobilised 
for trade justice in Europe, and look at today’s Financial Times and see this quote from Oxfam 
saying we need to do something.’ Not that he would do that but the idea would be that we are 
a counter, if you like, to the entrenched anti-reform position which he is also hearing and 
which all ministers are hearing 182.  
 
The ability of Oxfam to deliver extensive research and documentation for their case is also 
acknowledged by Commissioner Nielson and John Nordbo of the Danish 92-group. Nordbo 
furthermore emphasised that Oxfam’s research was indeed the “backbone” of the advocacy 
work of other European NGOs (debate notes, interview). Even so, the last sentence in the 
above quote from Jo Leadbeater is more a statement about the significance that Oxfam wants 
this research to have, rather than a confirmation of how it is actually being used by the 
Commissioners. To this picture Sonia Vila-Hopkins (also from Oxfam Brussels staff until 
2004) adds that:   
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… DG Trade has been extremely open, transparent. Whenever we contact them, we get a 
private or public response. Commissioner Lamy has been extremely engaged. DG Trade has 
civil society dialogue meetings every month, and they are under no obligation to. DG Agri is 
more of a ‘black hole’. They are sent everything, but we don’t get responses. When we do 
they tend to be aggressive, confrontational, and offer less opportunity for dialogue183.  
 
However, the ‘Civil Society Dialogue’ has been criticised for being more about improving 
public relations than about granting real influence (WWF 2002: 6ff). Also, it should be noted 
that there has been extremely few Dialogue meetings with DG Agriculture; most of them have 
been with DG Trade (DG Trade web site). This is important inasmuch as DG Trade cannot 
‘overrule’ DG Agriculture at the WTO negotiations in matters on trade that are directly 
dependent on adjustments of agricultural policy (EUC/DG Trade web site, Vila-Hopkins 
interview). 
 
The Commission also directly criticised Oxfam on some occasions during the reform process, 
such as when Franz Fischler labelled the rhetoric on export dumping as “the dumping of 
slogans”184. He was seconded at a press conference by Commission spokesman, Gregor 
Kreuzhuber, who added that “Oxfam slogans will not suffice to solve problems that are much 
more complex”185. Also, at a 2003 Oxfam reception Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy 
remarked that “maybe your job is to push us in the right direction: I accept that. But mine is 
to broker workable solutions which usually necessitate difficult compromises. The moral high 
ground is a nice place, and always a good view-point. But sometimes we have to make 
progress, too”186. A more candid exposition of this view came when former Development 
Commissioner, Poul Nielson, stated that: 
 
Oxfam does indeed have its own ’area of work’ … but I have my reservations about it. It’s too 
much like when Kelloggs introduces a new brand of cornflakes. Oxfam takes up issues that aren’t 
really very new in the EU political process and presents them as ’new’. They do impressive 
preparations in terms of policy analysis, research, etc., and they are right in many of their claims, 
but it’s a campaign-machine and you cannot dialogue with them.  … It’s a bit like a ’priesthood’. 
And I don’t like the fact that their campaigns just ’roll on through’ member states and then 
’discover problems’ that others have already been working with for a long time. It reminds me of 
all the cheap and easy rhetoric from the celebrities involved in similar campaigns187. 
 
Ultimately though, it’s hard to assess how much of a role the stated perceptions of individual 
Commissioners have played - or will play - with regard to facilitating or barring Oxfam from 
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political influence. Many of the statements about Oxfam may be attributable to a natural 
tendency for any Commissioner - as indeed any policy-maker - to position themselves as 
being ‘just realistic’ about policy options (and thereby conversely positioning Oxfam and 
other ‘moralistic NGOs’ as the opposite). It also emphasises the public image that the 
Commission presumably would like to promote, namely of an institution ‘struggling hard to 
reconcile different interests’. And this (very natural) state of affairs need not imply an 
entrenched negative perception of Oxfam. As Poul Nielson put it: “ …it’s difficult to get a 
’symbiosis’ to function, between what they do and what the Commission does. One can say, 
though, that in terms of promoting sugar reform Oxfam is a kind of ally for the Commission. 
And, at the end of the day, everybody needs friends. One can’t always be choosy.” 
 
John Nordbo, for his part, cites an anonymous source in DG Trade for saying that they are 
“on their toes” each time Oxfam publishes a new trade report - but primarily to defend the 
EU, though (Nordbo, interview). This was most evident in the Commission’s 32-page 
rejoinder to Oxfam’s first trade report. Together with Hopkins’ comments this suggests a 
division of work between DG Trade and DG Agriculture, where DG Trade is supposed to 
fend off public criticism of EU trade policy, whilst in reality having limited space for 
changing trade policies the content of which are deeply dependent on DG Agriculture and 
developments in the CAP reform process. But be that as it may, the abovementioned 
indications still point to the reality that Oxfam is indeed considered a ‘threat’ - at least in 
terms of the DG Trade putting priority on reacting to Oxfam and trying to downplay or 
reframe the organisation’s criticism. Given sustained campaigning on trade this development 
is likely to continue in the future and thus enable Oxfam to continually improve its ability to 
attract the Commission’s attention - and in turn, it could be argued, more media attention.  
However, as shown in chapter 4 there was a relatively scarce number of press releases, and 
other EU communications, reacting to Oxfam publicly (on sugar). So for as long as 
circumstances allow it, DG Trade could be assumed to continue to dialogue with Oxfam 
primarily through private channels (letters, meetings, etc.), in order to avoid ‘helping’ 
controversial issues on to the media agenda by providing Oxfam with media resonance 
(positive or negative). 
7.3.2 Supporting developing countries in the WTO dispute 
Oxfam’s own, publicly available evaluations188 say very little about the sugar part of the 
Make Trade Fair-campaign. However, one of the few paragraphs on sugar posit that:  
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7. Against the tide – Oxfam campaign and the EU sugar policy process 
 90
After the [WTO] rulings [on sugar and cotton], developing countries involved in 
making the complaints expressed gratitude for Oxfam’s public support and advocacy. 
We cannot judge to what degree the sustained campaigning on cotton and sugar 
subsidies by Oxfam and others influenced the formal deliberations within the WTO 
panel that considered the complaints. However, we can be sure that campaigning does 
help to create an atmosphere that supports developing countries to take forward 
complaints, and puts pressure on offending countries to comply with rulings189.  
 
The text is perhaps fittingly optimistic for a publicly available evaluation, where the essence 
of the argument is that Oxfam’s campaigning has ‘encouraged’ developing countries to take 
their complaints to the WTO - and then in turn via the WTO to get more influence on EU 
sugar trade policy (and on US cotton trade policy). Staying with just the sugar example, it 
should be recalled firstly that the WTO case was taken forward on 27 September 2002 by 
Brazil, Australia and Thailand, none of which are ACP or LDCs  - the groups Oxfam have 
been mostly concerned with190-191. Secondly, although Oxfam’s sugar reports were used by 
the complaining parties, particularly Brazil, in support of their case (WTO 2004192 and 2005a: 
31), these reports were just supplements to a very long list of highly technical evidence.  
 
A more plausible prediction for future dispute settlements is therefore that taking up legal 
action at the WTO, with regard to sugar or other product areas, would be first and foremost a 
function of developing country legal resources, the outcome of political deals in the regular 
WTO negotiations (that may ward off disputes at an early stage), and the perceived prospects 
of actual implementation of any given settlement (Schaffer 2003). Also, since the ‘penalty’ 
for not abiding by a WTO ruling is the permission for the plaintiff to conduct trade sanctions, 
it would still leave many of the poorer developing countries with little real benefit from 
winning a dispute, if the EU did not comply. The export incomes of the EU would not be 
reduced very much by trade sanctions from a group of African sugar LDCs, for example.  All 
of these are factors which Oxfam and other NGDOs are not able to influence very much, 
despite sustained campaigning. Lastly, as regards compliance, apparently the Commission did 
not feel under any particular pressure in the sugar case. Thus, in the fall of 2005 it requested 
from the WTO arbiter a period of over 19 months to comply, instead of the usual 6, citing a 
plethora of political, institutional, technical and economical reasons for the necessity of this 
prolongation (WTO 2005b). In this case, the arbiter granted the EU 12 months for the 
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implementation and thus postponed the EU’s withdrawal from its export dumping practices 
and the possible increase of world price levels. 
 
As regards the general WTO context, there are good indications, though, that Oxfam has 
played a significant role with regard to providing knowledge and documentation directly 
usable for developing countries in the political negotiations during the 2003 WTO Ministerial 
in Cancún, but this was primarily assistance on other trade issues than sugar (e.g. cotton) 
(Nordbo interview; Brock and McGee 2004; Yanacopulos 2005). 
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8. - Conclusion: ‘Cornflakes with sugar?’  
 
A prominent part of Oxfam International’s “Make Trade Fair” campaign was focused on the 
attempt to pressure the EU Commission to propose a sugar reform that gave improved, but 
still managed, access for some sugar exporting developing countries at a remunerative price 
level, and also to stop all forms of export dumping. Oxfam worked to gain media visibility on 
its demands for reform to put pressure on the Commission both directly, and indirectly via 
individual member states, particularly the UK. The research objective was to analyse to what 
extent Oxfam had been successful in using the media to influence the United Kingdom, as 
well as the EU Commission to this end. In doing it was also the goal to understand better the 
limitations of advocacy via the media, which has become part and parcel of the activities of 
most Northern NGDOs in the recent decade. This last chapter sums up the main conclusions 
of the particular case: 
 
8.1 Influence on UK media coverage  
There was relatively high media visibility positive to Oxfam’s messages in the Guardian, 
whereas focus had been low and coverage balanced in both the BBC News and the Daily 
Telegraph. 
 
The strong visibility in the Guardian can most likely be attributed to the significance this type 
of story had for the outlet. For the BBC visibility was low because development stories are 
generally regarded as stories that attracted low ratings, because of lack of airtime for complex 
issues and because the norm of the news day is biased away from long policy processes. It 
was not possible to make any definitive conclusions about the Telegraph’s priorities due to 
lack of interviewees.  
 
In all three cases, it played little or no role in fomenting negative coverage that there were 
three potential constraints on Oxfam’s campaign message: 1) That sugar and poverty 
reduction are only tentatively linked; 2) That there would be no reform without adjustment 
costs for the ACP developing countries; 3) and that elimination of export subsidies may not 
affect world prices in the long-term. It appeared that the media in general, even the Telegraph, 
disregarded such tensions and focused more on ‘telling a good story’.  
 
Also the demands of the LDCs in 2004 for lower price reductions presented Oxfam with 
tactical problems with regard to arguing their case in the media and vis-à-vis the government, 
as previous Oxfam reports had been quite critical of EU ‘price fixing’.  
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8.2 UK government rhetoric on sugar reform and the media 
The UK government’s preferences remained firm throughout the period, where substantial 
price reductions and opening markets via the EBA were seen as important, contrary to 
Oxfam’s demands. In line with Oxfam’s demands, however, was the goal to stop export 
dumping - but this was a political reality even before the campaign began.  
 
The effects of Oxfam’s advocacy via the media on the rhetoric of the UK government were 
therefore limited to resonance that was consonant on the issue of export subsidies and 
dissonant on prices and access. Even so the campaign may have contributed to keeping the 
UK government to its stance on subsidies, and also on securing restructuring aid for the ACP. 
The UK government sometimes did reproduce Oxfam’s frames on reform, but in a way so as 
effectively divert attention from differences between the government and Oxfam on prices 
and access. In general, though, informants agreed that there had not been enough media 
visibility to impact on the UK’s position on reform where it diverted from Oxfam’s.  
 
Furthermore, all of the involved departments of the UK government firmly based their 
political preferences on a more liberal paradigm to agricultural reform, something which 
stemmed in part from the ideological basis of the ruling Labour-party, that British sugar was 
considered fairly competitive even under price reductions, and because of less tight relations 
with the farm sector (which came to share some reform goals with developing countries on 
prices). 
 
Lastly, government unity and certainty on the sugar issue and their consistent use of ‘fair 
trade’ rhetoric never presented a clear or particularly attractive conflict-scenario for the 
media, unless they already were biased towards development issues.  
  
8.3 The difficulties of influencing the EU reform process  
The EU Commission ended up agreeing on a legislative proposal for reform that also saw 
preference for heavy price reductions (39%), upholding free market access for the LDCs in 
2009 and a conditional promise on eliminating export subsidies.  
 
Consonance with Oxfam in a wide range of Commission documents were close to non-
existent. Dissonance were seen somewhat more often, noticeably through the argument that 
the EBA on the one hand was ‘inevitable’ but also the refusal to renegotiate it, much as was 
the case in the UK.  
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The Commission was attentive not to fuel the already-existing sceptical public sentiment 
towards the legitimacy of the EU institutions, but to the extent that this was a genuine 
concern, the strategy became to reframe the criticism by trying to relegate blame for 
depressed world prices on other big producers, such as Brazil.  
 
The ACP and the LDCs ended up allying themselves with the sugar farmers and industries in 
Europe, alongside several Eastern and Southern European states, to battle against steep price 
reductions, something which caused tension in the Oxfam campaign that had to some extent 
‘villainised’ the EU sugar sector. So paradoxically enough the reform-minded Commission 
faced opposition from both decade-long entrenched farmer interests and development 
countries and NGOs.  
 
Overall, the sugar regime was one of the last ‘casualties’ of a CAP reform process dating back 
to the early 1980s. Just as the CAP subsidy system for a long time upheld itself by 
encouraging rent-seeking, inefficient production and asymmetrical distribution of costs, so did 
it also create ‘crises by design’, as the strain it put on the EU budget was increased. These 
budget problems coincided with increasing EU commitments in the WTO to reduce tariffs 
and export subsidies. These pressures also combined with the need to improve the negotiating 
position for non-agricultural interests in the WTO. The result was that the paradigm of 
agricultural exceptionalism gave way for a more liberal, but still market-managed, approach 
to sugar.  
 
As regards the only ‘victory’ for Oxfam, the promise to phase out export subsidies, the 
Commission’s offer was mainly prompted by previous WTO commitments, and the expiration 
of the WTO peace clause on agricultural disputes and not by campaigning or the media. As 
long as the US was reluctant to reciprocate it also gave the EU an opportunity to boost its 
public relations and negotiation position without really making any real and immediate 
concessions on agriculture. 
 
Furthermore, the Commission was encouraged to go forth with its sugar reform proposal 
because of support from major member states, and because an augmented compensation 
scheme made the heavy price cuts more ‘digestible’ for the countries that had been opposing 
the deal. The ACP was also given a token aid package from the EU development budget to 
restructure or dismantle their sugar industries.  
 
Lastly, Oxfam’s claims that its campaigning had somehow facilitated the WTO trade disputes 
for developing countries appear dubious, given the number of other factors that decide 
8. Conclusion: Cornflakes with sugar 
 95
whether or not developing countries engage in disputes. Even so, there are good indications 
that Oxfam’s campaign have improved the organisation’s position as a notable civil society 
actor that especially DG Trade is becoming increasingly wary of.  
 
In general the attribution problem was pervasive and it appears not to be possible to 
definitively rank the importance of the different drivers that lead to change, or even to 
relatively ‘superficial effects’ such as resonance. Also, Oxfam’s media work cannot be seen in 
isolation from other parties’ advocacy on sugar that may have resonated in the media. 
 
In conclusion, it must be said that trade and development have indeed long been “dry issues” 
outside of the political arena, as Larry Elliot from the Guardian put it. Oxfam has in its 
communication worked hard to reframe developing countries as people, and trade and 
agriculture politics as a question of morals, in order to almost literally ‘put a human face’ on 
international trade issues; although Oxfam and its allies are still being resisted by the counter-
framing manoeuvres of the political establishment.  
 
Perhaps Poul Nielson had a point about Oxfam’s campaign goals not being “very new” in the 
internal EU debate, but their merit may lie in a wholly different category, by making them 
‘new’ and more ‘digestible’ to the media and to the general public for the first time. To this it 
should be added that Oxfam’s research also has played a prominent role in inspiring and 
supporting the campaign work of other European NGDOs, as Nordbo mentioned.  
 
So maybe the Make Trade Fair campaign was “a new brand of cornflakes” - but this time it 
came with added sugar. 
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